IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1998] QCA 303
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
C.A. No. 128 of 1998
Brisbane
[R v. LSS]
THE QUEEN
v.
LSS
(Applicant) Appellant
Pincus JA
Thomas JA
Ambrose J
Judgment delivered 2 October 1998
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court; each concurring as to the orders made.
APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION ALLOWED. CONVICTIONS ON COUNTS 1 - 11 INCLUSIVE QUASHED. JUDGMENT AND VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL ON COUNTS 3, 4 AND 5 ENTERED. NEW TRIAL ORDERED ON COUNTS 1, 2, 6 - 11 INCLUSIVE.
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE REFUSED.
CATCHWORDS: EVIDENCE - Sexual offences - recent complaint - requirement of recency of complaint - need for judicial direction on limited use of fresh complaint evidence.
Whether evidence of “coaching” of complainant admissible - finality and collateral evidence rule - exception in favour of evidence of bias or partiality in a witness.
Evidence of uncharged acts - warning necessary where evidence of uncharged acts (not properly receivable as propensity or similar fact evidence) presents risk that jury may identify a propensity to commit a charged offence.
BRS v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 1512
Gipp v R (1998) 155 ALR 15
R v K (CA 64 of 1998, 23 June 1998)
Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461
Suresh v The Queen (1998) 72 ALJR 769
Jones v The Queen (1997) 71 ALJR 538
Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460
R v Umanski [1961] VR 242.
Counsel: Mr P. Callaghan for the appellant
Mr B. Campbell for the respondent
Solicitors: Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
Hearing Date: 1 September 1998
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A.
Judgment delivered 2 October 1998
I have read and, subject to the observations which follow, agree with the reasons of Thomas J.A. His Honour refers to the decision of the High Court in Jones (1997) 71 A.L.J.R. 538, which appears to me to throw doubt upon the proposition that evidence of recent complaint may buttress the credit of the complainant, where the charge is one of a sexual offence: Kilby (1973) 129 C.L.R. 460 at 472. In Jones, in discussing whether the absence of a proper direction as to the use of evidence of recent complaint necessitated an order for a new trial, the Court remarked:
"Unless explained, the evidence might well have played an important part in the jury’s assessment of credibility".
Since it is clear that such evidence cannot be used in proof of the Crown case, the only possible basis for its admission is credit. The sentence I have quoted from Jones should not, in my respectful opinion, be treated as authority that evidence of recent complaint may not be used in assessing credit.
Under the heading "Evidence of Uncharged Acts", Thomas J.A. refers to the decision in Gipp (1998) 194 C.L.R. 106. As is mentioned by Thomas J.A., I discussed that case in K (C.A. No. 64 of 1998,…
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- R v LSS [1998] QCA 303
- Case
- [1998] QCA 303
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the evidence of a recent complaint was admissible, and if so, whether the trial judge had adequately directed the jury on its limited use. Additionally, the court had to consider the admissibility of evidence regarding the complainant's alleged "coaching" and the necessity of a warning to the jury about the potential prejudicial effect of this evidence. Furthermore, the court needed to assess whether the trial judge had appropriately warned the jury about the risk of identifying a propensity to commit the charged offence when considering evidence of uncharged acts.
The court held that the evidence of the recent complaint was admissible, but the trial judge had not sufficiently directed the jury on its limited use. This failure to provide appropriate direction led to an unfair prejudice against the appellant. Furthermore, the court found that the evidence of "coaching" was admissible as it fell within the exception for evidence of bias or partiality in a witness. However, the trial judge had not warned the jury about the risk that this evidence might be used to infer a propensity to commit the charged offence. The court also found that the trial judge had not adequately warned the jury about the potential prejudicial effect of evidence of uncharged acts. These errors led to a miscarriage of justice, and the appeal against the convictions on counts 1 to 11 was allowed, with the convictions being quashed and a new trial ordered.
In conclusion, the High Court allowed the appeal against the convictions on counts 1 to 11, quashed those convictions, and entered a judgment and verdict of acquittal on counts 3, 4 and 5. A new trial was ordered on counts 1, 2, 6 to 11 inclusive. The application for leave to appeal against the sentence was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION ALLOWED. CONVICTIONS ON COUNTS 1 - 11 INCLUSIVE QUASHED. JUDGMENT AND VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL ON COUNTS 3, 4 AND 5 ENTERED. NEW TRIAL ORDERED ON COUNTS 1, 2, 6 - 11 INCLUSIVE. APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE REFUSED.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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