Industrial Law (Cth)—Industrial arbitration—Industrial dispute—Award in partial settlement of dispute—Application to vary—Party to dispute not bound by award or affected by application to vary—Right to appear—Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), ss. 59 (2), 61.

Decisions

Aug. 16.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
GIBBS J. On or about 30th April 1970 the Municipal Officers' Association of Australia ("M.O.A.") served upon the State Electricity Commission of Victoria ("S.E.C.V."), the Electricity Trust of South Australia ("E.T.S.A.") and certain other electricity authorities a letter demanding that they should grant to their employees the salaries and conditions of service set out in a log of claims which was attached to the letter of demand. Amongst other things it was demanded that the ordinary hours of duty of persons employed in or in connexion with the operation of electricity undertakings conducted by the authorities should be thirty per week. The demands were not complied with and on 19th May 1970 M.O.A. notified the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission ("the Commission") of the existence of an industrial dispute between the M.O.A. and the authorities, including S.E.C.V. and E.T.S.A. On 8th June 1970 a Commissioner found that an industrial dispute existed in a number of States between M.O.A. and S.E.C.V. and E.T.S.A. and other authorities. On 18th October 1971, in part settlement of the dispute, a Commissioner made a consent award entitled the Electricity Trust of South Australia (Staff Conditions) Award, 1971 ("the E.T.S.A. Award") (1971) 140 CAR, pp 781 et seq . The S.E.C.V. did not appear before the Commission when this award was made and is not one of the persons on whom the award is intended to be binding (cl. 32). By cl. 5 of the award the ordinary hours of work for a day worker are to be thirty-seven and a half but there are exceptions (apparently wide in their scope) in the case of which the hours are to be forty. On 1st November 1976 M.O.A. made application for an order varying the E.T.S.A. Award, by, in effect, making the ordinary hours of work thirty-seven and a half in all cases. The application was numbered C. No. 3966 of 1976. On 14th January 1977 E.T.S.A. also made application to vary the E.T.S.A. Award; its application was numbered C. No. 5003 of 1977. (at p618)

2. On or about 23rd May 1972 the Electrical Trades Union of Australia and six other unions served on E.T.S.A. and S.E.C.V. a letter of demand and a log of claims for wages and conditions of employment in the electricity industry. One of the claims was for a thirty hour week. The demands were not met, the unions notified the Commission of the existence of an industrial dispute and on 31st May 1972 the Commission found that an industrial dispute existed between the unions and…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Isaac; Ex Parte

Details

AGLC: R v Isaac; Ex Parte [1978] HCA 33
Case: [1978] HCA 33
Decision Date: 16 August 1978

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *R v Isaac; Ex Parte* involved an application for a writ of prohibition brought by Isaac against the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. The dispute concerned the validity of certain search warrants issued under the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) and the subsequent seizure of documents. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the search warrants, which authorised the search for and seizure of documents relating to the offence of conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth, were validly issued. Specifically, the court had to determine if the information laid before the issuing magistrate was sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for believing that the documents sought would afford evidence of the commission of the offence. A related issue was whether the warrants were too broad in their scope, failing to sufficiently particularise the documents to be seized.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the warrants were invalid. Their Honours reasoned that the information laid before the magistrate did not provide sufficient particularity to justify the broad scope of the warrants. The information merely stated that the documents sought would afford evidence of conspiracy to defraud, without specifying the nature of the documents or the particular transactions involved. The court applied the principle that search warrants must be specific and that the issuing authority must have reasonable grounds for believing that the items to be seized are likely to be found at the premises to be searched and are evidence of a specific offence.

Consequently, the High Court made absolute the order nisi for a writ of prohibition, quashing the search warrants.

Orders