R v Jones - [1998] QCA 40

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1998] QCA 040
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 393 of 1997.

Brisbane

[R v. Jones]

T H E Q U E E N

CRAIG VICTOR JONES

(Applicant) Appellant

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Pincus J.A. Williams J. Fryberg J.

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Judgment delivered 13 March 1998

Joint reasons for judgment of Pincus J.A. and Williams J., separate concurring reasons
of Fryberg J.

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APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE GRANTED. APPEAL

ALLOWED. SENTENCES IMPOSED BELOW SET ASIDE AND IN LIEU THEREOF:

(A)	SENTENCES OF 3 YEARS IMPRISONMENT ARE IMPOSED IN RELATION TO THE OFFENCES CHARGED IN INDICTMENTS 1 AND 2; AND
(B)	SENTENCES OF 18 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT ARE IMPOSED IN RELATION TO THE OFFENCES CHARGED IN INDICTMENTS 3 AND 4;

SENTENCES (B) TO BE CUMULATIVE ON SENTENCES (A).
RECOMMENDATION MADE THAT APPELLANT BE CONSIDERED FOR PAROLE AFTER
HAVING SERVED 18 MONTHS. OTHER ORDERS MADE BY SENTENCING JUDGE

CONFIRMED.

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CATCHWORDS: Criminal Law - appeal against sentence - false pretences - extensive criminal history involving offences of dishonesty - only one prior sentence of imprisonment - charges related to offences committed in 1992 and 1996 - 4 years imprisonment imposed for 1992 offences and 2 years cumulative for 1996 offences - sentencing judge inaccurately informed of amount of money wrongly acquired.

J.C. Jones (C.A. No. 63 of 1997, 27 May 1997)

Counsel:	Ms J Dick S.C. for the applicant/appellant. Mrs L Clare for the respondent.
Solicitors:	Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant/appellant. Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent.
Hearing date:	27 February 1998.

JOINT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A. AND WILLIAMS J.

Judgment delivered 13 March 1998

The applicant was, having pleaded guilty, convicted in the District Court on 3 October 1997 on charges relating to two groups of offences, the first committed in 1992 and the second in 1996. All of them involved pecuniary dishonesty. The applicant was born in 1964 and is now 33; he has an extensive criminal history and the judge sentenced him to a total of 6 years imprisonment, 4 years for the 1992 offences which were the more serious group and 2 years cumulative for the 1996 offences. His Honour recommended that the applicant be eligible for parole after having served 2 years and made a declaration in his favour as to a 73 day period of custody.

The criminal history begins with charges of false pretences, in May 1985, when the applicant was 20. In each year since then, except 1987 and 1990, the applicant has been convicted of a number of offences of dishonesty. The primary judge said that swindling became a way of life with him and that seems to be so. The present charges were 3 counts of false pretences dating from 1992 and 13 counts of various other offences of dishonesty in 1996. The 1992 offences attracted the sentence of 4 years imprisonment which we have mentioned. The first count was based upon the applicant having held himself out as a financial consultant able…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Jones

Details

AGLC: R v Jones [1998] QCA 40
Case: [1998] QCA 40
Decision Date: 13/03/1998

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Craig Victor Jones, appealed against the sentence imposed by the District Court for offences of dishonesty committed in 1992 and 1996. The case reached the Supreme Court of Queensland, where the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal against the sentence. The central issue was whether the sentences imposed were appropriate, given the misapprehension by the sentencing judge regarding the amount of money wrongly acquired by the applicant. The Court had to decide if the sentences imposed were within the acceptable range given the circumstances of the case, particularly considering the applicant's extensive criminal history.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge was inaccurately informed about the total amount of money involved in the fraud, which led to an overestimation of the sum defrauded. This error was significant enough to warrant a reconsideration of the sentences imposed. The Court acknowledged the applicant's extensive history of dishonesty but noted that his only previous imprisonment was set aside on appeal. Despite the applicant's persistent offending, the Court determined that the sentences imposed were excessive, especially considering the applicant's first term of imprisonment was only set aside two years prior. The Court also considered the possibility that a further substantial period of imprisonment might encourage the applicant to change his ways.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the sentences should be reduced. They set aside the original sentences and imposed new ones: 3 years imprisonment for the 1992 offences and 18 months imprisonment for the 1996 offences, to be served cumulatively. The Court recommended that the applicant be considered for parole after serving 18 months and confirmed the other orders made by the sentencing judge. This decision ensured that the sentences fairly represented the totality of the criminality involved, aligning with the principles of sentencing and the totality principle.

Orders