R v Manton - [2002] NSWCCA 316

Reported Decision:
(2002) 132 A Crim R 249

New South Wales

Court of Criminal Appeal

CITATION: REGINA v MANTON [2002] NSWCCA 316

FILE NUMBER(S): CCA 60106/02

HEARING DATE(S): 3 July 2002

JUDGMENT DATE:
8 August 2002

PARTIES :

Regina v Lance John MANTON

JUDGMENT OF: Mason P at 1; Hulme J at 21; Simpson J at 22

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) : 01/52/0276

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL
OFFICER : Twigg DCJ

COUNSEL : Appellant: P D Rosser QC
Crown: W G Dawe QC

SOLICITORS: Appellant: Many Rivers Aboriginal Legal Services
Crown: S E O'Connor

CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW - appeal by case stated - intimidation of a police officer - s 60(1) Crimes Act 1900 - whether established by proof of no more than that acts or words caused the officer to experience fear or apprehension - statutory interpretation - natural meaning of words.

LEGISLATION CITED: Crimes Act 1900, s 60
Police Service Act 1990
Police Service Regulation 2000

CASES CITED:
Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1
Mellor v Low (2000) 48 NSWLR 517
R v K (1993) 46 FCR 336
R v Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314
R v Mathews (1992) 64 A Crim R 305
R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681

DECISION: See par 20

CCA 60106/2002

MASON P
HULME J
SIMPSON J
Thursday 8 August 2002

REGINA v Lance John MANTON

Judgment

1 MASON P: This is an appeal by case stated by his Honour Judge Twigg QC.

2 The Stated Case is as follows:

1. DETERMINATION

On 12 December 2001 the appellant appeared before me on his appeal against conviction on a charge:

that he on 26 January 2001 at Ballina in the State of New South Wales did intimidate Constable Goeths, a police officer, whilst the said police officer was executing his duty.

At the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, following submissions by the solicitor for the appellant, I held that a prima facie case had been made out.

2. FACTS

The evidence before me was capable of establishing the following facts:

a) Following an incident at a hotel in Ballina the appellant was arrested by the informant and other police and taken to Ballina Police Station.

b) Later the appellant was placed in a cell by the informant and Constable Martin and his handcuffs removed;

c) As the two constables were leaving or had just left the cell the appellant looked directly at the informant and said “Wait till I see you on the street, I’ll kill you, youse will get yours, I’ll find where you live and get you”. Constable Goeths then saw the appellant draw his finger across his throat simulating the cutting of his throat;

d) The informant and Constable Martin then immediately left the cell area;

e) The informant felt concerned and threatened by the words and actions of the appellant.

The evidence before me comprised the oral evidence of the informant,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Manton

Details

AGLC: R v Manton [2002] NSWCCA 316
Case: [2002] NSWCCA 316
Decision Date: 8 August 2002

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties involved in the appeal were the appellant, Manton, and the respondent, the Crown. The nature of the dispute was an appeal against a conviction for intimidation of a police officer, contrary to section 60(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. The appeal was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether the statutory provision in question was limited to cases where the acts or words of the accused caused the officer to experience fear or apprehension, and whether the natural meaning of the words used in the statute could be relied upon in the interpretation of the provision. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the provision was limited to cases where the accused's acts or words caused the officer to experience fear or apprehension, or whether it was sufficient that the accused's acts or words caused the officer to experience any form of fear or apprehension.

The court's reasoning and outcome were that the natural meaning of the words used in the statute could be relied upon in the interpretation of the provision, and that the provision was not limited to cases where the accused's acts or words caused the officer to experience fear or apprehension. The court held that it was sufficient that the accused's acts or words caused the officer to experience any form of fear or apprehension. The court further held that the provision was not limited to cases where the accused's acts or words caused the officer to experience fear or apprehension in the sense of being afraid or apprehensive of some future event or consequence. Rather, the provision was intended to protect police officers from any form of intimidation or harassment, regardless of whether the officer experienced fear or apprehension in the strict sense of the term.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be allowed, the conviction be quashed, and the matter be remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

Orders