[1996] QCA 328
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 266 of 1995
Brisbane
BeforeMacrossan CJ
Fitzgerald P
Davies JA
[W v. M]
BETWEEN:
W
(Applicant) Appellant
AND:
M
(Defendant) Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE CHIEF JUSTICE
Judgment delivered 06/09/1996.
Compensation for injury suffered by the appellant was assessed by the judge below at $20,000. The assessment was made on the basis that the statutory maximum referred to in s.663AA(1) of the Criminal Code was applicable to her injury. That provision was part of a statutory scheme of compensation for criminal injury contained in chapter 65A of the Code in force at times relevant for the appellant's claim. New provisions have been introduced (see CriminalOffence Victims Act 1995 but transitional provisions (see s.46) have preserved the application in the appellant's case of the Code.
At the proceedings below there was considerable evidence that the appellant had suffered a severe psychiatric illness as a result of her father's continuing sexual mistreatment of her when she was a young girl, this behaviour being concentrated in the early years of the 1980s decade. Although there were references to the father's having committed numerous offences upon the appellant during a continuing course of conduct, only three offences were represented by convictions. There were two offences of incest and one of indecent dealing all taking place on dates unknown within periods extending from 13 December 1979 to 31 December 1982.
The evidence connected the appellant's psychiatric illness with the whole course of her father's conduct and not just the three offences for which he was convicted, but no question presently arises whether the compensation assessed was, on that account, in any way excessive as "compensation for injury suffered ... by reason of the offence or offences of which the offender (was) convicted", this being relevant wording appearing in s.663B(1). The question for decision on this appeal is whether the judge wrongly found the quantum of the appellant's claim to be restricted by the limitation found in s.663AA(1) which was in these terms:
"The prescribed amount for the purposes of this Chapter in the case of mental shock or nervous shock is $20,000."
The matter has to be determined by giving consideration to these provisions in Chapter 65A:
"663A.In this Chapter -
`injury' means bodily harm and includes pregnancy, mental shock and nervous shock; ...
`prescribed amount' means -
(a)(reference is here made to an instance which is not relevant for present purposes.)
(b)in all other cases save those that are the subject of particular reference in section 663AA, the amount for the time being specified in ... (the reference is then to a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act 1916 which, it is accepted, specified a sum of $72,680)."
Then followed s.663AA of which subsection (1) has already been quoted and s.663B(1) which provided for the possibility of Court ordered compensation in terms from which a somewhat fuller quotation can be given:
"Where a person is convicted on indictment…
Continue reading R v Morrison; ex parte West
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- R v Morrison; ex parte West [1996] QCA 328
- Case
- [1996] QCA 328
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the definitions of "injury" and "bodily harm" within the Criminal Code and examined relevant case law to determine the appropriate interpretation of these terms. The majority of the court, represented by Macrossan CJ and Davies JA, concluded that the appellant's psychiatric illness was a "bodily injury" and therefore not limited to the prescribed amount for "mental shock and nervous shock." They found that the statutory provisions should be interpreted broadly to include psychiatric illnesses within the definition of "bodily harm." Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the compensation amount was increased to $72,680. Fitzgerald P dissented, arguing that the appellant's claim should be resolved against her based on established case law and that her suffering was grossly undercompensated by the maximum award permissible for "mental shock and nervous shock."
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and to increase the compensation awarded to the appellant to $72,680, with the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the proceeding and appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.