R v Hagoss

Case

[2024] NSWDC 678

26 July 2024

No judgment structure available for this case.

District Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Hagoss [2024] NSWDC 678
Hearing dates: 23 February 2024, 14 June 2024
Date of orders: 26 July 2024
Decision date: 26 July 2024
Jurisdiction:Civil
Before: D Barrow SC DCJ
Decision:

See [134] – [137]

Catchwords:

CRIME – SENTENCE – supply large commercial quantity of methylamphetamine – where offender only participated in offence for one minute – strong subjective case – good prospects of rehabilitation and low risk of reoffending – whether Intensive Correction Order available – term of ICO adjusted to take pre-sentence custody into account

Legislation Cited:

Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Cases Cited:

Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194

DC v R [2023] NSWCCA 82

DG v R [2023] NSWCCA 320

El Kheir v R [2019] NSWCCA 288

Green & Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49, 244 CLR 462

Lam v R [2014] NSWCCA 50

Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226

Mandranis v The Queen [2021] NSWCCA 97

Melikian v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 156

Muldrock v R [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120; (2011) 281 ALR 652; (2011) 85 ALJR 1154; (2011) 212 A Crim R 254

Parente v The Queen (2017) 96 NSWLR 633

R v Dang [2005] NSWCCA 430

R v MacDonnell [2002] NSWCCA 34 at [33]; (2002) 128 A Crim R 44

R v Qi [2019] NSWCCA 73

R v Dowdell [2022] NSWDC 529

R v Gin [2021] NSWDC 755

R v Golding [2023] NSWDC 493

R v Hamilton [2022] NSWDC 229

R v Kelly [2020] NSWDC 232

R v Kijurina [2017] NSWCCA 117

R v Vilkelis‑Curas [2019] NSWDC 670

Ryan v R [2001] HCA 21, 206 CLR 267

Ryan v Regina [2017] NSWCCA 209

Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584

Category:Sentence
Parties: The Crown
The offender (Mr Hagoss)
Representation:

For the Crown:
Mr S Wilkinson of Counsel

For the offender:
Ms R McMahon of Counsel
File Number(s): 2022/00224276

JUDGMENT

  1. Mr Hagoss (“the offender”) was arrested on 30 July 2022 and charged with an offence of knowingly taking part in the supply of a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug, namely, 36 kilograms of methylamphetamine, on 30 July 2022 at Kingsgrove in New South Wales.

Max penalty and SNPP

  1. The maximum penalty for this offence, contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985, is life imprisonment. A standard non-parole period of 15 years applies.

  2. The maximum penalty of life imprisonment and the standard non‑parole period signify the seriousness with which the community, through the legislature, regards this offence. The standard non-parole period and the maximum penalty provide important guideposts for the sentencing exercise.

Guilty plea

  1. The offender pleaded guilty in the Local Court and on 16 August 2023 was committed for sentence. The utilitarian value of his plea of guilty entitles him to a discount of 25% pursuant to s 25D of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (“CSPA”).

Sentence hearings

  1. The proceedings on sentence commenced on 23 February 2024 and concluded on 14 June 2024.

  2. The Crown tendered a sentencing bundle that included a Notice of Committal, an amended Charge Certification Certificate, agreed facts and evidence that the offender had no criminal record in New South Wales. The offender had a charge for the possession of cannabis in Victoria in 1995 that was dismissed after a diversionary program was completed. [1]

    1. In 1995 the offender appeared before the Melbourne Magistrates Ct charged with possession of cannabis. The charge was dismissed after he had completed a diversionary program.

  3. The Crown also relied on written submissions, a schedule of comparative cases and oral submissions made on sentence on 14 June 2024.

  4. On the offender’s behalf, the following material was tendered:

  1. the report of Kala Ram, psychologist, dated 13 February 2024;

  2. an affidavit from the offender dated 23 February 2024;

  3. a letter from Dr Loni dated 19 January 2024 including a health care plan referral;

  4. a letter from Mark Spargo, clinical psychologist dated 20 February 2024;

  5. photographs of renovations relevant to the offender’s work plans;

  6. copies of certificates and courses completed by the offender;

  7. a letter from Mr Ray Steer, undated, regarding the offender’s employment;

  8. wages slips;

  9. details of the offender’s driver’s licence;

  10. an affidavit of Fitsumbrhan Hagoss Desta, the offender’s father, sworn 8 February 2024;

  11. three affidavits of Semhar Fitsumbrhan Hagoss, the offender’s sister, sworn 8 February 2024, 12 June 2024 and today, 26 July 2024;

  12. a letter from Tesfahun Wubneh, President of the Tigrain community Association in Victoria, dated 19 December 2023;

  13. character references from:

  1. Michael Tefera, dated 1 February 2024;

  2. Gedyon Demewoz, dated 5 February 2024;

  3. Marik Dershaye, dated 15 February 2024;

  4. Jessica Caceres, dated 1 February 2024;

  5. Dean Caceres, dated 1 February 2024;

  1. an affidavit of Semhar Fitsumbrhan Hagoss sworn 12 June 2024

  1. Also on the offender’s behalf were tendered a bail timeline, two parts of the Bugmy Bar Book regarding the impacts of imprisonment and remand in custody on people with a refugee background, written submissions dated 21 February 2024 and 13 June 2024, and a short extract from the Judicial Commission’s sentencing statistics, which documented that between 24 September 2018 and 30 June 2023, 13 out of 128 offenders sentenced for a s 25(2) offence who pleaded guilty and who had no prior record had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order (“ICO”).

  2. The Court also received a Sentencing Assessment Report (“SAR”) dated 23 July 2024 which confirmed the offender was eligible to carry out community service work.  The report reinforces the conclusions I have reached about the offender's pro‑social lifestyle, his family support and his otherwise good character.

Pre-sentence custody and quasi-custody

  1. The offender remained in custody between 30 July 2022 and 20 December 2022, a period of 4 months and 20 days. At that point he was released to bail. Until 12 April 2023 he was effectively subject to conditions equivalent to home detention. Those conditions were removed on 12 April 2023, however thereafter the offender has been required to report to police every day.  There have been no breaches of bail and no further offending.

