R v Eaton

Case [2019] QCA 147


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Eaton [2019] QCA 147

PARTIES:

R
v
EATON, Grant Anthony
(applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 306 of 2018
SC No 737 of 2018
SC No 1564 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Sentence Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 31 October 2018 (Boddice J)

DELIVERED ON:

30 July 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

30 May 2019

JUDGES:

Fraser and Morrison and Philippides JJA

ORDER:

Application for leave to appeal is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – PARTICULAR OFFENCES – DRUG OFFENCES – DEALING AND DISTRIBUTION OF DRUGS – TRAFFICKING OR SALE AND SUPPLY – where the applicant was convicted on seven counts related to the trafficking, supply and possession of dangerous drugs – where the applicant was also charged with eight summary offences, all drug related – where the applicant was convicted for the trafficking and possession of dangerous drugs including: cannabis, methylamphetamine, 3,4 methylenedioxymethylamphetamine (MDMA) and Lysergide (LSD) – where the applicant was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment for count 1, nine months imprisonment for count 7 and six months imprisonment on each of counts 2 and 3 with a parole eligibility date set after serving three years and five months – where the applicant was convicted on all other counts and not further punished – whether the offences warranted the sentence imposed

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant challenges the sentence imposed on the ground that the sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive – where the applicant submits that the learned sentencing judge proceeded to sentence on the basis that the appropriate starting point for the sentence was approximately 10 years, if not more – where it was contended the starting point of the sentence was higher than it ought to have been, and in that sense, the learned sentencing judge was led into error – where it is contended that the applicant’s sentence was markedly and unacceptably higher than that of the co-offender – where the applicant submits that in respect of the authorities cited, the learned sentencing judge was led into error in receiving and applying submissions – where it is contended that the sentencing discretion miscarried because the learned sentencing judge acted on a wrong principle – whether the learned sentencing judge erred in his sentencing of the applicant

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – PARITY BETWEEN CO-OFFENDERS AND OTHER RELATED OFFENDERS – where the applicant contends that the parity principle is applicable – where it was submitted that there was an unacceptable disparity between the sentence imposed upon the applicant and that of his co-offender – where the applicant contends that the sentence was manifestly excessive and markedly and unacceptably higher than that of the co-offender – where there were differences in the extent, length of time and degree of…

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AGLC
R v Eaton [2019] QCA 147
Case
[2019] QCA 147
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Eaton, the applicant contested the sentences imposed upon him, arguing that they were excessively harsh and that there was an unacceptable disparity between his sentence and that of his co-offender, Ms Harvey. The applicant had been convicted on seven counts related to the trafficking, supply, and possession of dangerous drugs, including cannabis, methylamphetamine, MDMA, and LSD. He was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment on count 1 (trafficking), nine months on count 7, and six months on counts 2 and 3, with a parole eligibility date set after serving three years and five months. The applicant raised three grounds for appeal: the sentence was manifestly excessive, the learned sentencing judge acted on a wrong principle, and there was an unacceptable disparity between his sentence and that of his co-offender. The court needed to determine whether the sentence was indeed excessive and whether the sentencing judge erred in his application of the principles of sentencing.

The court considered whether the sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive. The applicant argued that the sentence was markedly and unacceptably higher than that of his co-offender and that the learned sentencing judge erred in setting the starting point for the sentence. The court found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive and that the learned sentencing judge did not err in setting the starting point for the sentence. The court noted that the applicant had been involved in a significant drug trafficking operation and that the sentence was appropriate given the seriousness of the offences. The court also rejected the applicant's argument that there was an unacceptable disparity between his sentence and that of his co-offender, finding that the differences in their respective roles and conduct justified the disparity in their sentences.

