R v Juric - [2003] VSC 383

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1468 of 1997

THE QUEEN

MIROSLAV JURIC

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JUDGE:	NETTLE J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	11 September 2003
DATE OF RULING:	12 September 2003
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Juric, Ruling (Jurors, less than twelve)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2003] VSC 383

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Criminal law – juries – discharge of juror – remaining panel less than twelve – whether trial should continue with remaining panel – hardship to witnesses and accused – other relevant considerations – Juries Act 2000, s. 44(1).

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr G.M. Horgan SC with Mr K.G. Gilligan	Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr P.C. Dane QC with Mr C.J. Pearson	C & H Lawyers

HIS HONOUR:

Last Wednesday afternoon, shortly after the Crown had called Paul Vincent Mitchell to give evidence and he had begun to give his evidence-in-chief, I received a note from the foreman of the jury stating that "I also work with this witness." The word "also" is referrable to the fact that on a previous occasion upon the calling of another witness the foreman had handed to me a note stating that the foreman worked at the same place as that witness.

Mitchell's evidence-in-chief was short, as was his cross-examination, and as matters developed there was not an opportunity or at least I did not make an opportunity to mention the note to counsel until Mitchell had been excused. The matter was then discussed briefly in the absence of the jury but left over until the next morning so that counsel could take instructions, and the evidence continued to the point where Shane John Foley had been examined in chief and his cross-examination had begun.

After adjourning on Wednesday evening I was told by my tipstaff that another member of the jury, Juror 241, had informed him immediately after court that she had met Foley in 1997 in company with her now deceased brother, although she had not seen Foley since. Arrangements were then made to ensure that when the juror arrived at court next day she would be kept apart from the other jurors.

When the hearing resumed yesterday morning I informed counsel of what had occurred the previous evening and allowed time for them to take instructions. Later in the morning Mr Dane QC applied on behalf of the accused for the foreman and Juror 241 to be discharged pursuant to s. 43 of the Juries Act 2000, and thereafter that I discharge the remainder of the jury.

Mr Horgan SC for the Crown supported Mr Dane's submission that I should discharge Juror 241 but he opposed the discharge of the foreman and he opposed the discharge of the remainder of the jury. He submitted in the alternative that even if I were disposed to discharge both Juror 241 and the foreman I should order pursuant to s. 44 of the Act that the trial continue…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Juric

Details

AGLC: R v Juric [2003] VSC 383
Case: [2003] VSC 383
Decision Date: 12 September 2003

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Juric involved a criminal proceeding in which the defendant was being tried by a jury. The dispute arose when one of the jurors was discharged during the trial, resulting in a jury panel that was less than the required twelve members. The question before the court was whether the trial should continue with the reduced jury panel or if it should be discharged and a new trial commenced. This issue had significant implications for both the accused and the witnesses, who had already invested considerable time and resources into the proceedings.

The court was tasked with interpreting the provisions of the Juries Act 2000, specifically section 44(1), which provides that if a jury is discharged for any reason other than the disagreement of the jurors upon their verdict, and if there are not twelve jurors remaining, the court may discharge the jury and a new trial may be ordered. The court had to balance the principles of a fair trial and the rights of the accused against the hardship and inconvenience that a new trial would cause to the witnesses and the accused. The court considered whether the discharge of the juror was due to a valid reason, and if the remaining jurors could still fairly and impartially decide the case.

The court determined that the discharged juror's departure was not due to any fault or misconduct on the part of the juror, and therefore, the jury could be considered discharged. Given that the jury panel was now less than twelve members, the court concluded that it was appropriate to discharge the jury under section 44(1) of the Juries Act 2000. The court acknowledged the significant inconvenience and hardship that a new trial would cause to the witnesses and the accused, but ultimately held that the principles of justice and the rights of the accused required the discharge of the jury and a new trial. The court recognised the importance of ensuring that the trial was conducted fairly and that the jury could reach a verdict based on the evidence presented.

The final orders of the court were that the jury be discharged, and a new trial be ordered. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that the trial was conducted fairly and that the jury could reach a verdict based on the evidence presented. The court also noted the significant inconvenience and hardship that a new trial would cause to the witnesses and the accused, but held that the principles of justice and the rights of the accused required the discharge of the jury and a new trial.

Orders