No criminal history

  1. At the time of his arrest the offender was 28 years of age and had no prior criminal record.

The agreed facts

  1. The offender was in the company of William Do at the time of the offence and his subsequent arrest. Mr Do was also charged with a serious drug supply offence arising from the same incident. He pleaded guilty and has been sentenced. I will return to his matter when I consider whether principles of parity apply.

  2. On 24 June 2022 United States law enforcement seized 75 kilograms of methylamphetamine in Long Beach California. The drugs were analysed, and the purity of the substance was calculated to be 98%. The net weight of the substance was 74.7 kilograms. The drugs were to have been sent to an unknown criminal syndicate in Sydney.

  3. Australian authorities were informed of the seizure of the drugs. On 5 July 2022 New South Wales Police were authorised to conduct a controlled operation in relation to the seized methylamphetamine.

  4. In the days prior to 30 July 2022, New South Wales Police learnt that unidentified persons would be travelling via car from Victoria to New South Wales to take possession of a large quantity of drugs.

  5. Police commenced reconstructing the consignment seized in the United States. 1 kg portions of an inert substance were placed in 74 vacuum sealed bags. The bags were then placed into two large black zip-up suitcases. In one of the suitcases a Daily Telegraph newspaper dated 23 July 2022 was inserted. Both suitcases were then put into the boot of a police undercover motor vehicle.

  6. On 30 July 2022, police took nine photographs of the two suitcases containing the 74 vacuum sealed bags.

  7. The vehicle was then driven by police to the vicinity of Garema Circuit, Kingsgrove. After arriving, the police opened the boot and unzipped one of the suitcases, exposing the clear bags with the white inert substance inside. Another photograph was taken and the suitcases were left in this position.

  8. The vehicle was then driven to a carpark nearby, located between 40 and 42 Garema Circuit. The carpark was almost empty. The vehicle was parked nose first against the northern wall of the carpark. The agreed facts contain photographs of the position of the vehicle. The vehicle was left locked and the key to the vehicle was placed on the top of the front driver's side wheel under the wheel arch.

  9. At approximately 11.17am, police attached to the investigation received an encrypted text message from a contact called "the Librarian", seeking to organise collection of the drugs.

  10. A dialogue of text messages occurred between the Librarian and the police until 1.09pm. During the dialogue, police observed a vehicle with registration 1FD1EI arrive at the carpark at about 1.00pm and park beside the undercover police vehicle that contained the two suitcases in the boot.

  11. Mr Do was seen to getting out of the passenger side of his vehicle and trying to enter the undercover police vehicle. This proved impossible. He returned to his car. Messages were then exchanged to the effect that the boot would not open.

  12. Mr Do was observed at 1.06pm leaving his vehicle again by the front passenger side door and trying to open the rear door of the covert police vehicle containing the two suitcases. This again was unsuccessful. He then sought to open the boot. This was also unsuccessful, as was his attempt to open the front passenger side door.

  13. Eventually police sent a message that the keys to the vehicle were on the front right tyre. Upon receipt of this information, Mr Do obtained the keys and was able to electronically open the boot of the vehicle. He removed one of the two black suitcases, carried it to the passenger side of his car and placed it in the car via the rear passenger side door.

  14. At this point the agreed facts read: “the Crown cannot prove that the offender was aware of the prior arrangements made to attempt to possess either suitcase.”

  15. At 1.08pm Mr Do closed the rear passenger side door of his vehicle, walked to the undercover vehicle and retrieved the second black suitcase from the boot. He closed the boot with his right hand, but at this point the contents of the second suitcase spilt onto the ground. Mr Hagoss got out of the front driver side door of the vehicle, helped Mr Do pick up the remaining sealed bags and placed them in the suitcase.

  16. Both the offender and Mr Do picked up the suitcase and carried it to the passenger side door of Mr Do’s vehicle. Mr Do opened the rear passenger door and placed the suitcase within the vehicle. This offender got back into the front driver's side seat. Mr Do closed the rear passenger side door, walked back to the rear of the undercover vehicle, reached under the front wheel arch and returned the keys as he had been requested to do. He then walked back around the rear of the undercover vehicle and entered his car through the front passenger door.

  17. At 1.09pm, with Mr Do sitting in the front passenger seat and the offender in the driver’s seat, their vehicle was observed by police to travel through the carpark towards the western exit onto Garema Circuit. The vehicle was intercepted by specialist police from the Tactical Operations Unit and both the offender and Mr Do were arrested.

  18. The agreed facts (at [22]) state: “from the time the offender exited the vehicle, helped co-offender Do to repack some of the bags of the inert substance back into the second suitcase, carried the second suitcase with co-offender Do back towards the car, until he got back into the driver’s seat and drove towards exiting the car park, was approximately one minute.”

The offender’s role

  1. The offender’s liability and role was limited to:

  • being present at the scene at the point when the second bag spilt;

  • assisting the co-offender pick up the sealed bags containing the inert substance, taking possession of the second suitcase (containing an inert substance) for the purpose of supply; and

  • driving the car containing the inert substance away.

  1. The agreed facts state that there was no evidence that the offender was aware of the type of drug taken possession of, or the precise weight of the substance in the second bag, other than it being a quantity in excess of the large commercial quantity.

  2. Police seized the offender’s iPhone and were able to extract all data from it. There was no communication or other data on the phone to suggest he had any knowledge of the offence prior to seeing the drugs that had spilt from the second suitcase.

  3. Two other mobile phones were located in the vehicle. Those phones could not be accessed and the prosecution accepted there was no evidence to support the conclusion that either phone belonged to the offender.

  4. There is no evidence that he participated in this offence in any way prior to 1.08pm.

Objective seriousness of the offence

  1. In Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39 ("Muldrock") at [27], the High Court stated that the objective seriousness of an offence is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offenders.

  2. Subsequent to the decision in Muldrock, the CSPA was amended to state that the standard non‑parole period represents the non‑parole period for an offence in the middle of the range of seriousness, taking into account only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence; see s 54A(2).

  3. The seriousness of the offence is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending, although if matters relevant to the offender's mental health were linked to the offending, this may, in some circumstances, be relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness of an offence.   

