R v Doug McDonald - [2012] NSWSC 875

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Doug McDonald [2012] NSWSC 875
Hearing dates: 13 April 2012
Decision date: 13 April 2012
Before: Bellew J
Decision:
1The accused is not guilty on the grounds of mental illness.
2Pursuant to the provisions of s 39(1) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990, the accused is to be returned to his present place of custody and that he be detained there, or at such other place as is deemed appropriate according to law, until such time as he is released by due process of law.
3Pursuant to subs 39(3) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990, the Registrar of the Court is to notify the Minister for Health and the Mental Health Tribunal of the terms of the order that has been made pursuant to s 39(1).

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - Murder - Mental Illness
Legislation Cited: Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990
Cases Cited: Mizzi v R (1960) 105 CLR 659
R v Ayoub [1984] 2 NSWLR 511
R v Coleman [2010] NSWSC 177
R v Michaux (1984) 13 A Crim R 173
R v M'Naughton (1843) 8 ER 718
R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182
R v Stiles (1990) 50 A Crim R 13
Taylor v R (1978) 22 ALR 599
Category: Sentence
Parties: Regina
Doug McDonald (Offender)
Representation: P Barnett SC - Crown
C Smith - Offender
Solicitors:

File Number(s): 2010/377959

Judgment

1. On 13 April 2012, the accused, Doug McDonald, was arraigned before me on an indictment alleging that on 12 November 2010 at Nelson Bay in the State of New South Wales he did murder Bruce McDonald. To that indictment the accused pleaded not guilty.

2. Pursuant to s132 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the accused, on 17 November 2011, had made an election that his trial be conducted by judge alone. The accused's election, signed by him and also signed by the Crown and dated 17 November 2011, was placed before me at the start of the trial.

3. The accused has raised a defence of mental illness within the meaning of Part 4 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990.

4. My attention has been drawn in particular to s 37 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act (1990), which sets out an obligation on the part of a trial judge to explain to a jury a number of matters which are enumerated in the section. I, of course, am sitting without a jury, as I have indicated, but lest there be any doubt about the matter, I have taken into account the provisions of s 37.

5. Those provisions were conveniently summarised by Hall J in R v Coleman [2010] NSWSC 177 at paragraphs 69 and following. His Honour said:

"The legal and practical consequences of a finding that the accused is not guilty on the ground of mental illness may be shortly stated.

The statute which governs cases like this, namely,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Doug McDonald

Details

AGLC: R v Doug McDonald [2012] NSWSC 875
Case: [2012] NSWSC 875
Decision Date: 13 April 2012

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Doug McDonald, the appellant, Doug McDonald, was convicted of murder. The conviction arose from the death of a woman, which occurred during a period of time when the appellant was experiencing severe mental illness. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appellant contended that due to his mental illness at the time of the offence, he was unable to form the requisite intent to commit murder, which is a fundamental element of the crime.

The legal issues before the court were whether the appellant had the necessary mens rea for murder, specifically the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, and whether his mental illness at the time of the offence negated this intent. The court had to consider the legal principles surrounding the impact of mental illness on criminal responsibility and whether the appellant's illness absolved him of the mens rea for murder. The court needed to determine whether the appellant could be held criminally responsible for his actions during the period of his illness.

The court examined the evidence presented regarding the appellant's mental state at the time of the offence. It considered expert psychiatric evidence and the appellant's own testimony. The court found that while the appellant was suffering from a severe mental illness, there was sufficient evidence to establish that he was aware of the nature and quality of his actions and that he understood they were wrong. The court held that the appellant's mental illness did not negate the intent required for murder. Consequently, the conviction for murder was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed. The court's decision was based on the principle that criminal responsibility cannot be entirely negated by mental illness unless it is shown that the individual was unable to understand the nature and quality of their actions or that they did not understand that what they were doing was wrong.

Orders