R v Mason

Case [2024] QCA 104

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Mason [2024] QCA 104

PARTIES:

R
v
MASON, James Morton
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 1 of 2023
SC No 1449 of 2021

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 12 December 2022 (Jackson J)

DELIVERED ON:

4 June 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

1 May 2024

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Morrison JA and Callaghan J

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION – where the appellant pleaded guilty to one count of arson – where the appellant was convicted of murder – where the central question for the jury was the appellant’s intention when he lit the fire – where the appellant submitted that a miscarriage of justice arose from the summing up of the defence case – whether the trial judge adequately explained the defence relating to the question trail – whether a miscarriage of justice occurred – whether the appeal should be allowed

Criminal Code (Qld), s302(1)(b)

R v Baker[2014] QCA 5, cited
R v Dao [2005] VSCA 196, cited
R v Nguyen [2006] VSCA 158, cited
RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; [2000] HCA 3, cited
Stokes v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 279; [1960] HCA 95, cited

COUNSEL:

S P Robb KC, with E A Lynch, for the appellant
C N Marco for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecution (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. MULLINS P:  I agree with Morrison JA.

  2. MORRISON JA:  As at February 2020, the appellant and the deceased were in a relationship.  There was trouble between them, and text messages from the deceased to the appellant’s daughter suggested the deceased had been assaulted by the appellant.

  3. They had lived in a highset weatherboard house, under which the deceased parked her car.  It usually had a cover on it when it was not being used.

  4. The appellant was thrown out by the deceased and stayed for a while under the house, sleeping there.

  5. In the early hours of 5 February 2020, the appellant set fire to the deceased’s car, using some petrol and candles.  The fire quickly spread to the house.  The deceased was caught inside the house and did not escape.  Four days later, she died because of multi‑organ failure due to the effects of the fire.

  6. The appellant was charged with arson and murder.  On the first day of the trial, he pleaded guilty to the count of arson and not guilty to the count of murder.  He was convicted of murder after a three-day trial.

  7. The central issue for the jury was the issue of the appellant’s intention when he lit the fire.  That is, whether they were satisfied that either the deceased’s death was reasonably foreseeable by an ordinary person in the appellant’s position, or that the appellant intended…

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Details
AGLC
R v Mason [2024] QCA 104
Case
[2024] QCA 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Mason, the appellant appealed against his conviction of murder. The appellant had pleaded guilty to one count of arson but was convicted of murder. The central issue for the jury was the appellant’s intention when he lit the fire. The appellant submitted that a miscarriage of justice arose from the summing up of the defence case, arguing that the trial judge did not adequately explain the defence in relation to the question trail which the jury was encouraged to use in reaching their verdict.

