SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v PAX [2000] QCA 136 PARTIES: R
v
PAX
(appellant)FILE NO/S: CA No 396 of 1999
DC No 1618 of 1999DIVISION: Court of Appeal PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at BrisbaneDELIVERED ON: 18 April 2000 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 13 April 2000 JUDGES: de Jersey CJ, Davies JA, Helman J
Judgment of the CourtORDER: Appeal against conviction on count 1 dismissed.
Appeals against convictions on counts 2 and 3 allowed.
Convictions and sentences on counts 2 and 3 set aside.
Orders for new trials upon the charges in those counts.
Notices to Crown witnesses extended accordingly.CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – appellant convicted on three counts of having raped his step-daughter – whether trial judge erroneously failed to direct the jury in relation to s 24 Criminal Code – whether appellant's persistent claims of consent inconsistent with the possibility of mistaken belief to this end – whether s 24 could have proper operation in light of the complainant's evidence of fear engendered in her by the appellant's history of violence
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – whether trial judge erred in directing the jury that actual lack of consent need not have been communicated to the accused – whether communication necessary
Criminal Code s 24, s 347
R v IA Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641, applied
R v P (1998) 104 A Crim R 220, referred toCOUNSEL: S Hamlyn-Harris for the appellant
N Weston for the respondentSOLICITORS: Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
THE COURT: The appellant was convicted in the District Court on three counts of having raped his stepdaughter. The first offence occurred between April and July 1983 when the complainant was about 12 ½ years old. The second occurred in December 1988 when she was 18. The third occurred in March or April 1989 also when she was 18.
With respect to the first offence, the complainant gave evidence that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her notwithstanding her telling him to “stop”, and saying “don’t do that”; he said: “If you have sex with me I will stop touching you”, to which she responded, “No”. The appellant gave evidence at the trial denying that this offence occurred. The jury were properly instructed. Mr Hamlyn Harris, who appeared for the appellant, rightly conceded that there was no tenable ground of appeal in respect of the conviction on the first count. The appeal against that conviction should be dismissed.
The challenge to the convictions on the second and third counts concerns whether the learned trial judge erred in not directing the jury in relation to s 24 of the Criminal Code, and in directing…
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- AGLC
- R v Pax [2000] QCA 136
- Case
- [2000] QCA 136
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues at the heart of this appeal revolve around the interpretation and application of section 24 of the Criminal Code. The appellant contended that the trial judge did not sufficiently instruct the jury on how to approach the concept of mistaken belief in consent, which could have been a mitigating factor given the complainant's fear and the appellant's history of violence. Additionally, the appellant argued that the trial judge incorrectly informed the jury that actual lack of consent need not have been communicated to the accused, questioning the necessity of such communication in the context of the offence. The court was tasked with examining these points to determine whether the trial judge's instructions were inadequate and whether such inadequacies warranted a new trial.
In addressing the appellant's arguments, the court found that the trial judge did indeed fail to adequately direct the jury regarding the possibility of mistaken belief in consent, particularly in light of the evidence presented. The court determined that the trial judge's omission to instruct the jury on this point was a significant error, as it could have influenced the jury's assessment of the appellant's claims of consent. Furthermore, the court held that the trial judge's direction that actual lack of consent need not have been communicated to the accused was incorrect, and this misdirection was likely to have affected the jury's verdict. As a result, the appeals against the convictions on counts 2 and 3 were allowed, and new trials were ordered for those counts.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal against the conviction on count 1 was dismissed, while the appeals against the convictions on counts 2 and 3 were allowed. The convictions and sentences on counts 2 and 3 were set aside, and new trials were ordered on those charges. The notices to Crown witnesses were extended to accommodate the new trials.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal against conviction on count 1 dismissed.
Appeals against convictions on counts 2 and 3 allowed.
Convictions and sentences on counts 2 and 3 set aside.
Orders for new trials upon the charges in those counts.
Notices to Crown witnesses extended accordingly.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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