R v OAE - [2025] QCA 129

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v OAE [2025] QCA 129

PARTIES:

R
v
OAE
(applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 183 of 2024
DC No 1439 of 2024

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Sentence Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 6 August 2024 (Rosengren DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

22 July 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 July 2025

JUDGES:

Mullins P, Bradley JA and Morrison AJA

ORDER:

The application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant was sentenced after pleading guilty to one count of torture (domestic violence offence) and one count of contravention of a domestic violence order, with a circumstance of aggravation – where a head sentence of five and a-half years with no parole eligibility date was imposed – where the applicant submits that an earlier release or eligibility date should have been set – where the applicant submits that the sentencing judge should have afforded more weight to the presence of some mitigating factors – where the applicant submits that the sentencing judge should have afforded more weight to the complainant’s views – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive

Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1979] HCA 63, cited
R v Abdullah[2023] QCA 189, cited
R v Ellis[2018] QCA 70, considered
R v Galleghan[2017] QCA 186, considered
R v GBI[2022] QCA 28, considered

COUNSEL:

J K Kennedy for the applicant (pro bono)
D Kovac for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service for the applicant (pro bono)
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

MULLINS P: I agree with Morrison AJA.
BRADLEY JA: I agree with Morrison AJA.
MORRISON AJA: On 6 August 2024, the applicant was sentenced, after pleading guilty to two counts, namely:
(a)Count 1 – Torture (Domestic Violence Offence); and
(b)Count 2 – Contravention of a domestic violence order, with a circumstance of aggravation.
Both counts arose out of the one set of circumstances which occurred on 2 November 2023. Though I will deal with those circumstances in greater detail later in these reasons, they can be summarised in this way:
(a)the applicant and the complainant were living together having been in a relationship for about two years; the relationship began to deteriorate due to their use of cannabis and amphetamines;
(b)because of physical disputes between them, a temporary protection order was put in place, in favour of the complainant;
(c)on 2 November 2023, whilst affected by amphetamines, the applicant commenced a series of assaults on the complainant which included: (i) whipping or hitting her about her body using items such as a phone charger, electric cord, dog leash, a whipper snipper and a broom handle; (ii) strangling her with a dog leash; (iii) stomping on her head, punching and hitting her to the face; (iv)…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v OAE

Details

AGLC: R v OAE [2025] QCA 129
Case: [2025] QCA 129
Decision Date: 22 July 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v OAE involved the applicant appealing against their sentence after pleading guilty to charges of torture and contravention of a domestic violence order. The applicant submitted that the sentence of five and a-half years with no parole eligibility was manifestly excessive, should have allowed for an earlier release or eligibility date, and should have afforded more weight to mitigating factors and the complainant’s views. The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive or inadequate, which involved assessing whether there was a misapplication of principle or the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust.

The Court of Appeal considered the principles for assessing whether a sentence was manifestly excessive, noting that it was necessary to demonstrate a misapplication of principle or that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust. The Court found that the applicant could not meet this test. The Court acknowledged that comparable cases did not involve the same set of facts and influencing aspects as the present case, and that the totality of the offending and the imposition of an SVO declaration in other cases rendered them of little assistance. The Court found that the sentence imposed in this case was within the range of what the applicant had contended at sentencing and did not result in a conclusion that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal refused the application for leave to appeal against sentence, finding that the applicant could not demonstrate that the sentence was manifestly excessive or inadequate. This decision affirms the importance of considering the totality of the offending and the imposition of an SVO declaration when assessing the severity of a sentence, and the high threshold for successfully appealing against a sentence on the ground that it is manifestly excessive.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The other submission was that the complainant’s views were relevant and should have been afforded more weight in the exercise of the court’s discretion.Consideration The principles applicable where the ground of appeal against sentence is that it is manifestly excessive, are well established. As this court observed in R v Abdullah:[4]“… to succeed on an application on this ground it is not enough to establish that the sentence imposed was different, or even markedly different, from sentences imposed in other matters. It is necessary to demonstrate that the difference is such that there must have been a misapplication of principle, or that the sentence is ‘unreasonable of plainly unjust’.”[4][2023] QCA 189 at [28]. Citations omitted. In my respectful view, the applicant cannot meet the test of showing manifest excess in this case. First, reference to Ellis, GBI and Galleghan does not compel the conclusion that there was any misapplication of principle or that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust. True, it is, that they do not involve a mental health condition or support for the victim, as is the case here, but as is often the case, the so-called comparable cases come with their own set of facts and influencing aspects. Thus, in Ellis the torture count involved a prolonged series of attacks which, itself, attracted a sentence of six and a-half years, and a declaration that it was a serious violent offence. However, count 3 in that case (malicious act with intent) involved the offender using a heated trowel to inflict more than 15 burns to the complainant’s upper thigh and left leg, resulting in partial thickness burns, removal of a superficial skin layer and disfigurement. That offence by itself attracted a sentence of six years’ imprisonment. However, the question of totality of the offending was taken into account in imposing the sentence on the torture count. That and the fact that an SVO declaration was imposed, render Ellis of little assistance in this case. GBI involved torture which attracted a six and a-half year sentence. The violence was triggered by the offender’s perception that the complainant had been engaging in sex with the people downstairs where they lived. The violence included pushing her backwards onto the bed, punching her in the head, berating her and poking her in the shoulder with a pair of scissors. The violence was relentless and constant. A second count (assault occasioning bodily harm) involved the offender punching the complainant in the face without warning, resulting in her being taken to hospital by ambulance. Significant features were the sheer volume and frequency of the assaults, the controlling and denigrating behaviour of the offender, the fact that he derived pleasure from the attack and the long-lasting impact on the victim. The total sentence reflected the overall criminality on both counts, with the head sentence being within the range of what the applicant had contended at sentencing. That is sufficient to demonstrate that GBI does not result in a conclusion that the sentence here was manifestly excessive.

CITATION:	R v OAE [2025] QCA 129
PARTIES:	R v OAE (applicant)
FILE NO/S:	CA No 183 of 2024 DC No 1439 of 2024
DIVISION:	Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:	Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:	District Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 6 August 2024 (Rosengren DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:	22 July 2025
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:	16 July 2025
JUDGES:	Mullins P, Bradley JA and Morrison AJA
ORDER:	The application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.
CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant was sentenced after pleading guilty to one count of torture (domestic violence offence) and one count of contravention of a domestic violence order, with a circumstance of aggravation – where a head sentence of five and a-half years with no parole eligibility date was imposed – where the applicant submits that an earlier release or eligibility date should have been set – where the applicant submits that the sentencing judge should have afforded more weight to the presence of some mitigating factors – where the applicant submits that the sentencing judge should have afforded more weight to the complainant’s views – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1979] HCA 63, cited R v Abdullah[2023] QCA 189, cited R v Ellis[2018] QCA 70, considered R v Galleghan[2017] QCA 186, considered R v GBI[2022] QCA 28, considered
COUNSEL:	J K Kennedy for the applicant (pro bono) D Kovac for the respondent
SOLICITORS:	Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service for the applicant (pro bono) Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent