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R v Hines (No 1)

R v Hines (No 1)

Case [2014] NSWSC 701 4 June 2014

Breach of Contract

Causation

Admissibility of Evidence

Severance of Counts

Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm

Separate Trial

Murder

Mens Rea & Intention

Transactional Evidence

Criminal Law

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Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Hines (No 1) [2014] NSWSC 701
Hearing dates: 29 May 2014
Decision date: 04 June 2014
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Hamill J
Decision:
(1) Count (2) is to be severed from the indictment and there is to be a separate trial in respect of that count.
(2) The evidence of the events giving rise to the allegation in count (2) is excluded.
(3) The application for severance of count (3) is refused.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - evidence - severance of counts - assault occasioning actual bodily harm - separate trial - murder - accused state of mind - transactional evidence
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Bull v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 443;
De Jesus v The Queen (1986) 61 ALJR 1;
HML v The Queen; SB v The Queen; OAE v The Queen [2008] HCA 16;
Jiang v R [2010] NSWCCA 277;
LJW v R [2010] NSWCCA 114;
O'Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566;
Phillips v The Queen (2006) 225 CLR 303;
R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510;
R v Barton [2004] NSWCCA 229;
R v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R;
R v Venna [1976] QB 421;
Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528;
Tully v The Queen [2006] HCA 56 230 CLR 234;
TWL v R [2012] NSWCCA 57;
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Crown
Accused: Alan John Hines
Representation: Counsel:
P McGrath (Crown)
E Wilson SC (Accused)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Aboriginal Legal Service (Accused)

File Number(s): 2013/52349

Judgment

The accused Allan John Hines has been arraigned on an indictment containing three counts. The first charge is that he did murder Aaron Jones. The second and third counts are counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm on two different victims, namely Teegan Jones and Caylan Jones. Mr Hines' trial is due to commence in Broken Hill on 23 June 2014.

By notice of motion dated 4 May 2014 the accused seeks orders;

(1) For severance of the indictment and separate trials;

(2) That count (2) - the charge of assaulting Teegan Jones - be severed from the indictment and that there be a separate trial with respect to that count;

(3) That count (3) - the charge of assaulting Caylan Jones - be severed from the indictment and that there be a separate trial with respect to that count.

The accused relies on evidence contained in an affidavit of his solicitor Rebecca Ellen Mitchell and a bundle of documents which became exhibit 1 on the notice of motion. Exhibit 1 contains a copy of the indictment, the Crown case statement, an expanded summary of the evidence prepared by Mr Wilson SC who appears for the accused, a chart which compares the evidence of the crucial witnesses, a chronology,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Hines (No 1)

Details

AGLC: R v Hines (No 1) [2014] NSWSC 701
Case: [2014] NSWSC 701
Decision Date: 04 June 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the respondent, Hines, was charged with murder and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia, which was required to determine whether the trial judge should have severed the counts in the indictment and ordered separate trials. The murder charge related to the death of a woman who had been stabbed, and the assault charge related to an incident where Hines had attacked another woman. The Court was required to consider whether the evidence of the assault was relevant to proving the murder and whether the two counts should have been tried separately.

The Court held that the evidence of the assault was relevant to proving the accused's state of mind at the time of the murder and was therefore admissible as transactional evidence. The Court also held that the trial judge was correct to refuse to sever the counts and order separate trials. The Court found that the evidence of the assault was not so prejudicial as to make a fair trial of the murder charge impossible, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it may have had. The Court held that the evidence of the assault was necessary to establish the accused's state of mind and intent at the time of the murder, and that this was a crucial element of the prosecution's case.

The Court concluded that the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion in refusing to sever the counts and order separate trials. The Court found that the evidence of the assault was relevant and necessary to prove the accused's state of mind at the time of the murder, and that the probative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it may have had. The Court held that the accused's state of mind was a crucial element of the prosecution's case, and that the evidence of the assault was necessary to establish this element. The Court found that the trial judge had not erred in his assessment of the evidence and had correctly exercised his discretion in refusing to sever the counts and order separate trials.

Orders