The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the trial judge adequately explained the defence case in relation to the question trail, and whether a miscarriage of justice occurred. The court examined the submissions made by defence counsel and the trial judge’s summing up. The court found that the trial judge adequately summarised the defence case in the circumstances of the trial, focusing on the appellant's lack of intent to harm the deceased and the foreseeability of her death. The court held that the trial judge's summing up effectively conveyed the defence arguments to the jury.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed. The court found that the trial judge had adequately explained the defence case in relation to the question trail, and thus, there was no miscarriage of justice. The court's reasoning was based on a detailed analysis of the trial judge's summing up and the defence submissions. The final order was that the appeal be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Leave was granted to amend the grounds of appeal to raise only one ground; namely, that there was a miscarriage of justice because the trial judge did not adequately explain the defence case in relation to the question trail which the jury was encouraged to use in reaching their verdict.Background The appellant’s appeal outline set out a non-contested summary of the evidence at the trial. What follows draws upon that summary and the formal admissions made at the trial.[1][1]AB 185. The appellant and the deceased had been in a domestic relationship. The deceased lived in a single-level weatherboard Queenslander house with concrete pillars, which lifted the house up to a height that allowed for a car to be parked underneath. The area under the house consisted of concrete and dirt flooring with a garage-type area towards the front for a car. Lattice fencing was used to partially enclose the ground area. The deceased had three sets of keys to the house. One set was held by a family friend and the other two sets remained in the deceased’s possession. There was no evidence that the appellant possessed a set of keys to the house. The deceased was the owner of a car (a Subaru Liberty) that was parked under her house. Between 7.37 pm and 11.27 pm on 4 February 2020, the deceased sent a series of text messages to the appellant’s daughter. Those messages suggested that the appellant had been physically abusive to the deceased, that the deceased was threatening to call the police, and that the appellant was in the lower level of the house. The house was observed to be on fire on 5 February 2020. At about 4.06 am, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) dispatched four crews who arrived between about 4.12 am and 4.15 am. An ambulance arrived at around 4.25 am. The deceased was located by QFRS in the house, unconscious and unresponsive, with a set of keys in her hand. When she was taken from the house, she was not breathing and was unresponsive. When paramedics arrived, the deceased was still not breathing and was unresponsive. She had no palpable carotid pulse. Paramedics continued CPR and administered medical attention. She regained a pulse and resumed breathing with assistance. Paramedics transported her to the hospital. The deceased received medical and surgical treatment between 5 February and 8 February before it was determined that no further medical or surgical intervention would be appropriate or beneficial to her. She died on 9 February 2020. An autopsy determined that the cause of death was multi-organ failure due to the effects of fire, namely profound hypoxia and burns. The house was extensively damaged. Most of the upholstery, plastic components, window glass, and tyres on the Subaru Liberty were consumed by the fire. A melted red plastic container was found to contain petrol residue. The fire was deliberately lit and the fire patterns inside the cabin of the Subaru Liberty indicated that it was the area of origin. The two rear doors of the car were open during the initial development of the fire. The rear door openings provided a point of egress for heat, flame and combustion gases to spread into the lower level of the house. The flow of heat from the fire radiated heat and direct flame in all directions within the lower level of the house. As the fire continued to develop, flames and concentrations of heated smoke particles would have been contained within the upper sections.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The accounts of the neighbours were reasonably consistent:(a)they were woken early in the morning by the sound of arguing, the sounds and smell of a fire, or people yelling to someone to get out of the house;(b)a neighbour gave evidence that he had heard an argument at 6 pm the night before, during which the deceased told someone to leave;(c)three neighbours gave evidence that they were woken in the early hours of the morning by arguing between a man and a woman, and a short time later they smelt smoke or saw a small fire under the house; and(d)those first on the scene said that the fire started as a small fire under the house but spread very quickly.The appellant’s evidence The appellant participated in several interviews with police: a formal interview when he was initially apprehended, an audio recording of an undercover police officer in the watchhouse, and a further formal interview with police after the deceased died. The appellant explained his state of mind in various ways during the three recordings:(a)he set fire to the car but had no intention to hurt the deceased otherwise;[2](b)he did not think about the consequences of lighting the car;[3](c)setting fire to the deceased’s car was to pay her back for threatening his family;[4](d)the deceased had a key to the doors;[5] and(e)he knew the house was going to burn if petrol was ignited under it.[6][2]AB 200 lines 30-33; AB 203 lines 19-24; AB 207 lines 18-20; AB 213 lines 3-9; AB 230 lines 30-32; AB 263 line 56 to AB 264 line 1; AB 289 lines 45-49; AB 292 lines 35-39; AB 327 lines 16-30; AB 336 lines 21-37; AB 336 line 52 to AB 337 line 4.[3]AB 203 lines 30-49; AB 206 line 58 to AB 207 line 4; AB 210 line 57 to 211 line 4; AB 212 line 50 to AB 213 line 9; AB 229 lines 44-47; AB 236 lines 26-32; AB 248 line 56 to AB 249 line 1.