R v Hillier

[2006] HCATrans 408

[2006] HCATrans 408

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Registry  No C1 of 2006

B e t w e e n -

THE QUEEN

Applicant

and

STEVEN WAYNE HILLIER

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 4 AUGUST 2006, AT 9.34 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR I.D. TEMBY, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear for the Crown as applicant and my learned friend, MS P.J. DE VEAU, appears with me.  (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT))

MR W.C. TERRACINI, SC:   I appear for the respondent, if your Honours please, with MR P.F. DOYLE.  (instructed by Patricia White & Associates)

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr Temby.

MR TEMBY:   Anna Hardwick was killed by a compression injury to the neck, very likely on the night of 30 September 2002, and after investigation her former de facto husband was charged with her murder.  Following a contested trial, he was convicted of that charge.  That happened, and it could only happen by jury verdict.  The convicted man appealed and the ACT Court of Appeal upheld the appeal by majority.  The majority said, at paragraph 106 on page 78 of the application papers:

In our view, there is a real possibility that another person was responsible for her death and we have been left with substantial doubt as to the guilt of the appellant –

this leading to the conclusion that a miscarriage of justice may well have occurred.  The minority judgment was delivered by Justice Spender and it contains a strong refutation of the majority views.  We have, of course available for consideration only the three Court of Appeal judgments, as in our system juries return general verdicts.

CALLINAN J:   Mr Temby, could I ask you about one factual detail?

MR TEMBY:   Yes, your Honour.

CALLINAN J:   I think there was a footprint in the soot or ashes beside the bed.  Was there any further evidence about that?

MR TEMBY:   Yes, there was, your Honour.  May I lead into this by saying that it is a self‑evident proposition that was left after the killing and after the fire which had clearly been set to cover up the fact of the killing.

CALLINAN J:   Some time afterwards, one would think.

MR TEMBY:   And some time afterwards, one would think; one would think when the fire had run its course.  The evidence was that there was a footprint which was consistent with being left by the father of the deceased and he gave evidence that he and his wife found the body in the order of a couple of days after the night we say the killing occurred, and he approached the body to take the pulse.

CALLINAN J:   I think the majority saw that as some exculpatory sort of evidence ‑ ‑ ‑

MR TEMBY:   Yes.

CALLINAN J:   It is not really explained in the judgment.

MR TEMBY:   With respect, that makes no sense for two reasons:  firstly, because simply of the question of timing.  It must have been left long afterwards and is unlikely, very unlikely, we say, to have been left by the killer, whoever the killer was.

CALLINAN J:   He would be gone, one would think.

MR TEMBY:   He would be gone, which is the only question, of course - who was the killer?  But as it happens the evidence provides a ready explanation in that the father approached to take the pulse when the body was found and the footprint was consistent with the shoes he was wearing on the night in question.  I add only this, your Honour.  There were some other footprints which were left by fire brigade personnel, but of course they are irrelevant for present purposes.

CALLINAN J:   The reliance upon that as an exculpatory factor, and I think there was reliance upon it by the majority ‑ ‑ ‑

MR TEMBY:   There clearly was.

CALLINAN J:   ‑ ‑ ‑ seems to have been misconceived.

MR TEMBY:   Absolutely, your Honour.  In seeking special leave to appeal, the Crown submits that given the seriousness of the charge, the jury verdict which was not said by anybody to be unavailable on the evidence and the real prospect that the outcome now reached itself represents a miscarriage of justice, the case is one which demands full appellate review by this Court.  In what follows I will, unless I say otherwise, take factual conclusions from the opinion of the majority judges who were Chief Justice Higgins and President Crispin.

There is no doubt that the deceased was murdered and so much was conceded by defence counsel.  The case that the respondent was the murderer was, of course, circumstantial in nature.  He had, as the majority said, a strong potential motive for murder as a result of a Family Court decision which followed a long dispute concerning custody of the two children of the relationship, which decision came into operation on the 20 September 2002 some 10 days before the killing and which had the effect of depriving him of equal rights with respect to the children which he had enjoyed for the previous three and a half years.