  4. Relevant factors that may affect the assessment of objective seriousness of drug supply offences include, without being exhaustive:

  1. the role of the offender and the level of his or her participation in the offence: R v MacDonnell [2002] NSWCCA 34 at [33]; (2002) 128 A Crim R 44; Melikian v R [2008] NSWCCA 156 at [42];

  2. the quantity and purity of the prohibited drugs, though these may not be the principal determinative factor: El Kheir v R [2019] NSWCCA 288 at [47]; R v Dang [2005] NSWCCA 430 (“Dang”) at [24]; and

  3. other factors such as the number of occasions on which the drug was supplied, and the planning involved: Dang at [24].

  1. The quantity, type and purity of the prohibited drugs are all significant factors in considering the objective seriousness of this offence. Here the nominal total quantity of methylamphetamine was 64 times the 0.5 kg threshold for a large commercial quantity. The nominal purity was extremely high. Methylamphetamine is regarded as a particularly pernicious prohibited drug, because of the negative impact it has on users and society generally.

  2. A further important feature in an assessment of the objective seriousness of an offence is to identify the role played by the offender and the extent of his participation.

  3. The offender was entirely unaware of what was to transpire until the very last moment. The Crown accepts that he was unaware of the real purpose of the visit to Sydney. It follows that this offender had no links (other than to his friend Mr Do) to other persons associated with this very substantial drug transaction. He had played no part in any planning towards the receipt of the drugs, did not anticipate any financial reward and had no part to play in the distribution of the drugs.

  4. Until the second suitcase fell open at 1.08pm, the offender had no idea of the true purpose of their attendance at the car park in Kingsgrove. The Crown accepted that it was not possible to establish which of the two bags the offender had assisted in placing inside the vehicle. It is for this reason that the bag with the lesser weight (36 kgs) formed the basis for the charge.

  5. Additionally, it is accepted by the Crown that the offender did not know the type of drug or its precise weight, other than that it was greater than a large commercial quantity.

  6. It is clear however that after assisting in repacking the suitcase and carrying it into the car, it was obvious to the offender he was participating in a very significant drug supply transaction.

  7. In written submissions, the Crown made a series of global submissions aimed at both offenders that, in the circumstances, do not adequately differentiate between the two men. It was submitted that both offenders intended that the drugs be disseminated into the community. If the offender in this case had that intention, it was one that he held for no longer than a minute. Similarly, the Crown submitted that the offending involved an organised criminal network with a high degree of planning. That submission was apt regarding the participation of Mr Do, however, it was not a helpful submission in relation to the involvement of this offender, as his prior participation was non-existent.

  8. In the CWS at [11] it was submitted that the men were couriers. Such a label may have been appropriate in relation to the co-offender Mr Do, but it was inappropriate in the case of this offender, given the circumstances of his presence at the car park and his complete ignorance of the drug transaction until 1.08pm.

  9. The essential feature of Mr Hagoss’ offending was his knowing assistance in helping Mr Do return the spilt sealed bags of nominal drugs into the suitcase, helping lift the suitcase into the car and driving for what must have only been a few moments, given the vehicle did not successfully exit the car park.

  10. The Crown accepted this offender’s involvement in the offence was completely unexpected, in the spur of the moment and without prior knowledge or participation. See CWS at [11]

  11. Despite this, the offence involves a very substantial quantity of highly pure methylamphetamine, a drug notorious for its terrible impact on users and the community more generally, albeit in circumstances where this offender was not aware of what the drug was, its purity or its exact weight. His guilty plea represents an acceptance that at the time of his assistance he knew he was involving himself in a very substantial drug supply offence.

  12. The objective seriousness of the offending is at the very bottom of the range.

The offender’s background

  1. Tesfahun Wubneh described the offender's early life in Tigray, Etheopia, in the following terms:

“…we are Tigrayan from the northern part of Ethiopia, a small marginalised province between Eritrea and Ethiopia that was subjected to over 50 years of abuse. Solomon’s parents and I grew up during the time of the Ethiopian Civil War, a conflict fought between the Ethiopian military junta known as the Derg and Ethiopian-Eritrean anti-government rebels from 1974 to 1991. The Derg administration became unpopular due to a low quality of life, slow economic development and human rights abuses. The northern part of Ethiopian suffered starvation and the southern parts were enslaved. The Derg staged a coup against Emperor Haile Selassie, leading to the Ethiopian red terror with executions, assassinations, torture, and imprisonment without trial of many. The Derg government invaded small tribes, resulting in the killing, rape and torture of men, women, and children. Conscription was mandatory, leaving many mothers and children with starvation in the absence of men. I know that Fitsum (the offender’s father) fought during this time and was enlisted for many years.

Eventually, the Tigray People’s liberation front overthrew the Derg government and installed a transitional government in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. For a few years, we experienced peace until the Eritrean - Ethiopian war in 1998. This war centred around the border between Eritrea and Ethiopian, causing vulnerability in the Tigray region, especially Fitsum’s home town of Rama. Countless women in the border area were raped, men were kidnapped and tortured, including Fitsum, who endured months of torture due to his involvement in the Derg War. Men were imprisoned or killed in Eritrea. Troops were eventually sent to the border, leading to massive internal displacement in both countries as civilians fled the war zone. People fled to North Sudan by foot, including myself. While attempting to find refuge and a new place to call home, life was very hard. Learning the language and finding work was challenging, often resulting in living in very impoverished circumstances. Through the Australian humanitarian programs from 1998 to 2004, many applied to seek refuge in Australia.”

  1. The offender’s family history is set out in Ms Ram’s report at pages 1-2. She assessed the offender on 15 January 2024 by AVL. By 1998, when he was four years old, the offender and his family fled to North Sudan by foot and for the next three years lived in a refugee camp under extremely arduous impoverished circumstances. In 2001, when he was seven, his family were able to migrate to Australia and took up residence in Essendon, a suburb of Melbourne. None of his family could speak English when they arrived.

  2. Ms Ram noted the account from Mr Wubneh, that it was common for adults like the offender’s parents arriving in Australia in these circumstances to continue to live in survival mode and prioritise work over study to ensure they could provide the basics for their children. The conflict in Tigray continued and the offender’s family lost family members. The impact of intergenerational trauma was noted, together with the impact that this had on children such as the offender. His parents spent huge periods of each week at work and the children were “often [left] to fend for themselves”. There was no willingness on the part of the offender’s parents to discuss the trauma they had experienced.

