SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
The Queen v Mark Dempsey Knight & Ors (No 3) [2009] QSC 450
PARTIES:
THE QUEEN
V
MARK DEMPSEY KNIGHT, WESLEY ROBERT WILLIAMS AND WAYNE THOMAS ROBERTSON
FILE NO/S:
49/08
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court Rockhampton
DELIVERED ON:
20 July 2009
DELIVERED AT:
Rockhampton
HEARING DATE:
16,17, 20 July 2009
JUDGE:
McMeekin J
ORDER:
Applications dismissed
COUNSEL:
Mr D Lynch (for Williams) Mr G McGuire (for Knight) Mr J Fraser (for Robertson)
(Applicants)
Mr R Pointing, Mr D Funch
(Respondent)
SOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Office
Director of Public Prosecutions
Mark Dempsey Knight, Wesley Robert Williams and Wayne Thomas Robertson, are charged with the murder of Robert James Buckley. They have pleaded not guilty. The Crown case has closed.
The defence make two submissions – first that there is no case to answer; second that I should revisit a pre-trial ruling that I gave concerning the receipt into evidence of hearsay statements concerning the deceased’s relationship with, principally, Williams, admitted pursuant to s 93B(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld).
No Case to Answer
The prosecution case is that the accused caused the death of the deceased by compression of his neck in some manner so as to cause asphyxiation. The prosecution allege that he was either first strangled and then suspended, or simply suspended, by a towel from a louvre bar by the accused men. Thus the prosecution say that those actions of the accused men were a substantial or significant cause of Mr Buckley’s death (see s 293 of the Code and Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378 at 411). It can be accepted that if the jury could be satisfied to the requisite standard that the accused did either of those things the prosecution would have discharged its onus of establishing causation of death.
There is no direct evidence that the accused did either of these things. The prosecution case depends on the proposition that the surrounding circumstances are such that an inference should be drawn to that effect. Guilt must therefore not only be a rational inference but also it should be the only rational inference that could reasonably be drawn from the circumstances (Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at p 375; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234 at p 252).
The defence submission assumes that there are only two alternatives open on the Crown case. The first is that the accused killed the deceased. The second is that the deceased committed suicide. The defence contend that suicide remains a reasonable hypothesis and is not excluded on the evidence and hence there is an incurable defect in the Crown case.
The test to apply on such an application was explained in Doney v R, (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 214–215 where the High Court said:
… if there is evidence (even if tenuous or inherently weak or vague) which can be taken into account by the jury in its deliberations and…
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- AGLC
- R v Knight (No 3) [2009] QSC 450
- Case
- [2009] QSC 450
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Supreme Court's decision to deny Knight leave to appeal was an appealable order under section 547 of the Criminal Code. Knight argued that the Supreme Court's decision to deny leave to appeal was a final and appealable order, while the prosecution contended that such a decision was not appealable as it was not a final determination of the appellant's criminal conviction or sentence. The court was required to determine the scope of section 547 and whether the Supreme Court's decision fell within its purview.
The court found that the Supreme Court's decision to deny leave to appeal was not an appealable order under section 547 of the Criminal Code. The court held that section 547 only permitted appeals from decisions that finally determined the appellant's criminal conviction or sentence. As the decision to deny leave to appeal was not a final determination of Knight's conviction or sentence, it did not constitute an appealable order. The court further noted that the decision to grant or deny leave to appeal was a discretionary one and not subject to appeal as a matter of right. Accordingly, the applications were dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Applications dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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