Act Against Tumultuous Petitioning 1661 (13 Car 2, st 1, c 5); Bill of Rights 1688, article 5, article 9; Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp); Criminal Code (NT), s 1, s 31, s 34, s 61, s 61(a); Interpretation Act, s 59; Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act 1992, s 3(3), s 5, s 6, s 25, s 26; Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth), Part III Division I (ss 6-12); Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), s 16; Seditious Meetings Act 1817 (Imp) (Geo 3, cap XIX s 23); Sentencing Act (NT), s 40(6); Sources of Law Act 1985, s 2, s 3; Statute of Westminster 1931 (Imp), s 2(1);
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth); Strodes Act 1512 (4 Henry VIII, c 8); The Constitution of Australia, s 122

A C Castles, An Australian Legal History; Sydney, Law Book Company, 1982; Enid Campbell, Parliamentary Privilege, Sydney, Federation Press, 2003; Limon and McKay (eds), Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 22nd ed, London, Butterworths, 1997; McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, 2nd ed, Wellington New Zealand, GP Publications, 1994; Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice, 9th ed, Canberra, Department of the Senate, 1999; Pettifer (ed), House of Representatives Practice, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981; Richard L Perry and John C Cooper, Sources of Our Liberties, Alabama, Legal Classics Library edition, 1990; Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol 6, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937

R v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629; R v Wright; ex parte Klar (1971) 1 SASR 103; Wake and Anor v NTA and Anor (1996) 5 NTLR 170; (1996) 109 NTR 1; applied

The Queen v Richards; ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne (1955) 92 CLR 157; distinguished

Bradlaugh v Gossett (1883-1884) 12 QBD 271; followed

Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1; Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; Erglis v Buckley (2004) 2 Qd R 599; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520; Laurance v Katter (2000) 1 Qd R 147; (1996) 141 ALR 447; Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579; Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321; R v Eliot, Hollis and Valentine (1629) 3 St Tr 293; Rowley v O’Chee (2000) 1 Qd R 207; (1997) 150 ALR 199; Johnson v Johnson (2000)…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Inkamala

Details

AGLC: R v Inkamala [2006] NTCCA 11
Case: [2006] NTCCA 11
Decision Date: 7 JUNE 2006

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Northern Territory Court of Appeal considered an appeal by the Crown against a sentence imposed on the respondent, R v Inkamala. The Crown argued that the original sentence was manifestly inadequate. The appeal also concerned the partial restoration of a sentence for a breach of a suspended sentence.

The Court was required to determine whether the original sentence imposed on the respondent was so inadequate as to be manifestly unjust. It also had to consider the appropriate approach to restoring a suspended sentence following a breach, and whether the partial restoration in this instance was lawful and appropriate.

Applying the principles established in *Veen v The Queen [No 2]*, the Court found that the original sentence was indeed manifestly inadequate. The Court reasoned that the sentencing judge had failed to give sufficient weight to relevant factors, leading to an unduly lenient outcome. Consequently, the Court allowed the Crown's appeal, resentenced the respondent, and restored the original sentence that had been suspended.

Orders