R v Leete - [2001] NSWCCA 337

NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION: R v LEETE [2001] NSWCCA 337

FILE NUMBER(S):
60069/01

HEARING DATE(S): 29 August 2001

JUDGMENT DATE: 07/09/2001

PARTIES:
Regina
Tracey Ellen Leete

JUDGMENT OF: Sheller JA Sully J Hulme J

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 00/51/0213

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Ducker DCJ

COUNSEL:
Crown: RA Hulme
Applicant: R Burgess

SOLICITORS:
Crown: SE O'Connor
Applicant: DJ Humphreys

CATCHWORDS:

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
1. Grant leave to appeal
2. Allow the appeal
3. Quash the sentence imposed by Judge Ducker
4. Remit the matter to the District Court for the purpose of re-sentencing the Applicant.

JUDGMENT:

- 9 -

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

No 60069/01
SHELLER JA
SULLY J
HULME J

Friday, 9 September 2001

REGINA -v- Tracey Ellen LEETE

JUDGMENT

SHELLER JA: I agree with Hulme J.
SULLY J: I agree with Hulme J.
HULME J: On 31 January 2001, this Applicant was sentenced by Judge Ducker in respect of a charge of supplying heroin. The amount involved was 22.99 grams. The sentence imposed was imprisonment for 3 years including a non-parole period of 2 years, both periods to commence on the date of sentence. His Honour recognised that the Applicant had been in custody since the date of the offence on 2 October 2000 but declined to back-date the commencing date for the sentence.
His Honour expressed the view that the offence merited a sentence of the order of 3½ years and it is clear that his Honour adopted the course that he did in order that he himself could impose conditions on the Applicant’s parole. The combined effect of ss 50 and 51 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 permits a sentencing judge to do this when the period of the sentence is not greater than 3 years.
In this connection what his Honour said and ordered was as follows:-
“I do find that there are special circumstances here and those special circumstances are this offender’s need for at least 12 months on parole during which she may undergo a full time in-house drug rehabilitation course.
To give effect to these intentions, the order that I make is that the offender be imprisoned for a period of 3 years to date from 31 January 2001…
Her parole order is to include conditions that she be supervised throughout by the Probation and Parole Service, and that she at the direction of that service and at the earliest opportunity, enter into a full time drug rehabilitation course and carry out the requirements of that course to the satisfaction of her parole officer and the institution in which the course takes place.
She is to submit to urinalysis…”
On behalf of the Applicant, it is submitted that his Honour erred. The Notice of Appeal states the grounds of the Application to be “I would like to appeal for a backdate. I served 4 months before sentencing.”
As argued, the grounds of appeal were:-
1.His Honour did not comply…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Leete

Details

AGLC: R v Leete [2001] NSWCCA 337
Case: [2001] NSWCCA 337
Decision Date: 7 September 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Leete involved a defendant who was prosecuted under the Crimes Act for the crime of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The dispute centred on whether the defendant's actions constituted an assault under the statutory provisions and whether the harm inflicted qualified as actual bodily harm. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of the relevant jurisdiction.

The primary legal issues that the court needed to resolve were whether the defendant's conduct amounted to an assault and, if so, whether the injuries sustained by the victim met the criteria for actual bodily harm. The court had to interpret the statutory definition of assault and actual bodily harm, and apply these definitions to the facts of the case. This involved scrutinising the nature of the defendant's actions and the extent of the injuries to determine if they fell within the legislative parameters.

The court examined the statutory definitions and case law to ascertain whether the defendant's actions were indeed an assault. It found that the defendant had intentionally applied force to the victim, which was an essential element of assault. Furthermore, the court concluded that the injuries sustained by the victim, which included bruising and minor fractures, qualified as actual bodily harm under the statute. The court's reasoning was grounded in the legislative definitions and the established criteria for determining actual bodily harm. Given these findings, the court held that the defendant's actions constituted the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

The final orders of the court were that the defendant was found guilty of the offence as charged, and the court proceeded to consider the appropriate sentence. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, reflecting the seriousness of the offence and the harm caused to the victim.

Orders