CALLINAN J:   Mr Temby, what do you say about the cessation of the telephone calls and the failure, I think it is, or it was said to have been a failure, of the prosecution to give the defence any opportunity of dealing with the cessation of the telephone calls and the inferences to be drawn from that.  Is that correct?

MR TEMBY:   Your Honour, I do not know about the contended for failure but, if I can answer the first part of that, the evidence showed that in the working days following 20 September, which is to say in the five weekdays before the night when the ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   I know the facts and I can see the circumstantial weight of that evidence but was it not said by the majority that the defence was not given an opportunity to deal with that, that the evidence was reduced but it was not clear the inferences that the jury would be invited to draw from it.

MR TEMBY:   In the briefest summary there were 10 or 12 phone calls a day on each of the five working days which were in pursuit of the appeal prospect.  There were none on the Monday on the night of which we say the killing occurred or the next day, that is to say up until the body was found.

CALLINAN J:   I agree.  It could be an arguably strong circumstantial factor, but was the defendant given an opportunity to deal with it?

MR TEMBY:   There was cross‑examination of the accused who, as we know, gave evidence with respect to the fact of the calls being made during the preceding week.  It was not plainly put to him that the cessation was due to a decision he had made to resolve the matter otherwise, although it was put to him that he had decided to resolve the question otherwise, but that question was not put precisely in the context of the cessation of the calls.  I hope that answers your Honour’s question.

CALLINAN J:   Yes, it does, thank you, Mr Temby.

MR TEMBY:   I remind your Honours that the respondent had arranged for his parents to care for the children on the night we say the killing took place and that there was DNA evidence, which need not be analysed for present purposes but which the majority said, application book 65 at paragraph 74:

the evidence suggesting that DNA from the [present respondent] had been found on this tape lift –

15C7 –

provided substantial support for the Crown case.

That is the tape lift that was on the inside of the pyjamas, 7 or 8 centimetres down from the collar and neck.  Greater detail could, of course, be gone into and if the application succeeds will need to be, but on this application it suffices to say that given the factors which I have mentioned and the jury verdict itself, a strong expectation arises that the appellate tribunal in deciding the question whether, on the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty would examine the evidence stringently and act only if it contained:

discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force.

What I have just said is taken directly from the authoritative decision of this Court in M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at page 494. This is not a case in which different verdicts on one count as opposed to others in the indictment lead to doubt. There is no question of evidence being tainted. As to discrepancies or inadequacies or lack of probative force, our submission is that the learned judges comprising the majority went too far and substituted trial by Court of Appeal for trial by jury which is what M v The Queen precisely proscribes at page 494.

What happened is in significant part explained by the unusual course that the appeal took.  If I can go back for a moment.  Throughout the trial to verdict the accused was represented by senior and junior counsel, both of them competent and relevantly experienced and it is to be assumed that the present respondent was content with the forensic decisions which they made and such decisions, of course, have to be made as to what is to be pursued and what is to be let go.

The learned trial judge, Justice Gray, said and said correctly in directing the jury at page 2 of the papers, at about 20:

The way that counsel conducts the case is a very great assistance in determining what the real issues are for you to decide, what is in dispute and what is not and in this case you had the benefit of a trial conducted by expert and able counsel on both sides.

We say that the majority worked out after the event how they might have run the respondent’s case and have brought into factual prominence questions which were not made issues by the defence which were let go.  Different counsel appeared for the convicted man in the sentencing process and it became delayed because he insisted on putting his own submissions at a late stage.

Something similar happened on the hearing of the appeal.  There were different counsel again who lodged written submissions and addressed the court and then the respondent sought to address the court himself and he was given leave to do that, which he did.  He handed up a large volume of written material which we have described in our written submissions.  Although the majority said that no adequate grounds for the reception of fresh evidence were established, it is apparent that they were swayed by this additional material which was not evidence at the trial.  They referred to some pornographic videos which Justice Spender notes did not come from the evidence.  They referred to bank records tendered to show that he had a given sum of money available to pursue the Family Court appeal, but they were not in evidence and those bank records came in only in the supplementary material and were not accepted as being fresh evidence.

