SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Mitchell [2025] QCA 27
PARTIES:
R
v
MITCHELL, Wayne Trevor
(appellant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 241 of 2024
DC No 103 of 2023DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Maroochydore – Date of Conviction: 6 November 2024 (Smith DCJA)
DELIVERED ON:
14 March 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
21 February 2025
JUDGES:
Flanagan, Boddice and Brown JJA
ORDERS:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The verdicts of the jury be set aside.
3. Verdicts of acquittal be entered for each count.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – where the appellant was convicted after trial of indecent treatment of a child under 12 – where the jury found the appellant not guilty of one count of rape – where the appellant appeals his conviction on the ground that the verdicts are unreasonable and/or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence and that the verdict of not guilty of rape is inconsistent with the verdicts of guilt – where the complainant’s account of penetration remained consistent throughout police interviews and in evidence – where the complainant accepted in evidence that she had given a false account of sexual activity between her and the appellant to her friends – whether the verdicts of guilty were unreasonable having regard to all of the evidence – whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt of each count, beyond reasonable doubt – whether the jury ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt of each of the offences
Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651; [2022] HCA 25, cited
Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123; [2020] HCA 12, citedCOUNSEL:
S B Neaves for the appellant
E L Kelso for the respondentSOLICITORS:
DME Law Pty Ltd for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
FLANAGAN JA: I agree with Boddice JA.
BODDICE JA: On 6 November 2024, a jury found the appellant not guilty of one count of rape, but guilty of an alternate count of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12. The jury also found him guilty of two further counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12.
The appellant appeals his conviction, on two grounds. First, that the verdicts are unreasonable and/or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. Second, that the verdict of not guilty of rape is inconsistent with the verdicts delivered on the alternative and remaining counts, such that on the whole of the evidence and having regard to the doubt in respect of the penetrative act particularised as count 1, it was not open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant was guilty of the remaining counts.
Indictment
Each count concerned the one female complainant. Each count was alleged…
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- AGLC
- R v Mitchell [2025] QCA 27
- Case
- [2025] QCA 27
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the jury was entitled to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt on each count, and whether the jury should have entertained a reasonable doubt about the complainant's reliability and the consistency of her evidence. An independent assessment of the record revealed that the discrepancies in the complainant's evidence, coupled with her admission of providing a false account to her friends, meant that the jury should have had doubts about her reliability. The detailed account of penetration, while consistent, was not corroborated in a way that would negate the reasonable doubt caused by the inconsistencies and the admission of a previous false account. The court concluded that the verdicts were unreasonable.
The appeal was allowed, the jury's verdicts were set aside, and verdicts of acquittal were entered for each count.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The verdicts of the jury be set aside.
3. Verdicts of acquittal be entered for each count.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant’s mother gave evidence that she had seen the complainant on a single occasion since New Years Eve. It was about 12 months later at a shop on the Sunshine Coast. The complainant was with her mother. A modest, friendly conversation took place between the group.ConsiderationGround 1 The determination of a ground of appeal that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence, requires this Court to undertake its own independent assessment of the record, to determine whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt of each count, beyond reasonable doubt. In so doing, due regard is to be given to the jury’s role and the advantages afforded to the jury in having seen and heard the witnesses at trial.[5][5]Dansie v The Queen [2022] HCA 25 at [9]; citing M v The Queen (1994) 191 CLR 487 at 493. However, if that independent assessment of the record reveals inconsistencies, discrepancies or other evidence which, even allowing for the jury’s advantages, are of such a nature that a reasonable doubt ought to have been entertained, the verdict is to be set aside as unreasonable.[6][6]Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123 at [99]. In the present case, an independent assessment of the record, supports a conclusion that the jury ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt of each of the offences. The complainant accepted in evidence that she had given a detailed but false account of sexual activity between her and the appellant to her friends. These were people she trusted and with whom she shared secrets. Her reasons for that false account was that she was tired and not thinking straight. Those reasons did not provide any satisfactory explanation for having given such a detailed account of being forced to engage in oral sex, of ejaculation inside her and of conversations said to have taken place between her and the appellant. The falsity of those detailed accounts was maintained by the complainant to her mother and her friends, because the complainant was concerned that her mother would be angry with her and because of concern as to the reaction of her friends to having made such untruthful statements. Against that background, the jury ought to have had a doubt that the complainant’s continued maintenance of a version of sexual conduct between the appellant and herself, was due to continued concern as to the impact any admission of falsity would have on her relationship with her mother and her friends. There was a further reason why the jury ought to have entertained a doubt. There was no logical basis upon which the jury could have entertained a doubt as to the complainant’s assertion of penetration of her vagina by the appellant with his fingers (which the jury must have had, in finding the appellant not guilty of the count of rape), yet not have had a doubt as to the reliability of the complainant’s account of what else had happened on that night. The complainant’s account of penetration was detailed and remained consistent throughout her interviews with police and in evidence. There was no logical reason to doubt the fact of penetration, in those circumstances, unless there was a doubt as to the complainant’s reliability generally. Such a doubt ought to have caused the jury to doubt the complainant’s reliability in respect of the other aspects of her evidence concerning sexual interaction between her and the appellant on the night in question.Conclusion