R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte - [1962] HCA 22

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ.

THE QUEEN v. COMMONWEALTH CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION COMMISSION; Ex parte MELBOURNE AND METROPOLITAN TRAMWAYS BOARD

(1962) 108 CLR 166

4 May 1962

Conciliation and Arbitration (Cth)

Conciliation and Arbitration (Cth)—Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission—Jurisdiction—Award—Industrial dispute extending beyond limits of any one State—Order of variation of award—Relation to original industrial dispute sufficient to bring it within its scope—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 51 (xxxv.).

Decision

May 4.
The COURT delivered the following written judgment:-
The question to be decided is whether an award and an order of variation made by the Senior Commissioner of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission were beyond his jurisdiction to make. We are concerned with nothing but his jurisdiction and that depends primarily upon the Commonwealth Constitution which in such a case as this makes it impossible that he should have jurisdiction unless his award and his order respectively related to the prevention or settlement of an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State. If they do not do so writs of prohibition must go to prevent their being put into operation or enforced. But we have nothing to do with the industrial merits, that is the industrial propriety or wisdom, of the course which the Senior Commissioner took, only with his jurisdiction to take it. The subject of the two documents, that is of the award and of the order of variation, is the use by the Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramway Board of one-man buses on certain routes except at given times. The routes actually in question were operated by the Board in Footscray (Melbourne) and the service had been by tram cars from the Footscray depot. These were discontinued and it was decided that the routes should be serviced by motor omnibuses, each staffed by one man. There are other routes which the Board had operated with one-man buses. (at p168)

2. When for the routes in Footscray now in question rosters were prepared for a one-man bus service to take effect as from Monday, 12th March 1962, the employees refused to staff and operate the service in that manner on the routes in question. Until the change they had been tram routes on which two-men trams had been run. (at p168)

3. The working conditions of the service are governed by an award of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission called The Tramway Employees (Melbourne) Interim Award 1958, as amended. It contained a wage rate for a "one-man bus operator" but otherwise did not deal with the subject. The basis of jurisdiction for that award was an industrial dispute arising from a log of claims for wages and conditions of employment by the Australian Tramway and Motor Omnibus Employees Association served upon tramway and bus authorities in Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania. No one denies that an inter-State dispute arose out of the service of the log in relation to the subjects which the log covered;…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1962] HCA 22
Decision Date: 4 May 1962

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an application for a writ of prohibition directed to the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The applicant, the Commonwealth, sought to prevent the Commission from proceeding with a compulsory conference and subsequent arbitration concerning a dispute between the Commonwealth and the Australian Postal Workers Union. The dispute related to claims for increased wages and altered conditions of employment for postal employees.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the dispute, as presented to the Commission, fell within the constitutional ambit of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) and, specifically, whether it constituted an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of section 4 of the Act. The Court had to determine if the claims made by the Union, and the nature of the relationship between the Commonwealth as employer and its postal employees, satisfied the requirements for an industrial dispute capable of being dealt with by the Commission.

The Court's reasoning focused on the definition of an industrial dispute and the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction. It was held that an industrial dispute requires a dispute as to industrial matters, which includes terms and conditions of employment. The Court examined the nature of the relationship between the Commonwealth and its employees in the postal service, noting that while the Commonwealth was the employer, the dispute concerned the terms and conditions of employment, which were matters of industrial concern. The Court applied the principles established in previous cases concerning the definition of industrial disputes and the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunals, emphasizing that the dispute must be real and likely to lead to industrial unrest.

The application for the writ of prohibition was dismissed.

Orders