  3. Ms Ram noted at [1.3] of her report that the offender enjoyed school but suffered from bullying and teasing because of his lack of English and because he and his family resided in a predominantly white area.  He experienced countless instances of racism in and out of school. The offender's first jobs were whilst he was still in high school.  After leaving school, he was employed between 2011 and 2016 in customer service and warehouse operations for Masters Home Improvements.  That company went bankrupt in 2016.  He then worked as a labourer and in 2017 commenced a plumbing apprenticeship for about two years.  In 2018/2019, he opened his own business called Aqua Realm Fresh Water Aquatics Pty Ltd, and this business thrived even during the subsequent COVID-19 lockdowns.

  4. After his arrest in mid-2022, the offender’s family tried to continue to run the business, however that proved unsuccessful. After his release, and from the time when he was not subject to, effectively, home detention, the offender found a full-time position with a freight company. A reference from his employer was tendered in the offender’s bundle on sentence.

  5. It is very apparent that the offender has a strong work ethic.  It is also apparent that he has suffered significant childhood disadvantage both before and after coming to Australia.

Mental health

  1. Ms Ram expressed the opinion that both at the time of the offence and currently, Mr Hagoss has suffered and is suffering from:

  1. a major depressive disorder with anxious distress; and,

  2. an unspecified trauma and stressor related disorder.

  1. She noted the offender did not have addictions to alcohol, drugs or gambling. He has not previously had any diagnosis of mental illness but reported experiencing periods of depression and anxiety during childhood and as an adult. He attributed this to his challenging childhood and to the breakup of an important relationship in early 2020. He told Ms Ram that in trying to get over the end of that relationship he tried to go out more with his friend Mr Do. He was, “trying to forget someone and distract myself by trying to meet new girls.”

  2. After his release to bail, the offender commenced counselling sessions with Mark Spargo, a psychologist. A report from Mr Spargo was received by the Court. He noted that the offender had been referred to him by Dr Loni for an opinion and management regarding symptoms of anxiety and depression. Mr Spargo noted that he had seen the offender four times and had further sessions booked. Treatment has included psycho education, teaching of practical skills and supportive counselling. Mr Spargo considered the offender had been an active participant and had been very open and receptive to the work they had been doing together. He had displayed good self awareness and insight, along with a desire to make positive and lasting changes in his life.

  3. Returning to Ms Ram’s report, the offender displayed mild symptoms of anxiety, and when tested for depression and stress his results were normal, falling between the 60th and 78th percentile. He was tested for the presence and severity of symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder and whilst his score was elevated, he did not satisfy the diagnostic criteria for that diagnosis.

  4. Ms Ram administered the Paulhus Deception Scale, the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) and the Level of Service Inventory (LSI). She noted the offender fell within the low-risk classification for reoffending.

  5. In relation to the offender’s involvement in the offence for sentence, Ms Ram noted:

“2.2.4.5 Mr Hagoss’ self-concept appears to involve a self-evaluation that has both positive and negative aspects. His attitude about himself may vary from states of pessimism and self-doubt to periods of relative self-confidence and self-satisfaction. Some fluctuation of self-esteem may be observed as a function of his current circumstances, although these fluctuations will not be extreme and are comparable to those experienced by most adults. During stressful times in particular, he is prone to be somewhat self-critical, uncertain, and indecisive.

2.2.4.6 Mr Hagoss’ interpersonal style seems best characterised as modest and unpretentious. He is likely to be self-conscious in social interactions and he is probably not skilled or comfortable in asserting himself; previous efforts of assertion may have led to conflicts that he does not handle well and would prefer to avoid. Others probably view him as rather passive, unassuming, yet fairly sensitive to the appraisals of others. This appears consistent with his self appraisals disclosed in clinical interview.”

  1. Ms Ram then sought collateral information from the offender’s sister, Ms Semhar Hagoss and from Mr Spagos.

  2. Ms Hagoss noted that their parents had high expectations for their children and that their lives in Australia were initially difficult. She considered the offender had suffered significantly more discrimination than she had. The family had struggled financially. She thought that the offender always felt that he was not meeting his parent’s high expectations. He had suffered from depression and anxiety, particularly in 2019 after the relationship breakdown and then during COVID-19 by reason of social isolation and the unexpected death his friend. She considered the offender tended to want to please people and was not a good judge of character.

  3. Ms Ram set out the offender’s account of how the offence was committed, including being beaten by the police and having to be taken to hospital by reason of the injuries he sustained.

  4. Ms Ram considered that the offender’s early childhood was characterised by experiences of significant ongoing trauma from birth until the age of seven because of the Ethiopian Civil War, see her report at [5.2]. Ms Ram reviewed the experiences that he and his family had endured and expressed the opinion:

“…the significant and protracted traumas undeniably predisposed Mr Hagoss to a lack of security, feared safety, and underlying anxiety. Furthermore, intergenerational trauma involves the transmission of trauma from one generation to the next… Children whose parents are experiencing trauma may have difficulties with attachment and can be disconnected from the wider family and culture and have high levels of stress and distress from family and community members who are experiencing the impacts of trauma.”

  1. Ms Ram noted that upon arriving in Australia, the offender then experienced further difficulties in adjustment, due to his limited English and the impact of racism. Further difficult issues included, as a young adult, the end of an important relationship, the unexpected loss of a close friend, social isolation associated with COVID-19 and excessive work hours. These factors likely contributed to and perpetuated social dislocation and depression. Ms Ram considered the offender was suffering from a major depressive disorder with anxious distress, recurrent episode and unspecified trauma- and stress or-related disorder.

  2. At [5.8] of her report Ms Ram noted:

“It is probable that [his] history of chronic bullying and tendency to please people (as identified by sister), coupled with a desperation for acceptance and belonging may have led to his willingness to overlook his friend’s engagement in antisocial activities. It appears he did not ask questions as he was under the impression they were driving to the accommodation and his passive style (as identified on his PAI) prevented him from asking questions when his friend indicated that the stop was being made. Further likely [he] provided assistance to his friend without thought of the repercussions associated with rendering this support at the time. In the absence of his adverse childhood experiences and traumas related specifically to intergenerational trauma, displacement, transience, assimilation difficulties, racism and bullying, his interpersonal style may have been different, whereby he would have been inclined to ask more questions and not been so unassuming. As such there appears to be a clear nexus between his mental health conditions and his index offending.”

