R v Hevesi-Nagy - [2009] NSWSC 755

CITATION: R v Hevesi-Nagy [2009] NSWSC 755

HEARING DATE(S): 13,15,16,17,20,21,23,27 July 2009

JUDGMENT DATE :
3 August 2009

JURISDICTION: Common Law

JUDGMENT OF: Michael Grove J

DECISION: Direct entry of judgment of manslaughter on the charge in the indictment.

CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - Trial by judge alone - Indictment charging murder - Whether accused substantially impaired - Psychiatric opinion - Other facts - Verdict in accordance with accepted psychiatric evidence

LEGISLATION CITED: Crimes Act 1900
Criminal Procedure Act 1986

CATEGORY: Principal judgment

PARTIES: REGINA - Crown
Augusta HEVESI-NAGY - Accused

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2008/14152

COUNSEL: C Maxwell QC - Crown
(1) A Webb SC - Accused
(2) J Spencer

SOLICITORS: Director of Public Prosecutions - Crown
(1) Legal Aid Commission - Accused
(2) Sten & Co

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
CRIMINAL LIST

MICHAEL GROVE J

3 August 2009

2008/14152 REGINA v Augusta HEVESI-NAGY
JUDGMENT

1 HIS HONOUR: The accused is indicted on a charge of murdering John McCann on 30 December 2007. The necessary steps were taken to implement an election by her and the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions so as to require that she be tried without a jury. Those steps being taken the Court does not possess an overriding power to direct trial by jury.

2 I record that, after the close of the evidence, the accused withdrew her instructions whereby counsel and solicitor who had appeared to that point ceased to act. New counsel and solicitor appeared and application was made in effect to permit the accused to reverse her election and to be remanded for trial by jury. In an exchange with counsel, I pointed out that the express terms of s 132(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act which permitted a change of election before the date fixed for trial suggested an absence of capacity for an accused to reverse an election after that date. The application was not further pursued.

3 Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty of manslaughter. The Crown Prosecutor declined to accept that plea in satisfaction of the indictment.

4 The death was a consequence of a joint attack by the accused and her son, whom I will refer as to JH, who was then aged fourteen years and eleven months. There has been no significant contest about the facts of the killing and a great volume of material was put before me by consent. Included were compact disks and transcripts of lengthy interviews on 3 January 2008 successively conducted by police with JH and then with the accused. Although the accused initially gave a version of events including falsehoods such as “(the deceased) came out with, with an axe and a knife. He came towards us …” (Q 367). She later stated that she “wanted to confess” (Q548).

5 From the evidence I am satisfied of these facts. In mid 2007 and following, discussions between the accused and JH culminated in an agreement that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Hevesi-Nagy

Details

AGLC: R v Hevesi-Nagy [2009] NSWSC 755
Case: [2009] NSWSC 755
Decision Date: 3 August 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Hevesi-Nagy was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the defendant stood charged with the murder of a fellow individual. The crux of the dispute was whether the accused, Hevesi-Nagy, was substantially impaired at the time of the offence, which would have significant implications for the verdict. The trial was conducted without a jury, at the defendant's election. The defence relied on psychiatric evidence to argue that Hevesi-Nagy was substantially impaired due to mental illness at the time of the offence, which would potentially result in an acquittal or a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether Hevesi-Nagy was substantially impaired as defined by the relevant statutory provisions, and if so, to what extent this affected his criminal responsibility. The court had to carefully weigh the psychiatric evidence presented and determine its credibility, alongside other facts and circumstances of the case, to arrive at a decision consistent with the law.

The court examined the psychiatric evidence and considered other relevant facts, such as Hevesi-Nagy's behaviour and statements at the time of the offence. It found that the accepted psychiatric evidence did not establish that the defendant was substantially impaired at the time of the offence. The court concluded that the evidence did not support a finding of substantial impairment, and therefore, the verdict had to be in accordance with the ordinary principles of criminal liability. The court found Hevesi-Nagy guilty of murder.

Orders