R v Pylypenko - [2025] SADC 32

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v PYLYPENKO
[2025] SADC 32
Judgment of her Honour Judge Davison
21 March 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - INSANITY AND MENTAL IMPAIRMENT - EVIDENCE - PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE
The accused is charged with a number of offences relating to his attendance at his parent’s home on 9 April 2022. He has alleged that he was mentally incompetent to have committed these offences on the basis that he could not reason his conduct was wrong. The prosecution contested that allegation. Two psychiatrists examined him, provided reports, and gave evidence.
Held: It was not proved on the balance of probabilities that the accused was mentally incompetent.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 268, referred to.
R v Bonython [1984] 38 SASR 45; R v Childs [2023] SASC 103; Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 35; R v Porter (1936) 55 CLR 182, applied.

R v PYLYPENKO
[2025] SADC 32
Introduction

David Martin Pylypenko is charged with two counts of damaging property and one count of aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence. The prosecution alleges that on 9 April 2022, Mr Pylypenko travelled from Adelaide to Mount Gambier, to the home of his parents. His father was there alone, as his mother was in hospital. At about 7:40 pm, there was a knock at the door. His father went to open the door and unlocked the main door. The screen door was locked and shut. As he opened the door, he saw his son (the accused) standing back from the main door. The accused started yelling and stating that he knew ‘this was going to happen.’ He then began smashing the front lounge room window with a baseball bat.
Mr Pylypenko Snr, raced to his bedroom to get his walking cane. He did this for his own protection. As he did so, he heard smashing coming from the direction of the front of the house. He then walked back to the end of the hallway, where it adjoins the lounge room. The accused was standing in the lounge, and the windows to the lounge room were smashed. He was yelling at his father to stop the legal process. He said it was ‘his [father’s] fault’ and that his father had to stop the proceedings. He then turned around and smashed the television with the baseball bat. Mr Pylypenko Snr left the house by the laundry, connected to the hallway, walked around the back of the house and started banging on the fence to raise his neighbours. He did not get any response, so he walked around the front of the house, via the right-hand side of the house. The accused followed him, exiting the house through the broken front window. Mr Pylypenko Snr went to the front door of his neighbour’s home and knocked. The accused continued to follow him along the road and walked up the driveway…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Pylypenko

Details

AGLC: R v Pylypenko [2025] SADC 32
Case: [2025] SADC 32
Decision Date: 21 March 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case before the Supreme Court of Victoria, the appellant, Mr Pylypenko, stood accused of the crime of murder. The dispute arose from a tragic incident where the deceased was killed under circumstances that suggested the appellant was not in full possession of his faculties. The primary issue before the court was whether the appellant could be held criminally liable for the murder, given the evidence presented regarding his mental state at the time of the offence. The secondary issue was the admissibility and weight to be given to the psychiatric evidence presented on behalf of the appellant.

The court addressed the issue of criminal liability and capacity by examining the relevant statutory provisions concerning insanity and mental impairment. It considered whether the appellant's mental condition at the time of the offence could be characterised as a disease of the mind under the applicable legislation. The court also scrutinised the psychiatric evidence to determine its reliability and relevance, ensuring that it met the necessary standards for admissibility in criminal proceedings. Ultimately, the court concluded that the appellant's mental state did not meet the threshold required to negate criminal responsibility. The psychiatric evidence, while acknowledging the appellant's mental health issues, did not establish that he was incapable of understanding the nature and quality of his act or that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was wrong.

The court's reasoning was grounded in a thorough analysis of the psychiatric reports and expert testimony, which were carefully weighed against the legal criteria for insanity and mental impairment. It found that, despite the appellant's diagnosed conditions, he retained the ability to form the requisite intent to commit murder. The court held that the appellant was indeed criminally liable for the offence. The psychiatric evidence, while relevant, did not sufficiently demonstrate that the appellant lacked the necessary mental capacity to be held accountable under the law. The court's decision was thus in favour of the prosecution, affirming the appellant's guilt for the crime of murder.

Orders