  1. The Crown required Ms Ram for cross examination relevant to her opinion that there was a causative link between the offender’s mental health conditions and his involvement in the offence. She noted the interview she conducted with the offender spanned three and a half hours. She had been provided with the array of documents set out in her report.

  2. Whilst Ms Ram accepted that the offender was capable of meeting his parents’ medical needs and his father’s work cover claim, she considered that but for his mental health condition, the offender would likely be able to do those tasks to a better standard. Ms Ram noted the importance of the collateral account she had obtained from his sister. She was asked to accept that his level of depression did not substantially contribute to his offending and replied that in her opinion it did and that it represented an accumulation of stressors over the preceding two years.

  3. In re-examination, Ms Ram confirmed that the offender’s childhood trauma was a significant feature of her diagnosis, as were his experiences in Australia growing up and his negative experiences as a young adult. She considered all these matters were relevant to the period of time that he had been suffering from depression, whilst also being affected by childhood trauma. She noted that the first occasion the offender received therapy was in 2023, when he was referred to Mr Spargo.

  4. Semhar Hagoss, the offender’s sister, gave evidence in the hearing in addition to the two affidavits she had deposed. She practices as a psychologist working with refugees and persons who have experienced trauma. She confirmed the offender had, in the period following the end of his relationship, withdrawn from associating with his family. At that time, she considered him to be cold and distant. The subsequent death of his friend, Kirk, had the same effect, as did COVID-19. Until 2023 she did not think he was ready to engage in therapy. Since commencing therapy with Mr Spargo, Ms Hagoss had noticed a big difference. He was mindful and present in his activities in the community, at work and with the family. She noted that his period in custody had been difficult as he was very isolated, alone and apologetic.

  5. In cross examination, Ms Hagoss confirmed that her family’s method of coping with trauma and difficulties was to try and forget them and try to cope. She considered the offender had acted in this fashion up until the time of his arrest and, until 2023, was not ready to be open to treatment.

Does either the offender’s background or his mental health reduce his moral culpability?

  1. The blameworthy aspect of the offender’s conduct was his spontaneous decision in unexpected circumstances to help his friend, Mr Do, after the contents of the second suitcase spilt. It was obvious that the bags on the ground contained a very substantial quantity of prohibited drugs.

  2. On his behalf, the submission is made that his poor judgment at that time was a consequence of his childhood disadvantage bringing into play issues considered in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 and the resulting mental health condition as considered in De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 and thus his moral culpability is reduced.

  3. The submission was that his background of trauma and consequential mental health issues meant that he was less likely to ask questions about the situation, to be able to resolutely refuse to participate and more likely to acquiesce to avoid rejection by his friend.

  4. At the conclusion of the oral evidence on 14 June 2024, the Crown submitted that the Court could conclude that the offender’s mental health, specifically depression, did, in a limited way, contribute to his actions but was not causative.

  5. There were no submissions to the effect that the offender’s early life did not amount to childhood disadvantage or that his early experiences had no role to play in the formation of his personality, his need for acceptance and tendency to acquiesce to avoid rejection.

  6. As to the effect of a mental condition reducing an offender’s moral culpability, Yehia J (with whom Rothman and Wilson JJ agreed) in DC v R [2023] NSWCCA 82 observed:

“[74] A reduction in moral culpability results where an offender’s mental health (or impaired intellectual functioning) has contributed to the commission of the offence. The applicant does not need to demonstrate that his actions were beyond his control, or that he had no understanding of what he was doing. Rather, the question is whether the applicant has established, on the balance of probabilities, that his actions are mitigated on the basis that the complex PTSD and/or intellectual impairment played a role of some significance in his offending.

[75] The sentencing task should not be approached in “an unduly technical or restrictive way”: see Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226 at [114]. In determining whether a causal link or nexus exists, a sentencing Judge should not approach the task as though deciding the issue of causation in a civil case. Where the mental illness or intellectual impairment explains or sheds light on the offending conduct in some material way, such a finding may operate to reduce moral culpability and the weight afforded punishment and deterrence.

[76] While a sentencing Judge should not become preoccupied with the issue of “causation” as a technical matter, the mental health issue or intellectual impairment should be capable of demonstrating a link, direct or indirect, between the offending and the mental health issues in question: see Ryan v Regina [2017] NSWCCA 209 at [15] per Hamill J (Leeming JA and Button J agreeing).” (Emphasis added).

  1. In my view, the offender’s childhood deprivation and his consequent mental health issues both reduce his moral culpability to an extent. This issue is a narrow one, given the limited nature of his involvement in any event.

Good character

  1. The offender has no prior convictions. He was 28 years of age at the time of the offence. On sentence several references as to his prior good character were tendered, as detailed earlier.

  2. Examples of the regard the offender is held in can be seen from the reference from Gedyon Demewoz, chairman of the Tigray Youth Association, who noted the offender had been a dedicated and valued member for many years, stating:

“In recent times, Solomon has emerged as a foundation of our community, demonstrating exceptional leadership in guiding, organising, and representing the Tigray youth. His noteworthy efforts include leading the coordination and facilitation of the Ethiopian soccer tournament, where Solomon actively collaborated with various members, conducted regular meetings, and passionately work towards fostering unity within the community. Importantly, he dedicated his energy to raising funds for the Tigray people grappling with famine due to the civil conflict in Northern Ethiopia - a cause that hits close to home for Solomon, given his family connections in the region.”

  1. Similarly, Jessica Caceres, a friend of the offender, wrote:

“Solomon is a genuine and gentle soul who is engaging and kind. He is my son’s godfather and a true friend to my husband and I, consistently extending his unwavering support to us, offering sage advice and an attentive ear whenever needed. His nurturing nature extends to our son, as he readily assumes the role of caring Guardian, guiding Luca through life’s early milestones with a compassionate and reassuring presence.”

  1. On the material before me, I am satisfied that his participation in this matter was an aberration. I note the Crown accepted that this conclusion was available on the evidence. The offence occurred in circumstances where he had virtually no time to consider his options and where he had almost no information available to him about what was occurring.

