R v Hannaford

Case [2017] QCA 36


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Hannaford [2017] QCA 36

PARTIES:

R
v
HANNAFORD, Ian Phillip
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 271 of 2015
SC No 15 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Toowoomba – Date of Conviction: 27 October 2015

DELIVERED ON:

17 March 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

28 July 2016

JUDGES:

Fraser JA and Dalton and Burns JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION – PARTICULAR CASES – WHERE APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant was convicted by a jury of murder – where the appellant contended that the trial judge wrongly permitted a lie allegedly told by the appellant to go to the jury as evidence of consciousness of guilt – where the appellant further contended that the trial judge erred in the directions given to the jury concerning the use to which the alleged lie could be put by the jury – whether the evidence at trial was capable of establishing that the alleged lie, if told, was untrue – whether the alleged lie was capable of amounting to evidence of consciousness of guilt

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – GENERALLY – where the appellant was convicted by a jury of murder – where the appellant contended that a miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of expert evidence given regarding a comparison of fibres and the repetition of the same in the summing up – where the appellant further contended that a miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of evidence given regarding presumptive testing for the presence of blood on an axe purchased by the appellant and the characterisation of that evidence in the summing up – whether aspects of the fibre comparison evidence were admissible – whether the limitations of the fibre comparison evidence were made clear by the trial judge in the summing up – whether the evidence regarding the presumptive testing for the presence of blood was admissible – whether the trial judge fell into error when characterising the evidence regarding the presumptive testing in the summing up – whether there was a miscarriage of justice

Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193; [1993] HCA 63, cited
R v Baden-Clay [2014] QSC 156, cited
R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; [2006] VSCA 263, cited
R v Ortega-Farfan (2011) 215 A Crim R 251; [2011] QCA 364, cited
R v Sam[2002] QCA 14, cited
R v Saub[2007] QCA 194, cited
R v Sica [2014] 2 Qd R 168; [2013] QCA 247, cited
R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167, cited

COUNSEL:

S M Ryan QC for the appellant
V…

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AGLC
R v Hannaford [2017] QCA 36
Case
[2017] QCA 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Hannaford, the appellant, who was convicted of murder by a jury, appealed against his conviction on multiple grounds. The appellant argued that the trial judge had erroneously allowed a lie allegedly told by him to be presented to the jury as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. Additionally, he claimed that the trial judge had given incorrect directions to the jury regarding the use of this alleged lie. The appellant further contended that a miscarriage of justice occurred due to the admission and characterisation of expert evidence regarding a comparison of fibres, as well as evidence concerning presumptive testing for blood on an axe purchased by the appellant. The court was tasked with determining whether the trial judge's handling of the evidence, particularly the alleged lie, was erroneous and whether this led to a miscarriage of justice.

The court examined the evidence presented at the trial, including the appellant's relationship with the deceased, his behaviour following the breakup, and the circumstances surrounding the deceased's disappearance and death. The court assessed whether the evidence was capable of establishing that the alleged lie, if indeed told, was untrue and whether such a lie could amount to evidence of consciousness of guilt. The court also reviewed the admissibility and the trial judge's handling of the expert evidence concerning the fibre comparison and the presumptive testing for blood. It was critical to determine whether the trial judge clearly communicated the limitations of the fibre comparison evidence and whether there was an error in characterising the presumptive testing evidence in the summing up.

The court found that the trial judge did not err in allowing the alleged lie to be presented to the jury, as the evidence was capable of establishing its untruthfulness and its potential to indicate consciousness of guilt. Furthermore, the court concluded that the trial judge did not err in the directions given to the jury regarding the use of the alleged lie. Regarding the expert evidence, the court found that the limitations of the fibre comparison evidence were adequately communicated to the jury, and there was no error in the characterisation of the presumptive testing evidence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal against the conviction was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Before considering the grounds of appeal, it is useful to commence with a brief overview of the evidence at trial.The evidence The appellant and the deceased first made contact with each other on an internet dating site in late 2011 and, within several weeks, formed a relationship. The deceased was 55 years of age at the time and living in a rental unit in Warwick. The appellant was three years older and living in Rockville, a suburb of Toowoomba. The deceased and her sister, Lynette McMillan, were raised in an orphanage. On leaving the orphanage at the age of 15 years, the deceased secured employment as a live-in housekeeper in Brisbane. In time, she met her first partner and they had a child together, Simon. After that relationship ended, the deceased eventually met and then married another man and their union produced a daughter. A subsequent relationship produced another son. When that relationship also broke down, the deceased found herself in the unfortunate position of being unable to properly care for her three children. She therefore decided to give them up for adoption and this occurred when Simon was about six years old. She had no further contact with her children except for Simon who managed to locate his mother after he attained his majority. Thereafter, the deceased remained in contact with Simon and, after he married, with his wife, Jackie, and their children. Otherwise, the deceased kept in touch with her sister throughout her life and, after Ms McMillan moved to Warwick in 2010, the deceased decided to follow her. Accordingly, at the time of her disappearance, the only family whom the deceased had to speak of were her son and daughter-in-law, their children and her sister. The relationship between the appellant and the deceased lasted a number of months but by early June 2012 it was over. The deceased told her sister that she broke up with the appellant because he “wanted everything his own way”.[1] She also told her son that it had been her choice to end the relationship.[2] She was reportedly “very happy” with that decision.[3][1]AB 172 (Lynette McMillan).[2]AB 235 (Simon).[3]AB 409 (Dugan). The appellant on the other hand was far from accepting that his relationship with the deceased had come to an end. He repeatedly telephoned her and, on at least one occasion, appeared unannounced at her unit in Warwick before being told to “get out”.[4] The deceased informed one witness who gave evidence at the trial that the appellant would telephone her, hang up and then “park his car around the corner … and come back and look through the windows”.[5] According to her daughter-in-law, Jackie, the deceased felt “harassed” and “threatened” by the appellant’s behaviour.[6] Indeed, she advised the deceased to “go to the police and talk to them about it, because [the appellant] just would not leave her alone”.[7] That, however, did not occur.[4]AB 262 (Jackie).[5]AB 430 (Tanner).[6]AB 265 (Jackie).[7]AB 282 (Jackie).

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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