The court concluded that the applicant's sentence was not manifestly excessive and that the learned sentencing judge did not err in his application of the principles of sentencing. The court refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal. The court held that the sentence imposed was appropriate given the nature and extent of the applicant's involvement in the drug trafficking operation and that there was no unacceptable disparity between the applicant's sentence and that of his co-offender. The court found that the applicant's arguments did not demonstrate that the sentence was manifestly excessive or that the learned sentencing judge erred in his application of the principles of sentencing.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application for leave to appeal is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant challenges the sentences imposed upon him on three grounds:(a)that the sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive;(b)that the sentencing discretion miscarried because the learned sentencing judge acted on a wrong principle; and(c)that there was an unacceptable disparity between the sentence imposed upon the applicant and that of his co-offender (Ms Harvey).Agreed facts The applicant was sentenced on the basis of an agreed schedule of facts.[3] That schedule first set out the nine counts listed above, noting that the maximum penalty applicable to counts 1 (trafficking) and 6 and 8 (possession of dangerous drugs in excess of two grams) was 25 years’ imprisonment. The maximum for count 9 (possessing property obtained from trafficking) was 20 years’ imprisonment, and 15 years’ imprisonment for the other counts.[3]Appeal Book (AB) 49. On 9 February 2016, police located an advertisement posted by the applicant on the “Craigslist” website, which used terminology consistent with that of methylamphetamine and cannabis. A law enforcement participant (LEP) was assigned and used a false name (Jones) when communicating with the applicant. In March 2016, police commenced an operation investigating on-line drug activity, and the applicant was one of its principal targets. It was suspected that the applicant was trafficking in methylamphetamine. During the operation police used a number of investigative techniques including covert electronic and physical surveillance to infiltrate the applicant’s network. Police obtained warrants to intercept two mobile phone numbers utilised by the applicant.Count 1 - trafficking The applicant unlawfully carried on the business of trafficking in methylamphetamine and cannabis between 8 February 2016 and 19 March 2017. He operated his business with the assistance of Harvey. He supplied up to one ounce of methylamphetamine and multiple ounces of cannabis on a daily basis. During the trafficking period he received requests for MDMA, cocaine and LSD. The applicant occasionally arranged the supply of these drugs to customers, on request. Throughout the trafficking period, the applicant’s preferred method of communication was through the encrypted phone application “Wickr”, which automatically deletes communications after a specified time. The extent of the applicant’s trafficking business was therefore limited to telephone intercepts and covert operations conducted by the police. The applicant’s trafficking was best characterised as high-end street-level, involving frequent supplies of methylamphetamine and cannabis. The applicant engaged two associates to deliver drugs and collect money on his behalf, which assisted the operation of the business. The applicant paid these associates with small quantities of drugs.Sourcing drugs The applicant sourced drugs from a supplier called Anderton, and Harvey. On some occasions the applicant supplied Anderton and Harvey with drugs. The applicant sourced or attempted to source up to 10 ounces of methylamphetamine and up to one pound of cannabis at a time, for example:(a)on 18 May 2016, the applicant sourced one pound of cannabis from Anderton for $2,800;(b)on 20 May 2016, the applicant contacted Anderton and requested eight ounces of methylamphetamine for $47,500; Anderton later advised the applicant that he was able to reduce the price of eight ounces to $45,000; it is not known if the transaction took place;(c)on 21 May 2016, the applicant requested four ounces of methylamphetamine from Harvey; the applicant stated that if the price was reasonable he would purchase that quantity “every week to week and a half”; the applicant advised that he was willing to pay up to $4,750 per ounce; Harvey contacted her supplier who agreed to supply the drugs at that price; Harvey relayed this information to the applicant, who advised that he had engaged someone else; it is inferred that he was referring to Anderton;(d)on 22 June 2016, the applicant contacted Harvey and requested seven ounces of methylamphetamine; Harvey sourced the drugs and arranged to have them delivered to her house;(e)on 24 June 2016, the applicant requested one pound of cannabis from Anderton; Anderton advised the cost would be $2,400; the applicant requested a cheaper price and stated that if they offered a cheaper price he would be become a regular customer; the applicant further advised that he went through one pound of cannabis a week; and(f)on 12 November 2016, the applicant contacted Harvey and requested a price for 10 ounces of methylamphetamine; Harvey informed the applicant that the price quoted from her supplier was $40,000; it is not known if the transaction took place.Customers and transactions

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I am unable to reach the conclusion that the applicant’s sentence can be demonstrated to be manifestly excessive.Conclusion For the reasons given above, the application for leave to appeal should be refused. PHILIPPIDES JA: I agree.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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