R v Owens

Case [2025] SASCA 96


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Criminal)

R v OWENS

[2025] SASCA 96

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice David and the Honourable Justice Stanley)

25 August 2025

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OR FINDING OF JUDGE

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRUG OFFENCES - DEALING AND DISTRIBUTION OF DRUGS - TRAFFICKING OR SALE AND SUPPLY

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE

This is an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) (‘the Director’) for permission to appeal against an interlocutory order made by a Judge of the District Court excluding evidence obtained during a traffic stop. The application is made pursuant to s 157(1)(e) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) (‘the CPA’).

The respondent was charged with two counts of trafficking in a controlled drug, contrary to s 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) (‘the CSA’). After stopping the respondent’s vehicle and administering an alcotest, police officers searched the vehicle and seized methylamphetamine (the subject of Count 1) and 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA) (the subject of Count 2).

On 4 October 2024, the respondent filed an interlocutory application, alleging the traffic stop was unlawful and seeking exclusion of all evidence seized by the police officers. During the voir dire hearing, the prosecution called the two police officers involved in the traffic stop. The respondent alleged that the police officers used the powers under ss 47E(2) and 40H of the Road Traffic Act1961 (SA) (‘the RTA’) as a pretext to investigate allegations of unlawful drug activity contained in intelligence briefings.

On 15 April 2025, the Judge ordered that the evidence be excluded in the exercise of the public policy discretion. The Judge held that the sole purpose of the police officers’ decision to stop the respondent’s vehicle was for the ‘ulterior purpose’ of investigating unlawful activity described in intelligence briefings rather than to administer an alcotest. The Judge held the traffic stop was unlawful.

The Director sought permission to appeal against the interlocutory order on the following grounds:

1. The Judge erred in her construction of the powers contained in ss 47E(2) and 40H of the RTA and made erroneous factual findings in determining that the stopping of the respondent’s vehicle was unlawful.

2.   Further, or in the alternative, the Judge erred in the exercise of her discretion to exclude the evidence.

Held, per the Court, granting permission to appeal and allowing the appeal:

1. The factual finding by the Judge that the police stopped the vehicle for the sole purpose of investigating the unlawful activity described in the intelligence briefings was erroneous. The police officers lawfully exercised their power under s 47E of the RTA to stop the vehicle. They also had the power to do so under ss 40H of the RTA and s 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA).

2.   The Judge’s order excluding the evidence is set aside.

3.…

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AGLC
R v Owens [2025] SASCA 96
Case
[2025] SASCA 96
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions sought leave to appeal against an order made by a Judge of the District Court of South Australia, which excluded certain evidence. The appeal concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained by police during an interaction with the respondent, Mr Owens, which led to charges of drug trafficking.

The central legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was whether the District Court Judge erred in exercising their discretion to exclude the evidence. This involved determining whether the police officers had lawful grounds to stop and detain Mr Owens, and consequently, whether the subsequent search and seizure of evidence were lawful. The Court was required to consider the application of relevant legislation, including provisions relating to road traffic offences and police powers.

The Full Court reasoned that the police officers possessed sufficient grounds to stop the vehicle driven by Mr Owens. They were aware that the vehicle had been associated with drug dealing and the respondent, and that the respondent was known to be driving without a valid licence. While the initial reason for observing the vehicle was to apprehend Mr Owens for driving disqualified, the subsequent observation of the vehicle driving partly on the wrong side of the road provided an additional, independent justification for stopping the vehicle under road traffic legislation. The Court found that the police officers' belief that they had grounds to conduct an alcotest, even if based on a misunderstanding of the relevant section of the Road Traffic Act, did not render the stop unlawful. The subsequent actions of the police, including the alcotest and the interview, were therefore considered to be lawful consequences of the initial lawful stop.

The Full Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the District Court Judge that excluded the evidence. The Court ordered that the evidence be admitted.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 5 June 2025, this Court granted the Director permission to appeal and allowed the appeal. The Court ordered that the Judge’s order excluding the evidence be set aside. The Rule 39 application dated 4 October 2024 was dismissed. The reasons for those orders follow.The evidence On 14 June 2023 at about 2:00pm, police officers Oakes and Knott were stationed at the Mount Barker Police Station. They were on uniform mobile patrol performing general duties together. Oakes was driving a marked police vehicle. They drove past an address on Faehrmann Avenue which was known to police as a ‘local drug address’. There, they observed a white Hyundai Getz in the driveway. Oakes parked the police vehicle in a position near the premises to observe the white Hyundai Getz. He said that the vehicle had previously been seen at the respondent’s home address, and he was aware the respondent did not have a valid driver’s licence. Oakes was also aware of information from an intelligence briefing (received about a week earlier) that the respondent was ‘selling drugs and driving around in a little white Hyundai Getz.’ This provided a further link between the respondent and the white Hyundai Getz. Oakes was asked why he stopped to observe the Hyundai Getz. He responded: ‘well just to see if, yeah, [the respondent] was driving it because we thought, yeah that would be - if we could get it and was driving then, yeah, we would just – getting a drive disqualified arrest probably wouldn’t take too long.’ At approximately 2:30pm, both police officers observed the Hyundai Getz reverse out of the driveway but neither saw who was driving the vehicle. Oakes said the Hyundai Getz drove a short distance, partly on the wrong side of the road, before turning right onto Victoria Road. In cross-examination, Oakes agreed that he decided to stop the Hyundai Getz before seeing this aberrant driving. The police officers continued to follow the vehicle. A short time later, Oakes activated the emergency lights. The vehicle did not stop immediately; however, it slowed down. Oakes and Knott both observed the driver remove a strap from his right shoulder before placing something over the passenger’s front side area or near the centre console. They also observed there to be only one person (the driver) in the vehicle. The vehicle did not stop but was not moving quickly. The driver of the vehicle did not appear to be trying to evade police. The vehicle turned right onto Hughes Street where it finally stopped. Oakes stated that the purpose for stopping the vehicle was to ‘identify the driver and conduct an alcotest.’ He said his power to do so was ‘I think the alcotest is the Road Traffic Act, I think s 47 something like that.’ He said he had no specific reason to conduct an alcotest and more specifically, ‘I didn’t have any suspicion that he was drink driving or anything.’ Before exiting the vehicle, Oakes activated his body-worn camera,[5] and retrieved the alcotest and a straw (used to administer an alcotest). He said a male exited the Hyundai Getz whom he immediately recognised as the respondent. Both Oakes and Knott said they have had dealings with the respondent in the past. The respondent approached the police and told them ‘…he did not have a licence or something along those lines.’ Oakes then directed the respondent to undertake an alcotest (which recorded a zero result). He also conducted a record of interview with the respondent during which the respondent was questioned about his driver’s licence. [5] Exhibit VDP2.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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