R v Piccles

Case [2020] QCA 84


[2020] QCA 84

COURT OF APPEAL

SOFRONOFF P
BODDICE J
DAVIS J

CA No 334 of 2019
SC No 56 of 2019

THE QUEEN

v

PICCLES, Lauren Elizabeth  Applicant

BRISBANE

MONDAY, 27 APRIL 2020

JUDGMENT

DAVIS J:  The applicant seeks leave to appeal against a sentence imposed upon her by Justice Crow sitting in Mackay on 2 December 2019 upon her plea of guilty to one count of trafficking in the dangerous drug methylamphetamine and one count of being in possession of the dangerous drug methylamphetamine with a circumstance of aggravation, namely, that the quantity of the dangerous drug exceeded two grams.

On the trafficking count, the applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of four years.  As the possession of methylamphetamine alleged in the other count on the indictment was one of the acts said to constitute the trafficking, his Honour convicted the applicant on the possession count and took no further action.  That was, with respect, clearly the correct approach.

At the time of the commission of the two offences, the applicant was on parole for earlier offences, including one of trafficking in methylamphetamine. Section 156A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 dictated that the learned primary Judge was obliged to order that the sentence imposed be served cumulatively upon the earlier sentences for which she was on parole. Section 160B required that his Honour set a new date for eligibility for parole. His Honour ordered that the sentence be served cumulatively on the other sentences and set a parole eligibility date of 24 April 2021, being a date approximately one year beyond the full-time expiry date of the earlier sentences.

No complaint is made about the sentence of four years’ imprisonment imposed by his Honour.  That sentence is supported by authorities such as R v Saggers [2016] QCA 344, R v Jobsz [2013] QCA 5, R v Bagnall [2005] QCA 20 and R v Spark [2018] QCA 231, all of which were cited to his Honour. The narrow point on the application for leave to appeal is that the fixing of a date for eligibility for parole at a point one year after the full-time expiry of the earlier sentences renders the sentence imposed by his Honour manifestly excessive. To understand that submission, it is necessary to look at the applicant’s criminal history.

The applicant’s first conviction was in the Mackay Magistrates Court on 17 January 2002, a few months before her 18th birthday.  She was convicted of various counts of assault.  Between then and 7 December 2005, the applicant was convicted on numerous occasions in the Mackay Magistrates Court for offences against the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 and for offences of dishonesty.

In 2006 and 2007, the applicant trafficked in methylamphetamine.  She was arrested but absconded while on bail.  After being at large for some time, she surrendered to police and was sentenced on 3 May 2011 in this Court to an effective term of imprisonment of five years.  The…

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R v Piccles [2020] QCA 84
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[2020] QCA 84
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Piccles involved the applicant, Lauren Elizabeth Piccles, who sought leave to appeal against a sentence imposed by Justice Crow in Mackay. Piccles was found guilty of trafficking in methylamphetamine and possession of the drug with an aggravating circumstance. She was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, which was to be served cumulatively on her earlier sentences while she was on parole. The only issue in the appeal was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. The appeal was dismissed, and the sentence was upheld as not manifestly excessive.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the sentence imposed by the primary judge was manifestly excessive. The applicant argued that the setting of a parole eligibility date one year after the full-time expiry of earlier sentences rendered the sentence imposed by the primary judge manifestly excessive. The Court of Appeal considered whether the sentence should be assessed as if it, and the balance to be served on earlier sentences, were together one sentence. The Court concluded that it was inappropriate to assess the severity of the sentence in this manner.

The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge was clearly aware of the principles applicable to sentencing in this context and that the only error alleged was manifest excessiveness, not a misapplication of principle. The Court held that when an offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, they are liable to serve the entirety of the term. The proportion of the sentence served in prison or in the community depends on factors such as the date when the prisoner becomes eligible for parole, whether the prisoner secures a grant of parole, and whether the prisoner complies with the terms of parole. The Court held that the sentence imposed by the primary judge was not manifestly excessive and dismissed the application.

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