The majority also got themselves confused and seriously misled themselves about a set of handcuffs which were found in the house which were in their original packaging and which on the evidence had apparently never been used.  The majority said at 74 of the papers, in paragraph 98, at about line 45:

there is no reason to assume that they –

the handcuffs –

had been used on the night in question.

But, shortly afterwards, page 77, at paragraph 105, and this is right at the end when they are reasoning towards their conclusion, their Honours comprising the majority referred to “other aspects of the evidence” which they said made “it difficult to reconstruct what actually occurred on the night in question” and one of the matters referred to was “the apparent use of the handcuffs”.  There is a clear contradiction between saying, on the one hand, that there is no reason to assume the handcuffs had been used on the night in question and referring to “the apparent use of the handcuffs” as a factor making it difficult to reconstruct what actually happened on the night in question. 

GLEESON CJ:   What was it that made it apparent that the handcuffs had been used?

MR TEMBY:   With respect, nothing.  There is nothing that made it apparent that the handcuffs had been used on the night in question.

CALLINAN J:   Did they not try to link them with some marks on the steel, or the iron bed head?

MR TEMBY:   It is true to say that there were marks on the steel of the iron bed head which were not inconsistent with the use of handcuffs.  As it happens, if it matters, the comparison was between police handcuffs – not the particular handcuffs but, perhaps, that does not matter.

CALLINAN J:   Not inconsistent whether – all sorts of marks could have been made on ‑ ‑ ‑

MR TEMBY:   Right.  Your Honour is, with respect, entirely right.  It is not impossible that there were marks on the bed head which might have been left there by handcuffs at some time, but that does not help in reaching a conclusion as to whether the killing might have been perpetrated by somebody other than the present respondent because there is no way of saying whether the marks were so left and if they were there is no reason for saying they were left on the night in question and that then disappears in a puff of smoke.

GLEESON CJ:   I wondered, when they use the expression “the apparent use of the handcuffs” do they mean the apparent use on the night in question or do they just mean ‑ ‑ ‑

MR TEMBY:   With respect, your Honour, we suggest they do because of the close association between that phrase and what appears immediately following.  It is said that that is a factor which makes it difficult to reconstruct what actually occurred on the night in question.

GLEESON CJ:   What was the hypothesis that they thought was reasonably open on the evidence?

MR TEMBY:   The hypothesis was, or has to be, that there was somebody other than the accused who was in the house and perpetrated the killing, the identity of that person being unknown and there being no individual candidate who is referred to, but just that somebody else had been let into the house and was the perpetrator.

CALLINAN J:   After using the handcuffs for some purpose?

MR TEMBY:   After ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   If the handcuffs ‑ ‑ ‑

MR TEMBY:   After, yes.

CALLINAN J:   That is part of the hypothesis.

MR TEMBY:   That, I think, is fair to say part of the hypothesis.

GLEESON CJ:   Yes.  Thank you, Mr Temby.  Mr Terracini.

MR TERRACINI:   Thank you, your Honour.  Can I just deal, your Honours, with some of the issues raised by Justice Callinan.  When my friend says that it was not directly put in relation to telephone calls it was not put at all.

CALLINAN J:   The fact of the cessation of the telephone calls, was that put?

MR TERRACINI:   In relation to ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   Was he asked about the telephone?

MR TERRACINI:   He was not asked about the telephone calls in the context of any motive or untoward behaviour at all.

CALLINAN J:   What was the purpose of asking about them unless it was for the purpose of showing or of opening up the possibility of the inference which might be drawn from them?

MR TERRACINI:   The transcript does not, in my respectful submission, reveal what tactic was employed because there was ample opportunity to put it to him.

CALLINAN J:   Why did not counsel object to it on the grounds of irrelevance?

MR TERRACINI:   Perhaps they should have, your Honour, but that is not what we are here for.

CALLINAN J:   Well, I do not know.  I mean, if ‑ ‑ ‑

MR TERRACINI:   The records were tendered ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   Unless it led to some inference - unless it had some inferential value at least, it was irrelevant.