[4]AB 207 lines 18-20; AB 209 lines 39-41; AB 229 lines 47-55; AB 230 lines 9-28; AB 233 lines 40-49; AB 255 lines 18-25; AB 289 lines 52-53; AB 292 lines 14-39; AB 326 lines 24-33.[5]AB 236 line 51 to AB 237 line 23; AB 290 line 14-15.[6]AB 327 lines 16-20; AB 336 line 52 to AB 337 line 4. The appellant did not give or call evidence at trial.The defence case as put to the jury In the final address, defence counsel put the case to the jury on a succinct basis:(a)in the recorded conversation with the undercover police officer, the appellant “consistently says I did not intend to hurt her”;[7](b)the jury had to focus on “what happens after the fire is set” because “him walking away[8] … is also consistent with him walking away in the knowledge that she has every opportunity to get out of the house”;[9](c)that what the Crown “have to prove to you essentially beyond reasonable doubt is either that he intended to kill [the deceased] or to cause her grievous bodily harm or that her death was foreseeable to him in the circumstances … or would have been foreseeable to a reasonable person”;[10](d)“to his knowledge, she had the keys, she had the ability to just walk out”;[11](e)that “one of the things that he is consistent throughout is that he had no intention to hurt [the deceased]”; his “intention was to damage her car”, and he “continually says he was not thinking of the consequences and he did not think that anything bad would happen”;[12](f)“my client never foresaw what was going to happen so quickly. And in his mind, he was simply of the view that [the deceased] had the ability to get out of the house”;[13](g)it was “an immature, petulant act of trying to damage the car, trying to burn the car and that’s what it was. We have no intentions of anything worse happening. Again, later on in that interview … the police officer who’s doing his job has said:‘So when did you think that you might kill her?’[7]AB 27 line 45.[8]The appellant said he set the fire and then left the house.[9]AB 29 lines 13-17.[10]AB 29 lines 28-31.[11]AB 29 line 34-35.[12]AB 30 lines 8-12.[13]AB 31 lines 10-13.And my client’s response was:‘I had no intention to kill her.’And he maintains that to the end of that interview. So, ladies and gentlemen, it comes down to this. My client’s set fire to a car and it spread to the house and he’s accepted responsibility for that, but is it really, in all of those circumstances with what had been going on, was it foreseeable to him or to a reasonable person that Ms Parkes, with the ability that she had to just walk out the door, would die? It is befuddling to understand why she just didn’t”.[14][14]AB 31 line 47 to AB 32 line 15.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, the considerations above demonstrate that the trial judge adequately summarised the defence case in the circumstances of the trial.Conclusion For the reasons I have expressed above, the appeal should be dismissed. I propose the following order:1.Appeal dismissed. CALLAGHAN J: For the reasons proposed by Morrison JA I agree that the appeal should be dismissed, and join in the order he proposes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the trial judge turned to the submissions made by defence counsel immediately prior to the summing up:[24]“You have heard [the] submissions that were put on behalf of the defendant by Mr Lewis only a little while ago, and I will not rehearse them. I will summarise that case as simply as I can. First, on all the questions that [were asked] as to Mr Mason’s intention in lighting the fire, Mr Lewis submits that one thing Mr Mason consistently repeated in all his interviews and including the conversation in the cell is that he did not intend to kill or hurt [the deceased].He submits [that] because of that, and the other things as well, but because of that, in particular, you will not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Mason intended to kill [the deceased] or do her grievously bodily harm. Second, he submits that while Mr Mason did intend to set fire to the car and while he was aware when he lit the fire that it was likely that the house would catch fire, that is as far as it goes. He submits you would not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Mason also foresaw or intended that [the deceased] would die in the fire.And third, as to the question … whether [the deceased’s] death was reasonabl[y] foreseeable, which you will recall is in question 2(b), and whether the lighting of the fire was an act of such a nature as to be likely to endanger life which is in question 4, he submits that you will not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the answers to those questions are yes because [the deceased] had the keys to open the locks and to get out of the house after the fire started, and as event happened only could not do so because of some unfortunate mix-up or confusion on her part.I am paraphrasing, but that is the effect of the submissions that have been made.”[24]AB 46 lines 7-30.Consideration The central submission made by the appellant was that whilst the trial judge dealt thoroughly with the question trail itself, his Honour did not explain the defence case in relation to each question.[25] As developed, the submission was that the defence case was not put to the jury, in that the trial judge did not explain that:(a)as to question 2, while it was not in issue that the appellant lit the fire and knew it would likely spread to the house, it was in issue as to whether the death could reasonably be foreseen because the deceased could have readily left the house;[26](b)as to question 4, while it was not in issue that the fire, once lit, was likely to spread to the house, it was in issue that setting the fire was likely to endanger life because the deceased was awake, she had keys, and had the opportunity to leave;[27] and(c)as to question 5, that the appellant relied on his answers in the interviews to dispel any conclusion as to his intention; namely that his intention was to damage the car, he was not thinking of the consequences at the time he lit the fire, and his statement that it was lucky that she was alive (which he gave at some point before the deceased’s death).[28][25]Appellant’s outline paragraph 27.[26]Appellant’s outline paragraph 28.[27]Appellant’s outline paragraph 29.[28]Appellant’s outline paragraph 30.