R v Edgerley

Case [2024] QCA 57


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Edgerley [2024] QCA 57

PARTIES:

R
v
EDGERLEY, David Charles
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 216 of 2022
SC No 1535 of 2020

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 8 September 2022 (Ryan J)

DELIVERED ON:

19 April 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 March 2024

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Morrison JA and Kelly J

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – where the appellant was convicted of one count of murder – where the appellant was intoxicated by methamphetamine at the time of the offence – where the only issue at trial was whether the appellant intended to do grievous bodily harm or kill the deceased – where the appellant submitted that a miscarriage of justice occurred due to expert evidence from a doctor in relation to the association between a higher dose of methamphetamine use, aggregation and violence – where the Crown prosecutor invited the jury to use that evidence in determining the issue of intent – whether a miscarriage of justice occurred

R v Carlton[2018] QCA 294, applied

COUNSEL:

P C O’Connor and E Thorsen for the appellant (pro bono)
D Kovac for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

No appearance for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. MULLINS P:  I agree with Morrison JA.

  2. MORRISON JA:  The appellant was convicted of murder.  While the deceased was vulnerable and asleep in bed, in a demountable dwelling at the back of a property, the appellant entered the bedroom, threw petrol on the deceased, and then ignited it.  The appellant then left, holding the sliding door shut to prevent the deceased from escaping.  The deceased was consumed by fire and succumbed to his injuries some time later.

  3. At the commencement of the trial the appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter.  That plea was not accepted by the Crown.  However, the appellant having admitted that he had unlawfully killed the deceased, the only relevant issue at the trial was whether the appellant intended to do grievous bodily harm or kill, at the time he set fire to the deceased.

  4. The sole ground of appeal was that a miscarriage of justice occurred due to: (i) the admission of the evidence of Dr Duncan as to the association between a higher dose methamphetamine use, aggregation and violence, and (ii) the Crown prosecutor’s invitation to the jury to use that evidence in determining the issue of intent.

  5. The prosecution case at trial was that the appellant’s intoxication with methamphetamine and/or his mental state, caused him to believe that the deceased had raped his niece, and in that context he formed the relevant intent to do grievous bodily harm or kill.

  6. The defence case at trial was that the appellant was under the influence of drugs, delusional, felt unsafe, was hearing voices and, for reasons that defied…

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Details
AGLC
R v Edgerley [2024] QCA 57
Case
[2024] QCA 57
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Edgerley, the appellant was convicted of one count of murder. The appeal concerned whether a miscarriage of justice occurred due to the trial judge’s admission of expert evidence from a doctor in relation to the association between a higher dose of methamphetamine use, aggregation and violence. The Crown prosecutor invited the jury to use that evidence in determining the issue of intent. The issue before the court was whether the appellant’s intoxication by methamphetamine at the time of the offence amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The court found that the defence case at trial was that the appellant was under the influence of drugs, delusional, felt unsafe, was hearing voices and, for reasons that defied any rational explanation, decided to create a distraction and escape by lighting the fire, without any intention to harm the deceased. The court held that the appellant’s specific submission to the jury was that the appellant was unmedicated, likely to be under the influence of drugs and delusional when he threw petrol into the deceased’s room and set it alight. This was said to show that he had no intention of causing harm to the deceased, let alone killing. The court found that the defence counsel did not object to Dr Duncan’s evidence and sought to use it for the defence’s own purposes, in circumstances where defence counsel knew in advance what Dr Duncan might say. Therefore, the court held that it had not been demonstrated that any miscarriage of justice followed from the admission of the evidence of Dr Duncan or the Crown prosecutor’s use of that evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal and proposed the following order: Appeal dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The defence case at trial was that the appellant was under the influence of drugs, delusional, felt unsafe, was hearing voices and, for reasons that defied any rational explanation, decided to create a distraction and escape by lighting the fire, without any intention to harm the deceased.Relevant aspects of the evidence What follows is a summary of the evidence at trial, on aspects that might relate to the sole issue raised on appeal. According to a friend of the deceased, the deceased and the appellant appeared to have a good relationship. The deceased was involved in the sale of drugs, and most of the people who were at his house either used drugs or knew others who did. Some days prior to the offence the appellant and some other people shared some methamphetamine. During that process the appellant asserted that he was a member of royal family, and purportedly attempting to contact the Queen, who he claimed was his grandmother. Prior to the offence, the appellant spoke to his sister, who resided in the USA. The conversation lasted about 18 minutes. During the conversation the appellant asked to use her credit card for a taxi that he needed in order to pick up medication for his depression. Throughout the discussion the appellant expressed concern about his niece’s wellbeing, repeatedly emphasising his apprehension at something untoward might befall her. After the offending, the appellant fled the scene and approached a motorist, asking to be taken to hospital. During that journey the driver observed that the appellant was groaning, crying, and visibly distressed. His speech grew louder and more agitated as they progressed, becoming less coherent over time. At one point, the driver overheard the appellant mention something about “him” raping either his cousin or his niece, and something about DNA evidence being involved or sought. At one point in that journey the appellant received a telephone call from his employer, during which the appellant was distressed, crying and expressing pain. Upon arrival at the hospital, a nurse described the appellant’s condition as sweaty, teary, incoherent and restless. He exhibited elevated blood pressure and pulse rate, dilated pupils, and had injuries to his lower arm and knuckles with singed hair. In conversation with that nurse the appellant asked for STD testing, due to an alleged incident where “[The deceased] raped his niece”. He made various bizarre statements, including feeling unsafe at the hospital because of the deceased, who raped his niece. He also asserted that he needed to leave for England as the Queen would give him a crown. At the hospital the appellant admitted to using “speed”[1] for three days, and his behaviour was consistent with that admission. That behaviour was also noted by other hospital staff and police officers.[1]Another term for methamphetamine. The appellant received treatment from a doctor to whom he disclosed that he had consumed eight points of speed over the previous three days, or that day. He also mentioned having gone three days without sleep and experiencing hunger. Throughout the consultation the appellant displayed restlessness and agitation, with intermittent breaks in his communication. He remarked that his grandmother was the Queen of England.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Thus the appellant’s specific submission to the jury was that the appellant was unmedicated, likely to be under the influence of drugs (which could only be a reference to methylamphetamine), and delusional when he threw petrol into the deceased’s room and set it alight. This was said to show that he had no intention of causing harm to the deceased, let alone killing. As this was the line to be taken at trial, it is not surprising to find that defence counsel not only did not object to Dr Duncan’s evidence, but sought to use it for the defence’s own purposes. And, that was done in circumstances where defence counsel knew in advance what Dr Duncan might say, given that she had produced a report and the defence had a copy.[36][36]AB 483, line 42.Conclusion For the reasons above, it has not, in my view, been demonstrated that any miscarriage justice followed from the admission of the evidence of Dr Duncan or the Crown prosecutor’s use of that evidence. I propose the following order:1.Appeal dismissed. KELLY J: I agree with the reasons of Morrison JA and with the order proposed by his Honour.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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