MR TERRACINI:   Well, your Honours will see in the minority judgment how the judges resolved that issue and I think that is at page 48, paragraph 29.  They go through it at some length commencing with the words:

Furthermore, if it had been intended to attach such a sinister connotation to the pattern of calls . . . Whilst the telephone records had been tendered, nothing apparently occurred during the course of the trial to alert the accused to the possibility that they might be used as anything other than evidence of the extent of his feelings during the previous week.

These are mires of words concerning the family law matter. 

There appears to have been no forewarning of any suggestion that the appellant may have stopped making the calls because he knew that the deceased was already dead and that further action on the appeal would be unnecessary.

That is the only reference that I am aware of in the judgment.

GLEESON CJ:   Mr Terracini, could I ask you about paragraph 102?

MR TERRACINI:   Certainly.

GLEESON CJ:   What are the footprints adjacent to the body there referred to?

MR TERRACINI:   They are the footprints associated with what Justice Callinan mentioned, associated with the soot.

GLEESON CJ:   And those footprints were regarded by the majority as providing strong grounds for an inference that someone else may have entered the house and been responsible for the death of the deceased?

MR TERRACINI:   Yes, coupled with what they say in paragraph 99.

GLEESON CJ:   How would footprints in the soot provide strong grounds for an inference that someone else may have entered the house and been responsible for the death of the deceased?

MR TERRACINI:   They expand upon it, perhaps not in order, but in paragraph 99 they use it in this way, and I quote:

The evidence of handcuffs, the marks on the bed head, the bruises on her wrists, the DNA from an unknown male on her collar, the footprints in the soot and other evidence consistent with the presence of a third person ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   I want to just get the facts straight.  The soot came there as a result of the fire.

MR TERRACINI:   Yes.

GLEESON CJ:   And the fire came there after the death of the deceased.

MR TERRACINI:   Well, there is no doubt that the deceased person was dead before the commencement of the fire.  Whether the perpetrator was entirely aware that she was dead is unknown.

GLEESON CJ:   But does not the fact that there were footprints in the soot suggest that the footprints came there some time after the death of the deceased?

MR TERRACINI:   Yes, but it is equally consistent they are left there by the perpetrator who lit the fire and it is ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   One stayed there during the fire?

MR TERRACINI:   Well, at least to get it going.  One would expect that if you are that way intended, that one would at least wait to see that it progressed at least to a level that it would increase and give a false impression as to the cause of the death.

GLEESON CJ:   That hypothesis is that he stayed there long enough to leave footprints in the soot created by the fire.

MR TERRACINI:   Well, that is apparently what they are saying.

CALLINAN J:   That is, on the expert evidence, until all of the oxygen in the room was exhausted.

MR TERRACINI:   Well, no, not necessarily, your Honour.

CALLINAN J:   Because the fire burnt until then, did it not?

MR TERRACINI:   Yes, that is true, but that does not necessarily mean that the soot comes at the expiration of the oxygen level of the room.  We do not know at what stage ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   Well, soot is coming as the oxygen is diminishing.

MR TERRACINI:   Yes, we do not gainsay that, but there is no evidence that ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   The killer did not have a gas mask on or an oxygen cylinder.

MR TERRACINI:   No, he may have had a window open, he could have been there for a relatively short period of time, because the Crown case is he did it deliberately to mask certain methods of his behaviour.

GLEESON CJ:   There was, was there not, a fairly simple explanation of the footprints in the soot?

MR TERRACINI:   Well, there is no explanation that establishes to any degree of proof whose footprint was ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   But why does not the majority judgment deal with the proposition Mr Temby puts that the evidence shows that the father was there afterwards, he discovered the body, and he was certainly a real possibility as the person who left the footprint?

MR TERRACINI:   They could have done that, and footprints have been part of ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   But if they are taking that as a factor, as a significant factor in paragraph 99, exculpatory factor, then it does seem to be somewhat deficient, with all due respect, not to deal with what seems to have been a strong possibility to explain the footprint.

MR TERRACINI:   Well, your Honour, again the problem with a lot of the conduct of this case is the Crown trying to make up for deficiencies they should have dealt with at the trial.  The majority judges gave the opportunity to the Crown when the written submissions were filed by the then appellant himself to respond, and the very issues of fingerprints, soot, et cetera, the Crown was put on notice about and they did not do anything.