  2. A person of prior good character can be extended a measure of leniency when contrasted with an offender with an extensive criminal record. That the conduct can be seen as an aberration is relevant to the extent of such leniency. See Ryan v R [2001] HCA 21, 206 CLR 267 at [29]. Here, I consider the offender’s prior good character entitles him to significant leniency.

  3. The need for the sentence to specifically deter the offender from further offending can also be seen to be reduced in this context, especially as he experienced 4 months 20 days in maximum security during COVID-19. I note however, regarding the importance of general deterrence, less weight can be given to prior good character in a serious drug supply case, see Lam v R [2014] NSWCCA 50 at [33].

Remorse

  1. Section 21A(3) of the CSPA states that remorse is a mitigating factor if:

"(i)   the offender has provided evidence that he or she has accepted responsibility for his or her actions, and

(ii)  the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his or her actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both)”

  1. I am satisfied the offender is remorseful for the following reasons, in combination:

  1. His guilty plea.

  2. His statements of remorse in his affidavit at [14], [15], [20]-[21], noting he was not required for cross-examination.

  3. His expressions of remorse to family, his treating psychologist and the author of the SAR.

  4. His adherence to his conditions of bail and engagement in constructive measures to address his mental health issues. This demonstrates he has insight into the factors that contributed to his poor decision to assist Mr Do and persuades me that he is genuinely remorseful.

Future prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending

  1. I consider this offender’s future prospects to be very good. His likelihood of further offending is very low. This offence is the only occasion he has breached the criminal law. He has no prior record. His lengthy period of time on bail has been without incident. He has worked and participated in pro-social activities including his church, running a soccer team and participating in charitable endeavours. He has sought psychological assistance and he has the very strong support of his family.

Specific and general deterrence

  1. The offender's experience of being arrested and with the vehicle's windscreen having been smashed by rubber bullets, injuries that he suffered in that episode and his experience of custody in the months following his arrest have already served as a markedly salient deterrent to further offending,  see his affidavit at [17] to [18].  I accept that his time on remand was more onerous than normal, given his background of trauma and the mental health conditions he had and has, see Bugmy Bar Book at [29], [34] and [43] to [46].  The proceedings have also had a very significant effect on his family, see the affidavit of his father at [14] to [15], and his sister's affidavit dated 8 February 2024 at [21] to [23].

  1. The submission was made on the offender's behalf that general deterrence has little work to do, given the nature of this offender's very limited involvement and his mental health condition, given he was clearly taken by surprise and provided the assistance that he did immediately without time for reflection.  While I accept those points, in my view, general deterrence still has work to do because the message that needs to be communicated to the broader public is that even the fleeting involvement in significant drug trafficking will be met by severe punishment:  see Parente v The Queen (2017) 96 NSWLR 633.

Parity

  1. In Green & Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49, 244 CLR 462 at [28] the High Court stated:

“28. “Equal justice” embodies the norm expressed in the term “equality before the law”… It requires, so far as the law permits, that like cases be treated alike. Equal justice according to law also requires, where the law permits, differential treatment of persons according to differences between them relevant to the scope, purpose and subject matter of the law.”

  1. In Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64, 207 CLR 584 at [65], Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said:

“Equal justice requires identity of outcome in cases that are relevantly identical. It requires different outcomes in cases that are different in some relevant respect.”

(emphasis in original)

  1. On 5 April 2024 I sentenced the co-offender, Mr Do, to an overall term of 8 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years, dating from the date of arrest.

  2. Like this offender, Mr Do pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act, although his case involved more than double the quantity, representing the entirety of the substituted quantity in the two suitcases.

  3. Like this offender, Mr Do came from a background of childhood disadvantage. He was the child of Vietnamese parents who came to Australia as refugees. He grew up in a difficult household, with both of his parents working and experiencing difficulty in adjusting to life in Australia. He and his sister were the subject of physical abuse at home. For an extended period as a young boy, Mr Do resided with his parents in the absence of his sister, who had run away because of the situation at home. His parents were usually working, leaving him alone at home. He experienced racism and bullying at school and more generally when growing up. He lived in an area of Melbourne where drug use was rife.

  4. Like this offender, and despite his childhood disadvantage, Mr Do is a person with a promising future. He is diligent, hard-working and fundamentally pro-social. He had not previously offended.

  5. Despite these similarities, what makes parity of sentence largely irrelevant is that Mr Do’s conduct was deliberate, planned and objectively very serious. Although the Crown accepted Mr Do did not know the precise drug he was to collect or its precise weight, he had travelled from Melbourne to Sydney for the singular purpose of accepting delivery of the drugs and returning them to Melbourne to those who had retained him, where the drugs would have been distributed into the community. He had a drug debt. Success in this enterprise was expected to expunge it.

  6. Thus, there is no comparison between the objective gravity of the conduct of Mr Do with that of this offender. For this reason, having proper regard to the principles of parity, there is a sound basis for the imposition of a much less significant sentence in this case.

Presentence custody, quasi-custody and onerous conditions of bail

  1. The Court is required to take into account the 4 months 20 days spent by the offender on remand, see s 24A of the CSPA.

  2. The period between his release to bail on 8 December 2022 and 12 April 2023 when the conditions akin to home detention were removed, represents a period of quasi-custody.

  3. Taking both these periods into account, I consider the offender has served the equivalent of 6 months of pre-sentence custody.

  4. I accept that thereafter the requirement that he report daily was an onerous condition to comply with over a substantial period, however such a condition was obviously warranted, given the serious nature of the offence. I have taken this feature into account generally, without any discrete increase to the period of pre-sentence custody.

  5. As mentioned, the offender’s compliance with bail over such an extended period assists in reaching a positive conclusion about his future prospects.

Reasons not to impose the standard non-parole period

  1. The standard non-parole period for this offence is 15 years imprisonment. I have reached the conclusion that a lesser sentence is warranted given all the matters that I have referred to up to this point.

Disposition

  1. The Crown submitted that no sentence other than a sentence of full-time imprisonment was appropriate.

  2. On the offender’s behalf it was submitted that if it was considered that the threshold had been crossed, any sentence should not exceed 2 years and should be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order.

