SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v KAV [2020] QCA 28
PARTIES:
R
v
KAV
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 242 of 2019
DC No 186 of 2019
DC No 216 of 2018DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Mackay – Date of Sentence: 1 August 2019 (Richards DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
Date of Orders: 14 February 2020
Date of Publication of Reasons: 28 February 2020DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
14 February 2020
JUDGES:
Morrison and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J
ORDERS:
Date of Orders: 14 February 2020
1. The application for leave to appeal is allowed.
2. The appeal is allowed.
3. The sentence imposed on 1 August 2019 is set aside to the extent that it set a parole release date at 30 April 2020.
4. The appellant be released on parole from 14 February 2020.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful stalking and two counts of unlawful stalking, contravening a Court order – where each count was a domestic violence offence – where the applicant also pleaded guilty to summary offences – where the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for three years in respect of each count of unlawful stalking, contravening a Court order and a concurrent period of one year’s imprisonment for the remaining count of unlawful stalking – where the applicant was convicted and not further punished for the summary charges – where the sentencing Judge set the parole release date on 30 April 2020 – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal the sentence on the grounds that the sentencing Judge erred in failing to recognise that a term of imprisonment was a penalty of last resort and that the sentence was manifestly excessive – where the applicant’s conduct occurred over a protracted period – where the applicant breached protection orders – where 20 months elapsed between the end of the conduct and the sentence and the applicant had committed no further offences – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive
COUNSEL:
J Crawford for the applicant
M P Le Grand for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
THE COURT: On 1 August 2019, the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful stalking and two counts of unlawful stalking, contravening a Court order. Each count was a domestic violence offence. The applicant also pleaded guilty to a number of summary offences.
The applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for three years in respect of each count of unlawful stalking, contravening a Court order and a concurrent period of one year’s imprisonment in respect of the remaining count of unlawful stalking. The applicant was convicted and not further punished in respect of each of the summary charges.
After declaring one day spent in pre-sentence custody as time already served, the sentencing…
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- AGLC
- R v Kav [2020] QCA 28
- Case
- [2020] QCA 28
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the sentencing Judge erred in failing to recognise that imprisonment was a penalty of last resort and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court considered the seriousness of the applicant's conduct, the breach of court orders, and the lack of any further offending in the two years between the end of the conduct and the sentence. The court also examined relevant authorities that provided a range of custodial sentences for stalking offences.
The court found that the sentencing Judge did not err in imposing a custodial sentence, as the applicant's conduct was particularly serious and persistent, breaching domestic violence orders and conditions of bail. The court also concluded that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, given the persistence and seriousness of the applicant's conduct over the extended period. The court noted that while comparable authorities suggested shorter custodial sentences, those cases did not involve the same level of persistent conduct, repeated breaches of orders, or the aggravating factor of each offence being a domestic violence offence.
In conclusion, the court allowed the application for leave to appeal and set aside the sentence to the extent that it set a parole release date of 30 April 2020. The appellant was ordered to be released on parole from 14 February 2020.
Orders
Orders of the court
Date of Orders: 14 February 2020
1. The application for leave to appeal is allowed.
2. The appeal is allowed.
3. The sentence imposed on 1 August 2019 is set aside to the extent that it set a parole release date at 30 April 2020.
4. The appellant be released on parole from 14 February 2020.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant’s stalking conduct was particularly serious, involving over 4,800 telephone calls and texts over an extended period of 13 months. A number of threats were issued to the complainant. The applicant physically approached the complainant’s home in breach of domestic violence protection orders and bail conditions. The applicant’s offending conduct also was directed towards the applicant’s new partner and his family. The applicant persisted in that conduct, notwithstanding being interviewed by police and being dealt with for breach of a domestic violence order.Consideration The sentencing Judge rightly observed that the applicant’s conduct involved a serious example of stalking. The applicant engaged in persistent conduct over a 13 month period, much of which was committed in breach of domestic violence orders and conditions of her bail. The conduct persisted notwithstanding the applicant being dealt with for breach of a domestic violence order during the offending period. Whilst the applicant had no criminal history at the commencement of the stalking period, and there were personality and associated circumstances which provided context to her persistent behaviour, her conduct in breach of Court orders was so serious as to justify sentences of imprisonment, including a period of actual imprisonment. Against that background, there is no basis to conclude that the failure of the sentencing Judge to specifically refer to a sentence of imprisonment as a sentence of last resort constituted an error in the sentencing discretion. The imposition of a head sentence of three years’ imprisonment was also not manifestly excessive. Whilst comparable authorities referred to at sentence and on appeal[1] contained yardsticks of 18 months to two and a half years’ imprisonment by offenders with more significant past criminal history and who engaged in, on occasions, more serious conduct, none of those authorities involved such persistent conduct over a protracted period, repeatedly breaching orders; and bail; and after being convicted of breaching a domestic violence order. Further, apart from SCM, none involved the aggravating factor of each offence being a domestic violence offence.[2][1]R v Macdonald [2008] QCA 384; R v Baker [2011] QCA 33; R v Conde [2016] 1 Qd R 562; R v Manning [2015] QCA 241; R v SCM [2016] QCA 175; R v Coutts [2016] QCA 206; R v Oliver [2018] QCA 348; R v Tarasiuk [2019] QCA 165.[2]Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, s 9(10A). Whilst SCM did have that aggravating factor, SCM involved stalking over a far shorter period, by an offender with diagnosed psychiatric conditions. Macdonald did involve conduct in contravention of Court orders. However, the stalking period was less than four months. Coutts and Oliver also involved stalking over a far shorter period, with the stalking ceasing upon police involvement. Tarasiuk, whilst involving stalking over a protracted period, involved one count without the circumstance of aggravation in contravention of a Court order, and without the offence being a domestic violence offence.