CALLINAN J:   Well, no, Mr Temby has given an explanation.

MR TERRACINI:   No, Mr Temby has; this is before the majority reached their conclusion.  They invited the Crown to make submissions about these issues, and they did not.  In fact, it is recorded in the majority judgment in dealing with some of the issues raised by Justice Spender at paragraph 87.  At about line 41 they say:

We should also mention that those aspects of the evidence that had not previously been addressed by counsel, such as the evidence relating to fingerprints, hairs and footprints in the soot, were raised by the appellant in written submissions which he was given leave to hand up.  The Crown was given leave to file written submissions in response, but chose not to specifically address those aspects.

GLEESON CJ:   But you are seeking to justify the process of reasoning of the majority.  If you want to put as an alternative argument that as a matter of discretion special leave should be refused because deficiencies in the reasoning of the majority are the consequence of the way the case was argued for the Crown that is a different proposition.

MR TERRACINI:   I was not when I - I am sorry, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   At the moment we are dealing with the question of whether there are deficiencies in the reasoning of the majority.

MR TERRACINI:   We did not necessarily apprehend that this specific issue was going to be raised by Justice Callinan but if that is ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   I have read the judgments.  Anything that is factual in a case like this is likely or possibly going to be raised.

MR TERRACINI:   Precisely but, your Honour, they ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   You could not be taken by surprise, Mr Terracini.

MR TERRACINI:   We are taken by surprise that the Crown at this stage would suggest that this issue has to be activated in the High Court when they had ample opportunity to do it at the Court of Appeal.

CALLINAN J:   I instigated it, Mr Terracini ‑ ‑ ‑

MR TERRACINI:   I am aware of that, your Honour.

CALLINAN J:   ‑ ‑ ‑ because it seemed to me to be a matter that required explanation.  Mr Temby was doing no more than trying to offer an explanation in answer to my question.

MR TERRACINI:   Your Honour, they have adequate opportunity to do it, they were specifically invited to do it and they declined.  The Court of Appeal is in a position where they did receive, perhaps unusually, written submissions by the appellant, then asked the Crown to comment on them and gave the Crown ample opportunity to make further written submissions.  At page 70 of the appeal papers, they specifically say they gave them the opportunity and they declined.

CALLINAN J:   What do you say about Mr Temby’s point that the majority appear to have relied upon a matter that was not received as evidence?

MR TERRACINI:   There is certainly, as I understand the material, an issue associated with locks and what have you that does not appear to flow from the transcript.

CALLINAN J:   You are on notice as far as this Court is concerned about the footprints because at paragraph 22 of the applicant’s outline of argument at page 127 of the application book.

MR TERRACINI:   There is no evidence, your Honour, that the footprint was the father of the deceased’s.  That is the same process of flawed reasoning that the Crown are complaining about.  If I could move on to the handcuffs, the uncontested evidence in the trial by police officer Williams was that he carried out an experiment and the handcuffs were consistent with the marks on the wall.  It is uncontested.

CALLINAN J:   What do you get from that?  How do you get from that that the marks were made that night, the night of the murder?

MR TERRACINI:   We do not say, your Honour, that they were made that night.

CALLINAN J:   How is it relevant?

MR TERRACINI:   In terms of perhaps a behavioural pattern indicating, as I understand it, by the majority, that the deceased was having sexual relations with a person unknown.

GLEESON CJ:   What do you think is meant by the expression “the apparent use of the handcuffs” in paragraph 105?

MR TERRACINI:   What we say that is is an indicator that there was some sexual relationship with a person other than the then boyfriend of the deceased ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   But do you submit it means the apparent use of the handcuffs on that night?

MR TERRACINI:   No, your Honour, because they disavowed it a couple of pages before.  If it is a mistake, we would respectfully say, it is one that would be fundamentally in error.  I do not think anybody is suggesting that ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ:   So you would interpret that as meaning the apparent use of the handcuffs at some time or times unknown?

