R v Mathews

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1992] QCA 462

QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 238 of 1992

T H E Q U E E N

v.

RUSSELL GORDON HAIG MATHEWS

(Appellant)

JUDGMENT - THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Delivered the 18th day of December, 1992.

I have read the reasons prepared in this matter by McPherson J.A. and Derrington J. and I agree with them that the appeal against conviction should be dismissed. In view of what is there stated, I can express my own reasons relatively

briefly.

The substantial question argued concerned the proper construction of s. 36A of the Crimes Act 1914 and the terms of the learned trial judge's summing-up in relation to that section.

The relevant words of s. 36A for our purposes are:

"A person who: (a) ... intimidates ... a person ... on account of his ... being about to appear, as a witness in a judicial proceeding shall be guilty of an indictable offence."

In dealing with the elements involved in the offence, the trial judge, in my opinion quite correctly, at one point of his summing-up instructed the jury in these terms:

"on account of simply means he intimidated her because

she was to appear as a witness."

However, a little later he instructed them further and in a little more detail on what the charge involved and Derrington

J., in his reasons, has quoted the words used by the judge. I wish to deal with this further instruction.

I think that in the present circumstances the words of the section under which the charge was brought involved a requirement of proof that the appellant had intimidated Joanne Kathryn Maddigan, that is, performed actions which had the prescribed effect upon her of intimidation and of proof also

that the appellant did what he did because she was about to appear as a witness. It is only on this second aspect that I need to say anything.

There are two quite distinct aspects which may be concerned
in cases like the present. One is the circumstances of which an

offender is aware which prompt him to act as he does. The relevant words of the section which I have quoted turn attention to this aspect because of the requirement that the action shall be "on account of" or, as it could equally simply be put,

"because of" the matter referred to. A quite different matter which it may be possible to distinguish is something that the section is not concerned with, namely, the result which an offender hopes will subsequently flow from the action of intimidation which he performs, that is, what he hopes to

achieve subsequently.

The later words of the summing-up quoted by Derrington J.
show that the trial judge dealt with a feature not necessarily
involved in the elements of the offence, namely, the likely

effect of the appellant's behaviour upon the woman's subsequent actions. The judge sufficiently conveyed to the jury that if they were to convict they needed to be convinced that the…

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Details
Case
[1992] QCA 462
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal of Queensland by the Chief Justice and two other Justices. The appellant, Russell Gordon Haig Mathews, was convicted of intimidating a witness under section 36A of the Crimes Act 1914. The appellant sought to appeal against his conviction on several grounds, including the trial judge's summing-up to the jury and the conduct of his solicitor. The primary legal issue was the proper interpretation of section 36A of the Crimes Act, specifically whether intent to deter the witness from giving evidence was an essential element of the offence.

The Court found that the trial judge's direction to the jury was accurate, and the judge's reference to the appellant's intent to deter the witness was appropriate but not essential. The Court held that the expression "on account of" in the statute indicated that the intimidation must be related to the victim's anticipated appearance as a witness, but it did not require a specific intent to deter the witness. The Court noted that the statute's scope was broader than common law offences related to the perversion of justice, encompassing a wider range of motives.

The Court concluded that any error in the trial judge's summing-up did not prejudice the appellant, as the jury was adequately directed on the essential elements of the offence. The appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the original conviction was upheld.

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