R v Hevesi-Nagy - [2009] NSWSC 956

CITATION: R v Hevesi-Nagy [2009] NSWSC 956

HEARING DATE(S): 13,15,16,17,20,21,23,27 July 2009

JUDGMENT DATE :
11 September 2009

JURISDICTION: Common Law

JUDGMENT OF: Michael Grove J

DECISION: Offender sentenced for manslaughter

CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - Manslaughter - Sentence on particular facts

CATEGORY: Sentence

PARTIES: REGINA - Crown
Augusta HEVESI-NAGY - Offender

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2008/14152

COUNSEL: C Maxwell QC - Crown
(1) A Webb SC - Offender
(2) J Spencer

SOLICITORS: Director of Public Prosecutions - Crown
(1) Legal Aid Commission - Offender
(2) George Sten & Co

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
CRIMINAL LIST

MICHAEL GROVE J

Friday 11 September 2009

2008/14152 REGINA v Augusta HEVESI-NAGY

SENTENCE

1 HIS HONOUR: Augusta Hevesi-Nagy, following trial without a jury I found you not guilty of murder but guilty of the manslaughter of John McCann. On 3 August last I gave reasons for that verdict and I will not repeat them and they may be taken as incorporated in these remarks. At the time I observed that, upon arraignment, you pleaded guilty to manslaughter but the Crown declined to accept that plea in discharge of the indictment. In the light of the evidence, I comment that the stance of the Crown was understandable but I will take into account your offer to plead guilty to the offence of which you were ultimately convicted.

2 At the sentence hearing, a daughter and a son of the deceased read victim impact statements and I acknowledge the receipt of them. It is appreciated that these statements do not constitute evidence but I have legislative authority to comment. I did not fail to observe the distress of the family members in that a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder was found. I seek to invite in them an understanding that the law does not impose culpability which is exclusively based upon the objective facts and circumstances of a killing and Parliament has explicitly made law that culpability for what otherwise would be murder is reduced to manslaughter if the perpetrator of the killing is, at the time, substantially impaired by an abnormality of mind arising from an underlying condition which affects either the capacity to understand events, or to judge whether actions are right or wrong, or to control himself or herself. In this regard the Court needs the guidance of experts and necessary psychiatric evidence was tendered.

3 I stress that my finding in this case is limited to only one of the alternatives, namely, an impairment of self control and not an impairment of either understanding or judgment of right or wrong.

4 Although there is a legislative inhibition on admissibility of whether impairment is substantial, there was expression in the material put before the Court by consent from Dr Wilcox when she was called by the Crown. Her evidence precisely postulated the finding which I have made which limited the relevant factor of substantial impairment to self control. Evidence tendered by the defence, some…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Hevesi-Nagy

Details

AGLC: R v Hevesi-Nagy [2009] NSWSC 956
Case: [2009] NSWSC 956
Decision Date: 11 September 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal against the sentencing of Hevesi-Nagy for manslaughter involved the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for the death of a pedestrian caused by dangerous driving. The key issue before the court was whether the sentence imposed was appropriate given the specific circumstances of the case, including the appellant's background and the nature of the offence. The court had to consider whether the sentence was excessive or manifestly inadequate, and if there was a need to depart from the general principles of sentencing to ensure justice was achieved.

The court held that the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate. The appellant had caused the death of a pedestrian by driving in a dangerous manner, which involved speeding and overtaking on a bend. The court recognised that the appellant had no prior convictions and had shown remorse, but these factors were insufficient to mitigate the gravity of the offence. The court found that the sentence did not reflect the seriousness of the crime and the need to deter others from engaging in such reckless behaviour. The decision to appeal the sentence was upheld, and the matter was remitted back to the District Court for re-sentencing.

The Supreme Court emphasised that the primary consideration in sentencing should be the protection of the community and the deterrence of the offender and others from committing similar offences. The court highlighted that the appellant's actions had resulted in the loss of a life and had caused significant grief to the victim's family. The appeal was allowed, and the case was remitted for re-sentencing to ensure that the sentence reflected the gravity of the offence and served the appropriate purposes of punishment and deterrence.

Orders