SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Elkerton-Sandy [2023] QSC 32
PARTIES:
R
vELKERTON-SANDY, Joshua Lindsay
FILE NO:
Indictment No 687 of 2022
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Trial
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at BrisbaneDELIVERED ON:
28 February 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
21 February 2023; 22 February 2023; 23 February 2023; 24 February 2023; 27 February 2023
JUDGE:
Cooper J
RULING:
Joshua Lindsay Elkerton-Sandy has a case to answer on the indictment.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – MATTERS RELATING TO PROOF – PRIMA FACIE CASE OR CASE TO ANSWER – GENERALLY – where the deceased died as a result of a stab wound inflicted by the accused after the deceased and others entered the hotel room where the accused was staying for the purpose of assaulting the accused – where the accused is charged on indictment with one count of manslaughter under s 303(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) – where the accused pleaded not guilty – where the evidence raises self-defence under s 271 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) – where the evidence raises defence of dwelling under s 267 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) – where at the close of the Crown case a no case submission was made on behalf of the accused – whether on the evidence as it stands the accused could lawfully be convicted of manslaughter
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 267, s 271, s 272, s 293, s 303(1)
Case Stated by DPP (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1, cited
Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; [1990] HCA 51, cited
May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654, cited
R v Cuskelly [2009] QCA 375, cited
R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, cited
R v Goldsworthy, Goldsworthy & Hill [2016] QSC 220, considered
R v Hill [1988] 1 Qd R 654, cited
R v Stewart; ex parte Attorney-General [1989] 1 Qd R 590, cited
R v Summers [1990] 1 Qd R 92, cited
Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; [1991] HCA 27, citedCOUNSEL:
D Nardone for the Crown
S Kissick for the defendant
SOLICITORS:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) for the Crown
Wallace O’Hagan for the defendant
On 26 January 2020, at about 9.25 pm, Kane Alexanderson and six other young men entered apartment 1705 (Apartment) in the iStay River City apartment building (iStay) located on Albert Street in Brisbane City. Joshua Lindsay Elkerton-Sandy and a number of other people had gathered in the Apartment on Australia Day.
On the Crown’s case, members of the group which entered the Apartment – including Mr Alexanderson – assaulted Mr Elkerton-Sandy after they entered.
In the altercation which followed Mr Alexanderson received two stab wounds. One of those wounds was to his chest. He died on 1 February 2020. The cause of Mr Alexanderson’s death was the subject of an admission in…
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- R v Elkerton-Sandy [2023] QSC 32
- Case
- [2023] QSC 32
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues were whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for manslaughter, and whether the defences of self-defence and defence of a dwelling negated the offence. The court examined the evidence led by the Crown, including CCTV footage and witness testimonies, to determine if it was open to the jury to find that Mr Elkerton-Sandy's actions were not justified under the defences. The court also considered the elements of self-defence and defence of a dwelling, specifically whether Mr Elkerton-Sandy reasonably apprehended death or grievous bodily harm from Mr Alexanderson's group and whether he believed it was necessary to use force to repel them from his dwelling.
The court concluded that the evidence could support a finding of self-defence or defence of a dwelling, depending on the jury's assessment of Mr Elkerton-Sandy's state of mind at the time of the incident. The court found that the evidence of Mr Elkerton-Sandy's words and actions before the physical altercation commenced could be taken into account by the jury. If accepted, this evidence might support a finding that Mr Elkerton-Sandy's state of mind was one of willingness to engage in a fight, rather than fear of death or grievous bodily harm. The court held that it was open to the jury to find that Mr Elkerton-Sandy did not hold the belief required by s 271(2) at the commencement of the altercation, and that the defences of self-defence and defence of a dwelling did not negate the offence of manslaughter.
The court dismissed the no case submission, allowing the case to proceed to the jury for determination of guilt or innocence. The jury was tasked with deciding whether Mr Elkerton-Sandy's actions were justified under the defences of self-defence or defence of a dwelling, and whether they could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defence or in defence of his dwelling.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to defence of a dwelling, Mr Elkerton-Sandy relied particularly on the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v Cuskelly.[23]In that case Keane JA (with whom Muir JA and Daubney J agreed) rejected the submission that where a defence of self-defence is raised, s 271 and 272 of the Code operate to the exclusion of s 267. His Honour concluded that s 267 affords a separate, and more extensive, ground of defence to an accused. The ground of defence is more extensive because of the different language used in s 267. In circumstances where lethal force is used s 267 does not require that the accused reasonably apprehend death or grievous bodily harm from deceased’s assault. The question which arises under s 267 is whether Mr Elkerton-Sandy believed on reasonable grounds that it was necessary to use the force he did use to “prevent or repel” Mr Alexanderson and the other members of the group from remaining in the Apartment with the intent to assault him. As Keane JA noted, an accused person who is defending his or her home need not retreat from a threat even if retreat is a reasonably available way to make effectual defence against a threatened assault.[23][2009] QCA 375.Consideration On the question of self-defence, I accept the Crown’s submission that the evidence of Mr Siemon that Mr Elkerton-Sandy said words to the effect of “one on one, one on one” before the physical altercation commenced and the evidence of Tremayne Sandow that he saw Mr Elkerton-Sandy holding the knife down by his side when members of the group who entered the Apartment were moving towards him is evidence which can be taken into account by the jury in its deliberations and which, if accepted by the jury, together with the evidence of Mr Elkerton-Sandy’s response in his police interview when asked what was going through his head at the moment that Mr Alexanderson’s group came into the Apartment, is capable of supporting a finding that Mr Elkerton-Sandy’s state of mind at that early stage of the confrontation was not one of fear of death or grievous bodily harm, but one of a willingness to engage in a fight. I do not accept that this evidence, if accepted by the jury, is incapable of excluding, beyond a reasonable doubt, all reasonable hypotheses that are consistent with innocence, and particularly the competing inference that Mr Elkerton-Sandy believed he could not otherwise save himself from death or grievous bodily harm than by using the force which he used. It will be a matter for the jury to decide whether they accept the evidence and, if they do, whether they are satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that Mr Elkerton-Sandy held the belief required by s 271(2) at the commencement of the altercation. The submission for Mr Elkerton-Sandy that a person who acts in self-defence must necessarily fight his attacker does not engage with the issue of Mr Elkerton-Sandy’s state of mind at the relevant time. While it is true that every person who acts in self-defence must fight in one form or another, I do not accept that any person who fights an attacker using lethal force, even in the circumstances in which Mr Elkerton-Sandy found himself when Mr Alexanderson and six other members of his group entered the Apartment, must necessarily believe at the time that force is used that he could not otherwise save himself from death or grievous bodily harm. For the reasons I have just explained, I do not accept that the jury, if it accepted the evidence identified by the Crown, could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Elkerton-Sandy did not hold the required belief.