R v GBT; Ex parte

Case [2025] QCA 157


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v GBT; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2025] QCA 157

PARTIES:

R
v
GBT
(respondent)
EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 3 of 2025
DC No 52 of 2024
DC No 53 of 2024
DC No 54 of 2024

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Sentence Appeal by Attorney-General (Qld)

ORIGINATING COURT:

Childrens Court at Maroochydore – Date of Sentence: 5 December 2024 (Long SC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

29 August 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

14 August 2025

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Boddice and Bradley JJA

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the respondent, a child, pleaded guilty to one count of receiving tainted property with a circumstance of aggravation (count 1), two counts of unlawfully using a motor vehicle in the night (counts 2 and 3) and one count of dangerous operation of a vehicle causing deaths and grievous bodily harm whilst excessively speeding (count 4) – where the child was sentenced to an effective head sentence of 6 years’ detention with an order that the child be released after serving 60 per cent of the detention period – where the appellant contends that the sentence of 6 years’ detention for count 4 was manifestly inadequate as the child’s offending on that count fell into the worst category warranting the maximum sentence of 7 years’ detention – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate

Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld)

R v BZZ & AZY; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld)[2025] QCA 89, cited
R v Patrick (a pseudonym); Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld)
(2020) 3 QR 578; [2020] QCA 51, cited

COUNSEL:

C M Cook for the appellant
E D Whitton for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the appellant
Legal Aid Queensland for the respondent

  1. THE COURT:  The Attorney-General of Queensland appeals against the sentence imposed on the respondent, a child, on 5 December 2024.

  2. On that date, the child was sentenced to an effective head sentence of 6 years’ detention with an order that the child be released after serving 60 per cent of the detention period.

  3. The Attorney-General appeals on the sole ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate.  The Attorney-General contends that the sentence of 6 years’ detention for count 4 was manifestly inadequate as the child’s offending on that count fell into the worst category warranting the maximum sentence of 7 years’ detention.  An argument advanced by the Attorney-General in the written submissions that the sentence was also inadequate because of the reduction of the period in actual detention from 70 per cent to 60 per cent was subsumed by the Attorney-General’s main contention that the maximum penalty should have been imposed for count 4.

    Indictments

  4. On 18 November 2024, the child pleaded guilty to four counts on one indictment, two counts on an ex officio indictment and one…

Continue reading R v GBT; Ex parte

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
R v GBT; Ex parte [2025] QCA 157
Case
[2025] QCA 157
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v GBT involved a child who pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including receiving tainted property, unlawfully using a motor vehicle, and dangerous operation of a vehicle causing deaths and grievous bodily harm. The child was sentenced to an effective head sentence of 6 years’ detention with a condition that the child be released after serving 60 per cent of the detention period. The Attorney-General appealed against the sentence, arguing that the 6-year detention for the most serious charge was manifestly inadequate. The central issue for the court was whether the sentence imposed by the lower court was manifestly inadequate, considering the child's extremely dangerous conduct that resulted in multiple fatalities and grievous bodily harm.

The court carefully considered the principles of sentencing for juvenile offenders, emphasizing the need for a balance between denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation. The court found that the sentence of 6 years’ detention was significant and appropriately recognized the need for deterrence, while also taking into account the child’s age and potential for rehabilitation. The court highlighted the child's young age at the time of the offence, the lack of prior court history, and the child's cooperation and acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. The court also noted the moderate to high risk of violent reoffending but considered this within the context of the child's potential for maturation and development. The court concluded that there was no basis to conclude that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the original sentence imposed by the lower court. The decision underscored the importance of considering the unique circumstances of juvenile offenders and the potential for rehabilitation, while also ensuring that sentences adequately reflect the seriousness of the offences committed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The child was sentenced to 6 years’ detention with a conviction recorded, for count 4 on the indictment, 18 months’ detention, with a conviction recorded, for count 3 on that indictment and lesser concurrent periods of detention, with no conviction recorded, for counts 1 and 2 on that indictment and the counts on the ex officio indictment. The child was reprimanded for the summary charge.Facts All of the offences were committed in April 2023, when the child was aged 13 years and had no prior court history. Counts 1 and 2 on the indictment were committed on 19 April 2023. On that day, food, keys and a motor vehicle were stolen from a residence. The vehicle was found the following day. It had sustained considerable damage. Forensic evidence linked the child to the vehicle and property. Counts 3 and 4 and the two counts on the ex officio indictment, were all committed on 30 April 2023. That afternoon the child was picked up from his residential care facility by juvenile co-offenders in a stolen vehicle. He was a passenger in the vehicle (count 1, ex officio indictment) when it was filled with petrol, without paying for that petrol (count 2, ex officio indictment). Later that evening, the child and his juvenile co-offenders stole a motor vehicle from a residence (commencement of count 3). Thereafter, the child dangerously operated the stolen vehicle for approximately 30 minutes. His juvenile peers were present. They subsequently left the vehicle, fearing for their lives, due to his manner of driving. Over the next hour, the child drove that vehicle dangerously. He crossed double white lines, did not maintain a safe distance from other road users and used excessive speed over a distance of many kilometres. This protracted period of dangerous driving only stopped when the child struck the rear of another vehicle, causing it to rotate clockwise into the path of another oncoming vehicle. The vehicle struck by the child contained three occupants. Two were killed and the third sustained grievous bodily harm. The sole occupant of the other vehicle was also killed. Witnesses variously described the child as “driving like an idiot” and driving “very fast”. Witnesses estimated the child’s vehicle travelling at between 180 and 200 kilometres per hour, shortly prior to the collision. Analysis of the scene revealed that the child’s vehicle had continued approximately 114 metres from the site of the initial impact down the roadway, before colliding with a large tree. All vehicles suffered extensive damage. Immediately after the collision, witnesses reported that the child was lying on the ground outside the driver’s side door. He began to cry and reported his leg hurt. Others attended to assist the occupants of the other vehicles. Two occupants were declared dead at the scene. A further occupant died during transportation to hospital. The surviving occupant remained in hospital for some 16 days. That person sustained significant brain injuries, chest and abdominal injuries and a fractured left leg. Those injuries required significant and protracted medical care and may result in life long cognitive deficits.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further, the sentence of 6 years’ detention was a significant sentence. Such a sentence appropriately recognised the need for denunciation and deterrence. It cannot be said that the sentence allowed the significant mitigating factors to overwhelm the importance of deterrence, both generally and personally.Conclusion There is no basis upon which to conclude that there was error warranting intervention, on an appeal by the Attorney-General.Orders The Court orders:1.Appeal dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