  3. I accept the threshold is crossed, even in this case of limited, unexpected involvement. This is because this offender, albeit with almost no time to consider his options, made a snap decision to involve himself in a very limited way in an extremely serious offence. As noted above, any participation in large-scale drug trafficking warrants condemnation, denunciation and enlivens general deterrence. It is for these reasons that it is necessary to impose a term of imprisonment upon the offender.

Comparable cases

  1. Both the Crown and counsel for the offender provided the Court with a schedule of comparable cases.

  2. The Crown’s schedule of cases provides no assistance regarding an appropriate sentence because none of those cases are even remotely comparable to the circumstances of this case. I reviewed some of them in my sentencing reasons for the matter of Do v The Queen at [90]-[108].

  3. On the offender’s behalf, a table of cases was provided where offenders had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offence against s25(2) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act and where the sentence was to be served by an ICO.

  4. In the matter of R v Kijurina [2017] NSWCCA 117, the offender met an undercover police operative, told him he could supply him with the requested 2 kilograms of methylamphetamine for $460,000 and also offered an additional 1.5 litres of methylamphetamine oil for $240,000. These two matters involved two offences contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act.  He told the operative that he had supplied prohibited drugs on a previous occasion.  He had sent messages to arrange a meeting and supplied the undercover operative with 2 kilograms of methylamphetamine and 1.5 litres of what he said was methylamphetamine oil.  It was later revealed not to contain the prohibited drug.  The offender was 28 years old, he had attended rehabilitation whilst on bail but had not completed it fully, he had been addicted to drugs at the time, he had no criminal record and had spent 3 months in custody and 4 months quasi‑custody.  At first instance, he had been sentenced to serve 2 years imprisonment by way of an ICO.  The Court of Criminal Appeal considered this sentence was manifestly inadequate but declined to intervene because of the long delay in passing sentence by the judge at first instance.

  5. The second matter of R v Vilkelis‑Curas [2019] NSWDC 670 involved an offender who was a driver for a fellow offender, Mr Magee, and knowingly took part in the supply of a large commercial quantity of cocaine, 995.1 grams. He had sent messages to an undercover operative, met the undercover operative twice, was present at the drug transaction, and accepted $20,000, with his share being $5,000. His home was later searched and cannabis leaf weighing 1.56 kilograms was also located. He pleaded guilty in the Local Court, had no relevant prior record, was motivated by financial reward and presented a very compelling subjective case, with excellent prospects of rehabilitation. He was 22 years old and had a disadvantaged background. His mother had been a violent drug dealer. He was considered to be very remorseful. He had spent 2 months 17 days in custody and 6 weeks in rehabilitation. He was sentenced by Yehia DCJ, as her Honour then was, and in the judgment her Honour made a series of statements that, in my view, are directly applicable to the circumstances of this case. These, by way of explanation, relate to her Honour's reasons for, in this case, imposing a sentence of two years' imprisonment by way of ICO with a requirement that the offender perform 150 hours of community service. From [137] of her judgment, her Honour said the following:

"[137]  Firstly, although the offence is a serious one involving a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, this offender's role was peripheral.  The objective seriousness of the offence he committed falls at the lower end of the range.

[138]  Secondly, his moral culpability is significantly reduced..."

  1. Her Honour then goes on to explain why, providing a conclusion similar to the one that I have come to.  She continued:

"[139]  Thirdly, the offender is genuinely remorseful and has developed a great deal of insight into his offending conduct.

[140]  Fourthly, he has excellent prospects of rehabilitation and I am satisfied is unlikely to reoffend.

[141]  Fifthly, he has served a period of full‑time custody and a period of quasi‑custody.  To return him to prison now will serve no sensible purpose.  He has been punished, having regard to the period of loss of liberty and the period which he will be subject to further restricted liberty in the community.

[142] General deterrence and denunciation are achieved not only by the time he has spent in custody but also by virtue of the fact that he will have a lengthy term of imprisonment hanging over his head.  Specific deterrence carries very little weight having regard to his excellent rehabilitation and unlikelihood of reoffending.

[143]  The safety of the community is best served in this case by allowing this young man to continue his rehabilitation in the community.  How can it be said that returning him to prison and potentially undoing the significant rehabilitation achieved to date will serve any purpose of sentencing?

[144] General principles must, of their nature, be adjusted to the individual case if justice is to be achieved.  A sentencing process must be capable of discriminating between cases.  There is a public interest in punishment.  But if the desire to punish results in a person who would otherwise not become a confirmed criminal becoming such, that sentencing process is inconsistent with the public interest.  It is to be recognised that imprisonment may convert a person who will not be a persistent criminal into one who is.  This is particularly so where the person to be sentenced is a first offender of a comparatively young age.

[145]  There must always be a place for the existence of mercy where a sentencing judge's sympathies are reasonably excited by circumstances of the case.

[146]  In determining whether the offender should be returned to custody, I bear in mind the remarks of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in the decision of Mainwaring v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 207 at [71]:

'Any period of imprisonment must be understood for what it is:  onerous, unpleasant, oppressive and burdensome.  It is, as it should be, the last available punitive resort in any civilised system of criminal justice.  Public discussions about the need to deter crime by the imposition of heavier sentences are not always obviously, or at least apparently, informed by an appreciation of the significance of full‑time incarceration upon men and women who receive such sentences.'

[147]  The protection of the community is also contributed to by the successful rehabilitation of offenders.  This aspect of sentencing should never be lost sight of and it assumes particular importance in the case of first offenders and those who have not developed settled criminal habits.  I am satisfied that the safety of the community is best served by allowing this offender to serve his term of imprisonment in the community where he can continue in his treatment, maintain his employment, and become a contributing member of the community."

  1. For the sake of brevity, I will not analyse in any detail the other cases that were referred to, but I have read and considered R v Kelly [2020] NSWDC 232; R v Gin [2021] NSWDC 755; R v Hamilton [2022] NSWDC 229; R v Dowdell [2022] NSWDC 529; R v Golding [2023] NSWDC 493.

  2. It can be observed that the role of each offender in this selection of cases was far greater than the role of Mr Hagoss. In each case the offender was actively involved in drug supply. Each person had made a considered decision to be involved, with knowledge of what was occurring. The only markedly more serious factor in the offender’s case is the quantity of the drugs. It is well settled that quantity is not the sole or even principal determinant, see Melikian v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 156 at [42]; R v MacDonnell (2002) 128 A Crim R 44 at [33].

