SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Peirano [2020] QCA 100
PARTIES:
R
v
PEIRANO, Zachary Scott
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 278 of 2019
SC No 47 of 2019DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Mackay – Date of Sentence: 9 October 2019 (Crow J)
DELIVERED ON:
12 May 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
7 April 2020
JUDGES:
Sofronoff P and Boddice and Williams JJ
ORDER:
Leave to appeal against sentence be refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a dangerous drug in excess of two grams and three summary charges, being one of contravening an order about information necessary to access information stored electronically, and two breach of bail conditions – where the applicant was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for the count of possessing a dangerous drug in excess of two grams – where a parole eligibility date was fixed after serving 20 months – where the applicant was not further punished in respect of each of the summary charges – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal against sentence on the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive – where the applicant transported methylamphetamine from Brisbane to Mackay, knowing the drugs were intended for a commercial purpose, at the request of his brother-in-law – where the applicant was in possession of the drugs when a search warrant was executed by Police – where the applicant had no criminal history – where the applicant had been treated for depression and anxiety for some years – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive
Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2, cited
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25, cited
R v Dean[1999] QCA 378, cited
R v Duong (2015) 255 A Crim R 57; [2015] QCA 170, cited
R v Dwyer [2008] QCA 117, cited
R v Gaerlan [2014] QCA 145, cited
R v Hieu Van Huynh [2003] QCA 371, cited
R v Truong [1997] QCA 49, citedCOUNSEL:
A J Kimmins for the applicant
T L Corsbie for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Gatenby Criminal Lawyers for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
SOFRONOFF P: I agree with Boddice J.
BODDICE J: On 9 October 2019, the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a dangerous drug in excess of two grams and three summary charges, being one of contravening an order and two of breach of bail conditions.
The applicant was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for the count of possessing a dangerous drug in excess of two grams. A parole eligibility date was fixed at 7 June 2021. The applicant was convicted and not further punished in respect of each of the summary charges.
The applicant seeks leave to appeal…
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- AGLC
- R v Peirano [2020] QCA 100
- Case
- [2020] QCA 100
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the applicant's involvement in the distribution of a large scale drug into the Mackay community, which involved serious criminality. The Crown submitted that the applicant's criminality warranted imprisonment in the range of eight to nine years, with parole eligibility set at the one third mark. The court compared the applicant's sentence with that of another individual, Walker, who was sentenced to four and a half years' imprisonment for trafficking in methylamphetamine. The court noted that Walker's sentence would have been moderated to allow for the fact that he was to receive a cumulative period of imprisonment for other offending. The court concluded that the sentence imposed on the applicant represented a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion, and that it was neither unreasonable nor plainly unjust. The court found that there was no misapplication of sentencing principles and no breach of the parity principle. Therefore, the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive.
The court refused the applicant leave to appeal against the sentence. The court found that the sentence imposed was within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion in accordance with comparable authority, and that there was no manifest excess. The court agreed with the reasons and order proposed by another judge, and ordered that leave to appeal against sentence be refused. The court emphasised that there is no single correct sentence to be found in the exercise of a sentencing discretion, and that an approach which seeks to grade the criminality involved by a close comparison of aggravating and mitigating factors is to be deprecated. The court concluded that the applicant's sentence was appropriate in light of the seriousness of the offence and the circumstances of the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
Leave to appeal against sentence be refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent further submits that the sentence did not breach the principle of parity. Whilst Walker was also sentenced for an offence of trafficking in methylamphetamine, his trafficking was based on assisting King by booking motels, providing accommodation and, on occasions, by supplying drugs. Further, Walker was only 23 years of age at the time of the offending, with a criminal history consistent with his drug addiction. Walker’s head sentence of four and a half years’ imprisonment must also be viewed in the context of Walker having been sentenced to a total period of five and a half years’ imprisonment, as a 12 month cumulative term of imprisonment was imposed for an offence of escaping lawful custody. The imposition of a cumulative period of imprisonment would have involved some moderation of the sentence otherwise to be imposed on the trafficking count.Consideration In order to succeed on a ground of manifest excess, absent specific error, it is necessary for an applicant to establish that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust, or that the sentence imposed was so different from comparable authorities that it warranted a conclusion that the imposition of the sentence involved a misapplication of sentencing principles. In undertaking an assessment of whether manifest excess is established, it is necessary for a court, on appeal, to recognise that there is no single correct sentence to be found in the exercise of a sentencing discretion.[2] As was observed in R v Dwyer[3]:“An approach which seeks to grade the criminality involved in such cases by a close comparison of aggravating and mitigating factors, as if there is only one correct sentence, is to be deprecated as involving the illusion of a degree of precision which is both unattainable, and, in truth, alien to the sentencing process …”[2]Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at 371 [27]; Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58.[3][2008] QCA 117 at [37]. In the present case, whilst the applicant’s offending involved one occasion of possession of the dangerous drug methylamphetamine, in circumstances where he had transported that drug, at the request of his brother-in-law, as part of his brother-in-law’s drug trafficking operation, his offending was properly described as serious. The applicant had transported over 180 grams of pure methylamphetamine from Brisbane to Mackay, knowing it was to be used for a commercial purpose. Although the applicant had many mitigating features in his favour, including his cooperation with the administration of justice by his pleas of guilty; his lack of prior criminal history; his expressed remorse; his pre-existing medical conditions; and his circumstances of financial distress when he committed the offence, a consideration of comparable authorities supports a conclusion that a sentence of six years’ imprisonment for such serious drug offending was within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion in accordance with comparable authority.