After recording that Dr Hatzipetrou had noted that given the child’s age and personal history, there was a requirement for intensive support and supervision on an ongoing basis, not only in detention, but also upon transition into the community, the sentencing judge found:“These are recognised factors to be taken into account and, potentially, on the one hand, indicating a moderation of the punitive and deterrent aspects of the sentence to be imposed on you. But also, perhaps, on the other hand are capable of indicating a sense of risk for the future, in terms of resistance to change and risk of reoffending. Here, that is the context for the debate that was engaged with Dr Hatzipetrou, particularly in the evidence he provided to the Court. Whilst as Dr Hatzipetrou identified and explained in knowing that as matters stand and with those prejudicial factors, at this stage, only being partly addressed and as he noted, presenting barriers to your rehabilitation or prospects thereof, an appropriate present assessment of risk of violent reoffending was noted to be, at least, moderate to high and of general recidivism, high. However, as Dr Hatzipetrou went on to explain, consistently with the principles I have noted to be applied by this Court under the Youth Justice Act, that in contrast to dealing with adult offenders and potentially ingrained characteristics, account must be had to what may be expected as to a process of maturation and development, in emotional, social and physical senses, particularly in the context of what had been identified as ongoing needs for interventions including continued involvement in education, as is now occurring whilst you are in detention and exposure to prosocial influences, which was, otherwise, noted to be a challenge whilst in detention.Notwithstanding the need for the horrendous consequences of your egregious offending on the 30th of April 2023 to be properly reflected in your sentence, in these circumstances and having regard, as the Court must, to your age and the limited extent of your past exposure to interventions and particularly those that might be expected to be associated with supervisory orders, the balance here should favour some moderation of approach. Including having regard to your particularly young age as you offended and your young age now, what I have noted is your cooperation at the scene of your tragic offending and the frankness that you later displayed in discussion with the officer from Youth Justice. And noting the cooperation that has occurred and facilitation at the course of dealing with these matters by the earliest possible entry of guilty pleas in respect of the first presented indictment and, of course, in respect of the ex officio indictment that came before the Court more recently. And as representing your acceptance of responsibility for this offending.I am not so sure that it is necessary to examine the different indications as to your sense of remorse or insight. Because, again, as explained by Dr Hatzipetrou, those things are constrained by your circumstances, your age and, again are matters that can be expected to be assisted by you gaining age and maturation and involvement in interventions. In particular, the matters that I have just mentioned, in my view, warrant some reduction of the portion of your sentence for which you are required to be kept in detention before release under a supervised release order.Before leaving the principles to be applied, what I have just described, it seems to me, is entirely consistent with what was described in dealing with R v Patrick in the Court of Appeal and particularly in reference to those Youth Justice Principles, as I have noted to remain applicable in dealing with you, in respect of requirements that a Judge deal with a child in a way that gives an opportunity to develop in a responsible, beneficial and socially accepted way and in a way that allows the child to be reintegrated into the community. Such considerations were described as commanding a sentencing Judge to do what can be done to increase the prospects of diverting the child from the potentially damaging effects of punishment, towards education, the learning of self-discipline, the nurturing of an appreciation and an acceptance of social standards and in due course, successful reintegration with the community.”[3][3]AB 158/48–AB 160/5.Consideration