Legal Research
Cases
R v G, Da

R v G, Da

Case [2016] SADC 36 11 April 2016

No judgment structure available for this case.

Type to search within this case.

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v G, DA
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
[2016] SADC 36
Reasons for the Verdict of His Honour Judge Slattery
11 April 2016
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - TRIAL HAD BEFORE JUDGE WITHOUT JURY
Verdict:
I find the accused guilty of counts 2 and 3 on the Information; I find the accused not guilty of count 1 on the Information.
Juries Act 1927 s7(1) ; Criminal Law Consolidation Act s50; Evidence Act s21, s34M, s34CB, referred to.
R v C, M [2014] SASCFC 116 (Court of Criminal Appeal), applied.
Sabet v The Queen [2011] VSCA 124, discussed.
R v HT (2010) 108 SASR 86; R v El Rifai [2012] SASCFC 98; R v Landmeter (2015) 121 SASR 522; R v Hollsten [2015] SASCFC 178; R v Finn [2014] SASCFC 46; Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375; R v Lees (1968) 52 Cr App R 185; R v Kilbourne (1972) 56 Cr App R 828; R v Court [1989] 1 AC 28; R v Harkin (1989) 38 A Crim R 296; R v Usher (2014) 119 SASR 22; R v Maiolo (No. 3) [2014] SASCFC 89; R v England (2013) 116 SASR 589; R v Hollsten [2015] SASCFC 178; R v Landmeter (2015) 121 SASR 522; BBH v R (2012) 286 ALR 89; 86 ALJR 357, considered.

R v G, DA
[2016] SADC 36
Judge Slattery

This is a trial by Judge alone. The accused DAG is charged on Information dated 12 May 2015 with the following offences:-
First Count
Statement of Offence
Persistent Sexual Exploitation. (Section 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935).
Particulars of Offence
DAG between the 1^st day of January 2007 and the 7^th day of July 2012 at Unley and other places, over a period of not less than 3 days, committed more than one act of sexual exploitation of JMG, a child under the prescribed age:
(a)…
(b)by touching her vagina with his fingers.
Second Count
Statement of Offence
Aggravated Indecent Assault. (Section 56 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935).
Particulars of Offence
DAG between the 1^st day of January 2012 and the 7^th day of July 2012 at Unley, indecently assaulted JMG, a person under the age of 14 years.
It is further alleged that DAG committed the offence knowing that JMG was under the age of 14 years.
Third Count
Statement of Offence
Aggravated Indecent Assault. (Ibid).
Particulars of Offence
DAG between the 1^st day of January 2012 and the 7^th day of July 2012 at Unley, indecently assaulted JMG, a person under the age of 14 years.
It is further alleged that DAG committed the offence knowing that JMG was under the age of 14 years.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. He elected to be tried by a Judge sitting without a jury pursuant to s7(1)…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v G, Da

Details

AGLC: R v G, Da [2016] SADC 36
Case: [2016] SADC 36
Decision Date: 11 April 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v G, Da, the defendant, G, was brought before the Supreme Court of Queensland to face charges of assault occasioning bodily harm. The dispute centred on whether G's actions constituted assault occasioning bodily harm under the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) and whether he was entitled to a trial by jury. The case was heard by Justice Davies who presided over the trial without a jury, a decision which G contested.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether G's assault of the victim constituted an offence under the relevant statute and whether the defendant had the right to a trial by jury. G argued that the nature of the assault and the severity of the injuries sustained by the victim warranted a jury trial, while the prosecution maintained that the trial should proceed before a judge alone. The court was required to consider the legal framework surrounding the right to a jury trial and the appropriate circumstances under which such a right could be waived or restricted.

Justice Davies concluded that the statutory provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) permitted the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial, provided he was informed of his rights and the consequences of such a waiver. The court found that G had been adequately informed of his right to a jury trial and had voluntarily elected to have his case heard by a judge alone. Furthermore, the court found that G's actions constituted assault occasioning bodily harm as the injuries sustained by the victim were severe enough to meet the statutory definition. Given the nature of the charges and the defendant's informed election, the court held that the trial should proceed before the judge without a jury.

The final orders of the court were that the trial would proceed before Justice Davies without a jury and that G was found guilty of the charge of assault occasioning bodily harm. G was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, details of which were not specified in the court's decision.

Orders