R v Meakin (No. 1) - [2016] NSWSC 1006

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Meakin (No. 1) [2016] NSWSC 1006
Hearing dates: 19 July 2016
Date of orders: 19 July 2016
Decision date: 21 July 2016
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Davies J
Decision:
Leave to the accused to adduce the evidence referred to in paragraphs [4] and [15] of the judgment.

Catchwords: EVIDENCE – admissibility – hearsay - statement by the deceased while events fresh in the memory – evidence of statement by person who heard the representation from the accused - statement containing implied admission and exculpatory material – implied admission not an issue in the trial – whether statement admissible – admission not adverse to accused’s interests – statement admissible under s 66(2) Evidence Act – accused to give evidence in trial – events fresh in the accused’s memory
EVIDENCE – admissibility – lay opinion – evidence of witness of accused’s reaction to information conveyed to him – whether witness could give conclusionary evidence of accused’s emotional state – whether evidence relevant – whether evidence could rationally affect assessment of fact in issue – evidence rejected
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Crisologo v R (1997) 99 A Crim R 178
R v Carter; Exp Gray [1991] Tas R 174
R v Parkes [2003] NSWCCA 12; (2003) 147 A Crim R 450
Sydleman v Beckwith (1875) 43 Conn 12
Texts Cited: Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, (Chadbourn Rev, 1978 vol 7)
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Crown
Michael Meakin (Accused)
Representation:
Counsel:
P Barrett (Crown)
G Brady SC (Accused)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Legal Aid NSW (Accused)

File Number(s): 2014/55959

JUDGMENT

These are my reasons for permitting certain evidence to be led by the accused from a Crown witness.
The Crown called Julie Meredith as a witness. She was a personal friend of the accused and had known him for approximately ten years in 2014. The Crown led evidence from her about the police making contact with the accused through her partner Ray who drank with the accused from time to time at the Plumpton Inn.
Senior Counsel for the accused sought to cross-examine Ms Meredith to adduce evidence of two conversations she had with the accused. The first conversation occurred later on the day of 21 February 2014, the day of the offences charged. Ms Meredith had spoken to the accused on the phone about the hit and run involving the deceased. She suggested the accused come around to her place to work it out.
The first conversation sought to be led occurred when the accused attended at her home somewhere between 3:30pm and 4:30pm on that day. The accused said:

I don’t know what I hit, I panicked, I turned left at the Doonside lights and made my way home. I didn’t know what to do. I heard on the radio that it was a fella and he died. I then knew it was bad.

Ms Meredith said:

You have…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Meakin (No. 1)

Details

AGLC: R v Meakin (No. 1) [2016] NSWSC 1006
Case: [2016] NSWSC 1006
Decision Date: 21 July 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Meakin (No. 1), the defendant stood accused of various criminal charges. The trial court had to determine the admissibility of specific pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, including hearsay and lay opinion. The primary legal issue revolved around whether statements made by the deceased, as well as the defendant's reactions, were admissible under the Evidence Act. The court examined whether these statements could be considered fresh in the memory and whether they contained any implied admissions or exculpatory material that could influence the trial's outcome.

The court considered whether the statement by the deceased, made while the events were still fresh in their memory, could be admitted under section 66(2) of the Evidence Act. It was determined that the statement was admissible as it did not contain any implied admission adverse to the accused’s interests. The court further examined the lay opinion evidence, specifically whether the witness could provide a conclusionary account of the accused's emotional state upon hearing certain information. Ultimately, the court found that such evidence was not relevant and could not rationally affect the assessment of the facts in issue, leading to its exclusion.

In its judgment, the court ruled that the statement by the deceased was admissible as it was made while the events were still fresh in the memory and did not contain any implied admissions that were adverse to the accused. The court also ruled that the lay opinion evidence was not admissible as it was not relevant and could not rationally affect the assessment of the facts in issue. The court's decision highlights the importance of ensuring that evidence presented in a trial is both relevant and admissible under the Evidence Act, particularly in cases involving hearsay and lay opinion. The court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence played a crucial role in the trial’s outcome, underscoring the significance of these legal principles in criminal proceedings.

Orders