R v Jo

Case [2012] QCA 356


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Jo [2012] QCA 356

PARTIES:

R
v
JO, Tatsuo
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 349 of 2011
DC No 936 of 2009

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Southport

DELIVERED ON:

18 December 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

24 August 2012

JUDGES:

Muir and Fraser JJA and Fryberg J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

TAXES AND DUTIES – INCOME TAX AND RELATED LEGISLATION – LIABILITY TO TAXATION GENERALLY – SOURCE OF INCOME – GENERALLY – where appellant convicted after jury trial of nine offences of dishonesty concerning alleged tax evasion scheme – where appellant argued payments to overseas company not dividends within ss 6(1) and 44 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (“ITAA”), deemed dividends, or “income” within ordinary meaning in s 25 ITAA 1936 – where appellant submitted jury could not exclude hypothesis that payments were fringe benefits, which were excluded from appellant’s assessable income – where appellant contended he did not obtain a financial advantage as a result of the alleged deception – whether payments were dividends, deemed dividends or ordinary income – whether jury could exclude hypothesis that payments were fringe benefits – whether appellant obtained financial advantage from alleged deception

CRIMINAL LAW – GENERAL MATTERS – ANCILLARY LIABILITY – AID, ABET, COUNSEL OR PROCURE – PARTICULAR CASES – where offence committed by company controlled by appellant – where appellant argued no evidence he aided company to make payments to another company within the meaning of s11.2(1) of the Code – where appellant contended that because he was guiding mind of company, his acts in making payments were acts of the company and hence the company’s liability for the offence was direct not vicarious – where appellant argued that his acts did not constitute aiding because it involved commission of an act which facilities and is different from act that constitutes principal offence – whether the appellant aided company

Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), s 11.2(1), s 134.2
Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth), s 66, s 136, s 148
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 6, s 19, s 23L, s 25, s 44, s 51
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 6-5, s 6-10, s 8-1

Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; [1990] HCA 51, cited
Expo International Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Torma (1985) 3 NSWLR 225, considered
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Anstis (2010) 241 CLR 443; [2010] HCA 40, cited
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Belford (1952) 88 CLR 589; [1952] HCA 73, considered
FederalCommissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 199; [1987] HCA 18, applied
Fisher v Bennett (1987) 85 FLR 469, considered
Hadjiloucas v Crean [1988] 1 WLR 1006; [1987] 3 All ER 1008, considered
Hamilton v Whitehead (1988)…

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Details
AGLC
R v Jo [2012] QCA 356
Case
[2012] QCA 356
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, R, was convicted following a jury trial on nine counts of dishonesty related to an alleged tax evasion scheme. The central issue in the case was whether the payments made to an overseas company constituted dividends, deemed dividends, or ordinary income under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. Additionally, the appellant argued that the jury could not exclude the hypothesis that the payments were fringe benefits, which would have excluded them from his assessable income. The appellant also contended that he did not obtain a financial advantage as a result of the alleged deception. Furthermore, the appellant argued that he did not aid, abet, counsel, or procure the company in making the payments, as required under the criminal code, and that his actions were those of the company, thus making its liability direct rather than vicarious.

The court examined whether the payments made by the company were dividends, deemed dividends, or ordinary income, and if the jury could reasonably exclude the hypothesis that the payments were fringe benefits. The court also assessed whether the appellant obtained a financial advantage from the alleged deception. Regarding the ancillary liability, the court considered whether the appellant aided the company in making the payments, as defined by the criminal code, and whether his actions constituted aiding given they were different from the principal offence. The court found that the jury was entitled to conclude that the payments were ordinary income and that the appellant did obtain a financial advantage from the alleged deception. The court also held that the appellant did aid the company in making the payments.

The appeal was dismissed by the court. The reasoning and findings of the court upheld the conviction on all counts, confirming that the appellant was liable for the tax evasion charges. The court's decision rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the nature of the payments and his role in the alleged scheme, thereby upholding the jury's verdict and the conviction.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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