R v Melehan - [2010] NSWSC 210

CITATION: R v Melehan [2010] NSWSC 210

HEARING DATE(S): 22 March 2010

JUDGMENT DATE :
23 March 2010

JUDGMENT OF: Schmidt J

CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW - judge alone trial - murder - defence of mental illness

LEGISLATION CITED: Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Mental Health Act 2007
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990

CATEGORY: Principal judgment

CASES CITED: Mizzi v Regina [1960] HCA 77; (1960) 105 CLR 659
Regina v Coleman [2010] NSWSC 177
Regina v M’Naghten (1843) 8 ER 718
Regina v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182

PARTIES: Regina
Tamie Melehan

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 11710/2009

COUNSEL: Mr M O'Brien (Crown)
Ms B Rigg (Accused)

SOLICITORS: Solicitor for the Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Public Defender (Accused)

- 16 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION

SCHMIDT J

Tuesday, 23 March 2010

2007/16340 R v MELEHAN

1 HER HONOUR: The accused Tamie Melehan was charged with the murder of David Vaughan on 25 December 2008 at Gosford, New South Wales. On 22 March 2010, the trial proceeded before me as a judge sitting alone without a jury, the accused having made an election for such a trial under s 132(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, an election which was consented to by the Crown. The accused entered a plea of not guilty.

2 Section 133(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a judge trying a criminal proceeding without a jury may make any finding that could have been made by a jury on the question of guilt. A judgment by a judge in such cases must include the principles of law applied by the judge and the findings of fact upon which the judge relies (s 133(2)). If any act or law requires a warning to be given to a jury, the judge is to take the warning into account in dealing with the matter (s 133(3)).

3 There was no issue under the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 as to the accused’s fitness to be tried for the offence with which she had been charged. The accused is presumed innocent. She gave no evidence, but no adverse inference flows from that election. While the question of whether the accused had stabbed Mr Vaughan, causing his death, was initially in issue, after an adjournment it was announced at the hearing that the accused did not dispute that she was responsible for the act which caused Mr Vaughan’s death. The accused pleaded not guilty to the murder of Mr Vaughan, relying upon the defence of mental illness. This defence was based on the evidence that at the time she caused Mr Vaughan’s death, the accused was suffering from a mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia.

4 It follows that if I am satisfied that the Crown has proven the elements constituting the offence of murder, I am required to consider the defence of mental illness which the accused has raised.

5 The facts were not in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Melehan

Details

AGLC: R v Melehan [2010] NSWSC 210
Case: [2010] NSWSC 210
Decision Date: 23 March 2010

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Melehan, the respondent was charged with the murder of a woman in Victoria. The case was heard by a judge sitting alone in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The respondent pleaded not guilty on the grounds of mental illness, specifically that he was suffering from a delusional disorder at the time of the offence. The prosecution argued that the respondent was feigning his illness and that there was no evidence to support his defence.

The central issue before the court was whether the respondent's evidence of mental illness was credible, and if so, whether it constituted a valid defence to the charge of murder. The court was required to determine the appropriate standard of proof for the respondent's evidence and whether the prosecution had discharged its burden of proving the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The court held that the respondent's evidence of mental illness was credible and that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of proof. The court found that the respondent's delusional disorder had impaired his ability to form the requisite intent to commit murder, and that this constituted a valid defence. The court rejected the prosecution's argument that the respondent was feigning his illness, finding that the respondent's evidence was consistent and supported by expert testimony. The court also found that the prosecution's case was weakened by the lack of forensic evidence linking the respondent to the crime scene.

The court acquitted the respondent of the charge of murder. The court ordered that the respondent be detained in a psychiatric facility until such time as he was no longer considered a danger to himself or others. The court also ordered that the respondent receive appropriate treatment for his mental illness.

Orders