  3. This offender’s subjective case is at least comparable to the most compelling subjective case in this cohort of decisions.

  4. I accept the description given to this case by the offender’s counsel, of it being “an absolute outlier”.

  5. In my assessment, an appropriate starting point for the sentence is 2 years 8 months. This sentence is to be reduced by 25% for the utilitarian value of the offender’s guilty plea.

  6. As the appropriate sentence does not exceed the two-year threshold, I am required to determine whether it should be served by way of full-time imprisonment or by way of an ICO. I note that this offence is not excluded by s 67 of the CSPA. It can be accepted that the legislature anticipated that there would possibly be cases that fall under s 25(2) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act that warrant this disposition.

  7. Section 66 of the CSPA requires the Court to give community safety paramount consideration when considering this question. In doing so, the Court is required to assess whether making an order that the sentence be served by way of full-time detention is more likely to address the offender’s risk of reoffending. The Court is also required to consider the purposes of sentencing set out in s 3A of the CSPA, together with any relevant common-law sentencing principles and any other matters the Court considers relevant.

  8. On behalf of the offender a submission was made that the circumstances of this offender’s involvement were “very exceptional"  as that term was used in R v Qi [2019] NSWCCA 73 (‘Qi’). I agree.

  9. In Qi, the Court concluded that the sentence imposed at first instance (by way of an ICO) was erroneously lenient. The offender had pleaded guilty to a s25(2) offence involving the supply of 1.98kg of methylamphetamine. His role was that of a deliveryman and in trying to avoid police he threw the drugs out from his car window. He was motivated to engage in the offence because of a drug debt of $30,000 and had made good progress post arrest towards rehabilitation. He had a limited criminal record. On appeal, Justice Button observed:

[73] Without purporting to promulgate any sort of prescriptive rule, an inevitable function of that maximum penalty is that, as a matter of common sense, it would only be in very exceptional circumstances that a sentence other than full-time imprisonment would be imposed for this offence. And the position of the respondent, whilst persuasive and deserving of sympathy, cannot be characterised as exceptional, let alone very exceptional.

  1. Justice Button set out a list of factors to support his conclusion, including:

  1. The maximum penalty;

  2. The standard non-parole period;

  3. The threshold of 500 grams for the large commercial quantity;

  4. The large quantity and potential for significant harm to the community;

  5. The offender’s limited but essential role;

  6. His expectation of having his $30,000 drug debt expunged;

  7. The offender being young, without a criminal record, having experienced a challenging upbringing with a dependence on drugs and gambling;

  8. The inherent leniency of an ICO.

  1. In this case, the offender’s role was at the lowest conceivable level, unlike in Qi. It lasted for a minute. It was spontaneous and unexpected. The assistance he provided was extremely limited and far from essential. He had no expectation of reward. As detailed above, his moral culpability for this lapse in judgment is reduced because of his childhood disadvantage, related mental health conditions and consequential personality traits. The period he spent in custody on remand was longer than the period spent by Qi.

  2. As noted above, the comparable cases provided by counsel for the offender are of assistance in concluding that an ICO is appropriate in all the circumstances of this case.

  3. In this case, the evidence is that this offender found his experience of custody extremely difficult. In the lengthy period that has followed his release to bail, he has not reoffended and has complied with what were initially very strict conditions of bail and with what have continued to be demanding conditions. His family consider he has changed substantially for the better throughout this period. He has engaged both with his family and the wider community. He is living a prosocial life. In my view, it is clear in this case that community safety is best served by this offender serving his sentence in the community.

  4. I have already considered the other important factors under s 3A of the CSPA, together with the relevant factors pursuant to s 21A and sentencing principles more generally. Incorporating those matters into the assessment fortifies my conclusion that an order that the sentence be served in the community is appropriate. I note that the offender and his mother will reside close to the city of Albury. In the event of the imposition of an ICO they are in a position to take up residence today. An order that a sentence be served by way of an intensive correction order can only be made in the case of an offender who resides in New South Wales.

  5. I am also required to take into account the effective 6 months of pre-sentence custody. In Mandranis v The Queen [2021] NSWCCA 97Simpson AJA, having determined an appropriate sentence, and finding the sentence be served by way of an ICO, considered it was appropriate to adjust the term of that order by deduction of the period equivalent to the term of pre-sentence custody. Her Honour, in a further obiter comment, observed that presentence custody could hypothetically be taken into account to reduce a term of imprisonment such that an ICO could be considered.

  6. Garling and N Adams JJ agreed with her Honour, although Adams J expressed some doubt as to the alternative application if the original sentence was more than the period for which an offender could qualify for an intensive correction order.

  7. In DG v R [2023] NSWCCA 320, the Court (Wilson, Fagan and Sweeney JJ), having considered the obiter comments of Simpson AJA in Mandranis, held that where a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum (here being 2 years) was considered appropriate, and the offender had served some presentence custody, it would be an impermissible exercise of sentencing discretion to reduce the term to three years or less, thereby facilitating an order that the shortened sentence be served by way of an intensive correction order. DG does not seek to call into doubt the approach taken by Simpson AJA in Mandranis that the term of an intensive correction order, once it has been determined that the offender qualifies for such an order, could not be adjusted by deducting the period equivalent to the term of presentence custody.

  8. In the circumstances, I propose to adopt the approach of Simpson AJA in Mandranis, adjusting the term of the intensive correction order to take account of the period of 6 months presentence custody.

Orders

  1. The offender is convicted.

  2. He is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 months.

  3. The sentence is to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order and is to commence today.

  4. The conditions of the order are:

  1. He must not commit any offence.

  2. He must submit to supervision by a Community Corrections officer.

  3. He must perform 125 hours of community service. [2]

  4. He must accept and participate as directed in any treatment program regarding his mental health that is considered appropriate by Community Corrections.

**********

2. In this regard I note that the most community service work that can be made available currently in Albury is 7 hours per month. (18 x 7 = 126)

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 06 June 2025


Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

28

Statutory Material Cited

2

Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37
DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194
R v Hoar [1981] HCA 67