R v Meakin - [2019] NSWSC 1311

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Meakin [2019] NSWSC 1311
Hearing dates: 5-9, 13-15,19, 23, 26-30 August 20192, 3, 5, 9-12 September 2019
Date of orders: 30 September 2019
Decision date: 30 September 2019
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Hidden AJ
Decision:
Accused found not guilty.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – trial by judge alone – murder – allegation of accused running over deceased in a car with the requisite intent – circumstantial case
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 52A(2)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 38
Cases Cited: Meakin v R [2018] NSWCCA 288
Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Regina (Crown)
Michael Meakin (Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
J Bowers (Crown)
N Steel (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2014/55959

Judgment

Early in the morning of Friday, 21 February 2014, a little after midnight, the accused, Michael Meakin, was driving a Toyota Hiace van on Richmond Road, Dean Park. The van collided with a pedestrian, Nicholas McEvoy, causing him fatal injuries. Mr McEvoy had been walking on a grass verge (or nature strip) at the side of Richmond Road, separated from the road by a gutter. The Crown alleges that Mr Meakin drove the van partially onto that grass verge and deliberately ran over Mr McEvoy, intending to kill him or to cause him really serious bodily injury. It is Mr Meakin’s case that the incident was a tragic accident: that Mr McEvoy stepped or stumbled onto the roadway, and it was there that the van struck him. Mr Meakin acknowledges that he failed to react in time to avoid the collision because he was affected by alcohol.
Mr Meakin was arraigned before me, sitting without a jury, on an indictment containing two counts:

the murder of Mr McEvoy;

in the alternative, dangerous driving occasioning the death of Mr McEvoy in circumstances of aggravation: s 52A(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the circumstance of aggravation being that he was driving with the prescribed concentration of alcohol in his blood: subs (7).

The prescribed concentration of alcohol is defined as 0.15 grams or more of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood: subs (8).

Mr Meakin pleaded not guilty to the first count but guilty to the second count. Accordingly, the trial of the first count proceeded before me. It is a retrial. Mr Meakin was convicted of murder after a trial by jury in 2016, but on appeal that conviction was set aside (on the basis of an issue which does not arise in the present trial) and a new trial was ordered: Meakin v R [2018] NSWCCA 288.
Late in the evening of Thursday, 20 February 2014, there was an encounter between the two men, who did not know each other, at the Plumpton Hotel. That hotel is situated on Richmond Road, Dean Park, near to where the fatal collision occurred. Richmond Road is a concrete road, a major thoroughfare running from…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Meakin

Details

AGLC: R v Meakin [2019] NSWSC 1311
Case: [2019] NSWSC 1311
Decision Date: 30 September 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was a criminal prosecution brought by the Crown against Meakin, who was charged with the murder of another person. The case was heard by a judge sitting alone, without a jury, in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The prosecution alleged that Meakin had intentionally run over the deceased in a car, thereby committing murder. The central issue before the court was whether Meakin had the requisite intent to commit murder, given the circumstantial nature of the evidence presented.

The court was tasked with determining whether the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to establish that Meakin had the necessary intent to commit murder. The prosecution's case relied on a series of events and inferences drawn from the evidence, including the accused's actions before and after the incident, as well as the circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased. The court had to assess the strength of the circumstantial evidence and whether it was capable of proving the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In reaching its decision, the court examined the evidence meticulously, considering both the direct and circumstantial aspects. The judge concluded that while the evidence established that Meakin had been involved in the events leading up to the death, it did not sufficiently prove the necessary intent to commit murder. The court found that there were reasonable doubts as to the accused's intent, and therefore, the prosecution had not met the required burden of proof. Consequently, the judge acquitted the accused of the charge of murder.

The court ordered that Meakin be discharged from the charge of murder. The decision underscored the importance of direct evidence in proving intent in murder cases and highlighted the limitations of circumstantial evidence in establishing the requisite mental state.

Orders