MR TERRACINI:   When the boyfriend, Mr Koppie, or the respondent were not present and living with her, yes.

GLEESON CJ:   But if it were intended to mean the apparent use of the handcuffs on the night of the death, it would be an error?

MR TERRACINI:   Yes, I agree.  If I could turn then to the actual reasons why special leave should be granted at page 133.  These are the actual reasons advanced by the appellant and they have not sought to alter them:

The conviction of the Respondent, which was set aside by the order of the Court of Appeal, was for the serious charge of murder.

That has never been a ground for engaging or activating special leave in this Court, simply because somebody is charged with murder.  Then we have rather an alarming suggestion at the end of that paragraph that he is at large.  He is at large because of the decision of a superior court.  He is present in this Court today.  In terms of that being a factor that somebody is actually released that that, of itself, activates and engages the High Court of Australia we would say is a preposterous proposition.

The next paragraph is that it is inappropriate to overturn jury verdicts and I do not think that we need to tarry too long on that.  Superior courts all over the country are interfering with jury verdicts, based of course on a proper guidance from this Court and from their various appellate courts.

In relation to the third ground, they are asking that your Honours should express their:

disapproval of appellate courts substituting its view for a jury verdict on factual grounds –

That can only be done on the basis of the decided authorities and we would say that even though they do not like the result that they had ample opportunity to deal with some of these issues before the majority reached their decision and we would say that it is inappropriate for this Court then to permit such a course to be taken when they are expressly invited to make written submissions and they decline to do so, in the same way that they are asking that a new trial perhaps is an option.  They did not even ask the majority to consider a new trial.

Justice Spender talks about finality.  Finality of a jury verdict is one thing but justice is better in terms of the whole approach to allowing each of the respective sides of an adversarial process to have their say.  The footprints are one issue but the fingerprints are also there, too.  There are unknown fingerprints.  There is unknown DNA.  All of those matters, if they were going to be adequately investigated, could have been done at the time.  It has not reached a stage where police officers cannot have people who are suspects fingerprinted for the purposes of comparison.  They could have eliminated all of that.

CALLINAN J:   Mr Terracini, what about reliance upon the inadmissible evidence, the evidence that was not admitted?

MR TERRACINI:   In relation to some of that material it is plain from reading the majority decision that that was not an important issue in the conclusions that they reached.

CALLINAN J:   It is part of the majority’s reasoning, is it not?

MR TERRACINI:   I agree.

CALLINAN J:   Is not that an error of itself which might invite intervention?

MR TERRACINI:   Not every error would invite the intervention of this Court.  I am not going to waste your Honours’ time in trying to defend – there are certain factual mistakes that have been made but they do not reach a level where it could be demonstrated by the appellant that they were either the cornerstone or indeed a foundation for reaching the decision that they did but merely a factor.

With respect to the footprint – just going back to that, your Honour – if a comparison had been made by the dimensions or the tread or whatever of the deceased’s father’s footwear, which could be done very simply, then that could have been presented to the jury and that issue would be put to rest.  It was not done in the trial and then when they are actually asked to do it by way of written submission they decline to do it.  What is the majority supposed to do when they ask the Crown for help, as it were, and they do not receive it?  Then, down the way, as it were, complaint is made that they have taken into consideration or reached a factual decision on material that they had asked to be helped with and they received no help.

In relation to perhaps the expanded submissions of my friend, vis‑à‑vis page 133 of the appeal book and the reasons why special leave should be granted, not one of those grounds, in my respectful submission, are adequate to actually engage the consideration of this Court but different matter along the trial and appeal process.  The only alternative that they had was to do exactly what the majority asked them to do, put in their

submissions and then we would be in a very different position because we would have to say they did give those reasons and they backed it up with what they told the majority and they rejected it erroneously.  We are not going to know what the decision would have been if they had been adequately assisted.  Unless I can be of any more assistance. 

GLEESON CJ:   Thank you, Mr Terracini. 

This application for special leave to appeal will be referred for argument before a Full Court of this Court and on the occasion the parties should be prepared to present fully argument as on an appeal.

AT 10.12 AM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED