R v Mason

[2001] NSWSC 400

CITATION:	R v Mason [2001] NSWSC 400
CURRENT JURISDICTION:	Common Law Division
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 70085/00
HEARING DATE(S):	11/05/2001
JUDGMENT DATE:	11 May 2001
PARTIES :	Regina (Crown) Christopher Charles Mason
JUDGMENT OF:	Hidden J at 1

COUNSEL :	P Dare (Crown) P Zahra SC with C Lyons (Mason)
SOLICITORS:	Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown) Legal Aid Commission (Mason)
CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW - accused not guilty of murder by reason of mental illness
CASES CITED:	R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 183
DECISION:	see paras 16-17

THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
CRIMINAL
HIDDEN J

Regina v Christopher Charles Mason

No 70085/00

Reasons for judgment

1     HIS HONOUR: The accused, Christopher Charles Mason, has pleaded not guilty to a charge that on 5 January 2000 at St Mary's he did murder Linda Anne Hynes. The only issue in this trial is whether he was mentally ill at the time. It is not in dispute that he killed Ms Hynes and that he did so with the intent requisite to the crime of murder.

2     He has elected to be tried by judge alone. Although the central issue in this case is his mental state at the time of the killing there is no suggestion that he is now unfit to plead and I accept that he has been capable of making that election in an informed manner. He has been represented by senior and junior counsel before me.

3     As an infant the accused was adopted by the Mason family. It is unnecessary to deal with his background except for two important matters. In 1998 an adopted brother, to whom he was very close, died in circumstances from which it appears that he had suicided. In the same year his adopted mother died, I take it, through natural causes. He was then a man in his 20's. He was born on 12 December 1971.

4     The victim of this crime was a young woman with whom he had had an intimate relationship. The crime occurred at her home in the small hours of 5 January 2000. It would be distressing to recount the circumstances in any detail and it is unnecessary to do so. It is sufficient to say that he strangled her with a telephone extension cord.

5     What led to the killing is extremely difficult to determine. In a recorded interview with police the accused spoke of being angry but it is by no means clear about what. There is some suggestion that he may have had a belief that she was being unfaithful to him but there appears to be no foundation for any such belief. The accused was interviewed on two occasions by police, admitting his involvement in the killing only on the second of those occasions. But those interviews, which were video recorded, show signs of disordered thinking and an inability to understand what was going through his mind at the time of the killing.

6     That same afternoon the accused attended the Emergency Department of the Nepean Hospital, where he was observed to be in a very disturbed state. Two days later he was admitted to the Bloomfield Hospital at Orange, where he was observed to be very distressed and was considered to be exhibiting schizophreniform psychosis, probably drug induced. He was arrested the following day, 8 January 2000, and within days of being taken into custody he was admitted to the psychiatric ward at the hospital at Long Bay Prison.

7     The Crown obtained a psychiatric assessment more recently by Dr Olav Nielssen and the accused's legal advisers obtained a report by Dr Bruce Westmore. Those psychiatrists are well known in the forensic sphere and are highly respected. To each of them the accused gave a history of the events of that fateful day, which betrayed a loss of memory of those events since his interview by police, but which clearly demonstrated seriously disordered thinking at the relevant time. Both psychiatrists recorded a history of delusions and auditory hallucinations, arising to a significant extent, it seems, from his preoccupation with the death of his brother and, indeed, his mother.

8     Both the accused and the unfortunate victim abused drugs. It is clear that the accused had been abusing a variety of drugs, including alcohol, for a significant period of time prior to this tragic event, and it is also clear that he was significantly affected by drugs on the occasion in question.

9     Dr Nielssen's conclusion, based upon the history provided to him by the accused and a review of the proof of evidence obtained by the prosecution, was that at the relevant time the accused was “acutely mentally ill…as a result of a combination of amphetamine induced psychosis and intoxication with amphetamine”. The doctor went on, “At the time of the offence itself his acutely disturbed mental state may have deprived him of the ability to recognise that what he was doing was morally wrong.”

10     Dr Westmore concluded that the accused suffered “a psychotic episode”. He went on to say, “The differential diagnosis would include a drug induced psychosis or a schizophrenic illness.” The doctor also noted, “a history of depression, possibly a complicated grief reaction”. By that, no doubt, the doctor was referring to the loss of his mother and brother.

11     Dr Westmore also concluded that at the relevant time the accused was suffering from “An acute mental illness”. The doctor added, “It is likely that his capacity to know that he ought not to do the act and that his act was wrong in a moral sense were both compromised.”

12     Of course, the accused bears the burden of establishing on the balance of probabilities that he was, at the relevant time, mentally ill, as the criminal law understands that expression. I am satisfied that he was. Indeed, the Crown Prosecutor responsibly has not submitted to the contrary.

13     That does not alter the fact that this is a tragic, senseless killing. I can well understand that the relatives and loved ones of the deceased would have little concern for the accused's mental state and would see him as deserving of severe punishment. It is for that reason it is helpful to examine the rationale of the defence of mental illness. It was perhaps never better explained than by Sir Owen Dixon sitting as a trial judge in the case of R v Porter in 1933. His Honour's summing-up in that case is to be found in 55 CLR at 183. Among other things his Honour stated this to the jury:

The purpose of the law in punishing people is to prevent others from committing a like crime or crimes. Its prime purpose is to deter people from committing offences. It may be that there is an element of retribution in the criminal law so that when people have committed offences the law considers that they merit punishment, but its prime purpose is to preserve society from the depredation of dangerous and vicious people. Now, it is perfectly useless for the law to attempt, by threatening punishment, to deter people from committing crimes if their mental condition is such that they cannot be in the least influenced by the possibility or probability of subsequent punishment; if they cannot understand what they are doing or cannot understand the ground upon which the law proceeds. The law is not directed, as medical science is, to curing mental infirmities.

Later in the summing-up, in directing the jury as to the crucial question which they were called upon to decide, his Honour stated this:

If through the disordered condition of the mind he (that is, the accused) could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that he could not know that what he was doing was wrong. What is meant by ‘wrong’? What is meant by wrong is wrong having regard to the everyday standards of reasonable people.

14     There is some evidence that the accused may have sought to cover his tracks over this killing, including the disposing of the body of his victim into the Nepean River. Even that may have its genesis in his psychotic state but, as far as his subsequent actions may suggest an attempt to avoid detection, they do not alter my conclusion that at the time of killing he was quite unable to reason about the moral quality of his act.

15     Of course, the result of finding the defence made out is not that he is a free man. He must be detained for as long as the responsible authorities consider necessary in his interests and the interests of the community.

16     I find the accused not guilty by reason of mental illness.

17     I order that the accused be detained at the Prison Hospital at Long Bay, or such other place as may be from time to time determined by the Mental Health Review Tribunal, until he is released by due process of law.

18     The Court expresses its sympathy for the family and all those affected by the death of the deceased.

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Last Modified: 09/17/2001