SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v MCY [2018] QCA 275
PARTIES:
R
v
MCY
(applicant)FILE NO:
CA No 75 of 2018
DC No 2683 of 2017DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 3 April 2018 (Porter QC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
Date of Order: 20 June 2018
Date of Publication of Reasons: 16 October 2018DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
20 June 2018
JUDGES:
Sofronoff P and Crow and Ryan JJ
ORDERS:
Orders delivered 20 June 2018:
It is ordered that, upon the undertaking of the applicant’s solicitor to inform the applicant in terms of s 160G(5) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) forthwith and to inform the applicant forthwith to report to the appropriate parole office:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. The order fixing the date that the defendant be released on parole be set aside.
4. In lieu thereof, order that the applicant be released on parole on 20 June 2018.
5. The declaration of presentence custody be set aside.
6. It is declared that the 55 days spent in pre-sentence custody between 4 July 2017 and 17 August 2017 and between 3 April 2018 and 12 April 2018 be declared time already served under the sentence.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – where the applicant was convicted of one count of burglary, with violence, while armed, in company – where the applicant was sentenced to 20 months imprisonment with parole release after four and a half months – where the applicant cooperated extensively with police –whether the sentence was manifestly excessive
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 13A, s 13B
Malvaso v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 227; [1989] HCA 58, cited
R v D; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld)[1995] QCA 332, cited
R v Galeano [2013] 2 Qd R 464; [2013] QCA 51, cited
R v Gladkowski (2000) 115 A Crim R 446; [2000] QCA 352, citedCOUNSEL:
D R Wilson for the applicant
P J McCarthy for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Rostron Carlyle Lawyers for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
SOFRONOFF P: The offence of entering a dwelling with intent to commit an indictable offence, threatening actual violence, armed with a dangerous weapon and in company, to which the applicant pleaded guilty, is a serious one. The applicant was sentenced to 20 months imprisonment with a parole release date of 30 June 2018, which meant that, after taking into account time served on remand, she would be released after serving four and a half months imprisonment. The applicant applied for leave to appeal against her sentence and, after hearing oral argument, the Court granted her leave to appeal and set aside that part of the order concerning parole and, instead, ordered that she be released on parole on that day. The result was that she had served 55 days…
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- AGLC
- R v MCY [2018] QCA 275
- Case
- [2018] QCA 275
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the relevant cases and the principles of sentencing in determining the appropriate sentence. The court observed that the sentence of three years' imprisonment with parole after 10 months was relatively high, taking into account the applicant's role in the offending, the absence of physical harm, and the applicant's personal circumstances. The court also noted that it is rarely possible or useful to rank offending on a stepped scale of seriousness. Instead, an appropriate sentence is one which takes into account the nature and seriousness of the offence, the personal circumstances and antecedents of an offender, and all other relevant matters which will vary from case to case.
The court allowed the appeal and reduced the period of actual custody to seven months' imprisonment. The court set aside the order fixing the date that the defendant be released on parole and ordered that the applicant be released on parole on 20 June 2018. The court also declared that the 55 days spent in pre-sentence custody be declared time already served under the sentence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Orders delivered 20 June 2018:
It is ordered that, upon the undertaking of the applicant’s solicitor to inform the applicant in terms of s 160G(5) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) forthwith and to inform the applicant forthwith to report to the appropriate parole office:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. The order fixing the date that the defendant be released on parole be set aside.
4. In lieu thereof, order that the applicant be released on parole on 20 June 2018.
5. The declaration of presentence custody be set aside.
6. It is declared that the 55 days spent in pre-sentence custody between 4 July 2017 and 17 August 2017 and between 3 April 2018 and 12 April 2018 be declared time already served under the sentence.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In allowing the appeal, and reducing the period of actual custody to seven months’ imprisonment, Applegarth J, with whom Fraser and Gotterson JJA agreed, observed that the complainant, in breach of a court order, decided to retain custody of the children. He encouraged Buckley to contact police, but she was unable to. She should have gone to the police station, but instead, she went to the complainant’s house. It was also not surprising that an upset mother would seek the complainant to comply with the court order and seek support in doing so, after she was unable to contact the police. The escalation in matters would have been appreciated by a clearer mind.[83] The complainant suffered minor physical injuries. There was no finding that a weapon had been used in the assault upon him (although he said he’d seen a man with a baseball bat). The implementation of a plan to assault the complainant if necessary could have resulted in more serious physical consequences for the complainant and others. The sentence of two years’ imprisonment was not excessive having regard to the principles of denunciation and deterrence.[84] However, requiring Buckley to serve 12 months of actual custody gave too little weight to her previous good character and antecedents and too little weight to the extenuating and subjective circumstances of her offending. His Honour supported his conclusion by reference to comparable authority, including the decision in Cockfield.[83]Opcit [96] – [100].[84]Opcit [102].Consideration of authorities The applicant argued that his Honour erred in viewing Denham and Fitzgerald as “materially less serious” than the applicant’s offending. His Honour considered Cockfield as “somewhat less serious”. The applicant submitted that such a description was “open on one view of the facts”, but that the offending in Cockfield was gratuitous. He had a relevant criminal history and he was a principal, in the sense of an active, offender.[85][85]Applicant’s outline of submissions, paragraph 32. It is rarely possible, or useful, to rank offending on a stepped scale of seriousness. While offending may be broadly categorised in terms of its seriousness, an appropriate sentence is one which takes into account the nature and seriousness of the offence, the personal circumstances and antecedents of an offender, and all other relevant matters which will vary from case to case. The respondent made this point by reference to the observation of Keane JA in R v Dwyer:[86]“An approach which seeks to grade the criminality involved in such cases by a close comparison of aggravating and mitigating factors, as if there is only one correct sentence, is to be deprecated as involving the illusion of a degree of precision which is both unattainable, and, in truth, alien to the sentencing process.”[86][2008] QCA 117 at [37]. However, treating the comparable cases appropriately – as yardsticks[87] against which to compare the sentence nominated by his Honour as the one which would have been imposed were it not for the applicant’s co-operation – reveals the sentence (of three years’ imprisonment, with parole after 10 months) to be a relatively high one having regard to the applicant’s role in the offending (she was not a principal offender: she was directed to stay in the car); the absence of physical harm; and taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances.[87]Consistently with Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2.