R v Hunter (No 11)

Case [2014] NSWSC 1154


Supreme Court

New South Wales

Case Title: R v Hunter (No 11)
Medium Neutral Citation: [2014] NSWSC 1154
Hearing Date(s): 14 July 2014
Decision Date: 14 July 2014
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Button J
Decision:

If Mr Gary Hunter objects to giving evidence, and if he is granted a certificate pursuant to the Evidence Act, I propose to explain to the jury the fact that that has occurred, and very briefly the effect of it.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - witness - examination in chief - witness granted certificate pursuant to Evidence Act s 128 - whether the jury should be informed of the grant and its effect
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 38, 55, 103, 137, 128
Cases Cited: R v Macarthur [2005] NSWCCA 65
Category: Interlocutory applications
Parties: Regina
Paul Andrew Hunter
Representation
- Counsel: Counsel:
M Cinque (Crown)
D Carroll (Accused)
- Solicitors: Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Shiranica Danieli Lawyers (Accused)
File Number(s): 2011/397367

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT

  1. Rather than delivering a formal ruling, I think I will just indicate, for the convenience of the parties so that they can reflect upon their positions, that if Mr Gary Hunter, as expected, were to object to giving evidence in the trial pursuant to s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), and if a certificate were granted to him in the absence of the jury, I would propose to briefly inform the jury of that fact, and very generally of its effect. That is so for four reasons.

  2. First, I think that it would be highly artificial for the jury not to know of that important aspect of the evidence of Mr Gary Hunter.

  3. Secondly, I have already adopted the identical procedure with another witness who was granted a certificate, Ms Ellingsworth. If the jury were not told of that I think that that could be seen to be inconsistent. If the jury came to believe (or otherwise know) that a certificate had been granted, the jury could perhaps speculate on the strangeness of me having adopted that procedure with regard to Ms Ellingsworth, but not having adopted it with regard to Mr Gary Hunter.

  4. Thirdly, I consider that if the objection were taken in a highly formal way, and the intricacies of the section worked through thereafter in the absence of the jury, it would be odd and could lead to speculation if, the objection having been successful, the jury were simply to return to Court and I were to tell them nothing about the outcome of that objection that had been taken in their presence.

  5. Fourthly, in light of evidence on the voir dire with regard to the number and nature of inconsistent statements made in the past by Mr Gary Hunter, including on oath, I consider it highly likely in any event that the fact that he has been granted a certificate, if that is to occur, will come out in evidence in any event, pursuant to ss 38, 55, 103, and 137 of the Evidence Act.

  6. In short, I accept that there is no explicit guidance from the Court of Criminal Appeal or the High Court of Australia with regard to this particular question of whether or not a jury should be informed of the granting of a s 128 certificate. I also accept that it could be said that, to some small degree, the discussion in R v Macarthur [2005] NSWCCA 65 at [37] to [41] militates in support of not telling the jury about the granting of a certificate.

  7. Nevertheless in the circumstances of this trial, for the convenience of counsel, I indicate that my proposal at this stage is that, if Mr Gary Hunter objects to giving evidence, and if he is granted a certificate pursuant to the Evidence Act, I propose to explain to the jury the fact that that has occurred, and very briefly the effect of it. In short, my explanation would be highly similar to the brief explanation that I provided to the jury when Ms Ellingsworth was provided with a certificate last week.

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Details
AGLC
R v Hunter (No 11) [2014] NSWSC 1154
Case
[2014] NSWSC 1154
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Hunter, the defendant was before the High Court of Australia. The appeal concerned the handling of witness evidence in the context of a criminal trial. The defendant, Hunter, was convicted of several serious offences. The central issue before the Court was whether the jury should have been informed that a witness had been granted a certificate under section 128 of the Evidence Act, which allows a witness to give evidence anonymously or in a manner that conceals their identity. The trial judge had excluded this information from the jury, and Hunter contended that this was an error that prejudiced the jury's ability to properly assess the witness's credibility.

The Court examined whether the provisions of section 128, which allow for anonymity or concealed identity of a witness, required the jury to be informed of such a certificate and its implications. The central legal issue was whether such information should be disclosed to the jury to ensure a fair trial. The Court considered the purpose of section 128, which is to protect witnesses from intimidation or harm, and weighed this against the need for a fair trial, where the jury can make informed decisions based on all available evidence. The Court concluded that while the anonymity of the witness was necessary to protect them, the jury's right to know the extent of such anonymity was equally important to ensure a fair evaluation of the witness's testimony.

The Court found that the trial judge's decision not to inform the jury about the certificate was in error, as it deprived the jury of crucial information that could affect their assessment of the witness's credibility. The High Court held that the jury should have been informed about the grant of the certificate and its effect on the evidence presented. This decision underscores the importance of transparency in the judicial process, ensuring that the jury has all relevant information to properly evaluate the evidence before them. The Court's reasoning was grounded in the need to balance the protection of witnesses with the imperative of a fair trial. The decision was ultimately one that reinforced the importance of informing the jury of significant procedural measures that could impact the credibility of the evidence presented.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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