SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Denning [2022] QCA 72
PARTIES:
R
v
DENNING, Sean Owen
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 269 of 2021
SC No 761 of 2021DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 22 October 2021 (Martin J)
DELIVERED ON:
10 May 2022
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
5 April 2022
JUDGES:
Sofronoff P and Bond JA and Boddice J
ORDER:
Leave to appeal is refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in dangerous drugs and one count of possessing a thing used in connection with trafficking in a dangerous drug – where the applicant was sentenced to six years imprisonment with respect to the trafficking count – where the applicant was convicted and not further punished with respect to the second count – where the sentence imposed was to be served cumulatively on a five year, six month sentence imposed in 2017 – where parole eligibility was set at April 2024 – where the applicant has an extensive criminal history, including previous drug offences – where the period of trafficking commenced six weeks after the applicant was released on parole – where the trafficking was at wholesale level – where the applicant provided drugs on credit and where the applicant pursued outstanding drug debts with threats of violence – where the applicant submits that the sentencing judge erred in setting the parole eligibility date, being fixed at more than 50 per cent of the overall head sentence – whether the sentencing judge erred with respect to the fixing of the parole eligibility date – whether the sentence represented a sound exercise of discretion – whether the sentence properly reflected the criminality involved in serious drug offending – whether the sentence is manifestly excessive
R v Berns[2020] QCA 36, considered
R v Byrne [2020] QCA 173, considered
R v Neilson[2014] QCA 221, considered
R v Nunn[2019] QCA 100, consideredCOUNSEL:
S C Holt QC for the applicant
S J Bain for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Owens & Associates for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
SOFRONOFF P: I agree with the reasons of Boddice J and with the order proposed by his Honour.
BOND JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Boddice J and with the order proposed by his Honour.
BODDICE J: On 22 October 2021, the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in dangerous drugs and one count of possessing a thing used in connection with trafficking in a dangerous drug.
On the same date, the applicant was sentenced to six years imprisonment for the trafficking count and convicted and not further punished in respect of the remaining count. It was ordered that the sentence of imprisonment be served cumulatively on an effective…
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- AGLC
- R v Denning [2022] QCA 72
- Case
- [2022] QCA 72
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the sentencing judge appropriately took into account the time that the applicant had served in custody and would serve in custody before commencement of the sentence, when fixing the parole eligibility date. The sentencing judge specifically acknowledged that the applicant would be required to serve additional time as a result of the cancellation of his parole. The court found that the sentencing judge fixed the parole eligibility date after a proper consideration of all of the relevant circumstances and that there was no basis to conclude that it arose as a result of any misunderstanding of the sentencing submissions or through inadvertence. The court also found that a sentence of six years imprisonment, to be served cumulatively on the existing sentence of imprisonment fell well within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. The court found that the sentence properly reflected the criminality involved in serious drug offending commenced weeks after release on parole for a serious offence of violence. The court concluded that the applicant had not established any specific error or that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
The court ordered that leave to appeal be refused. The court found that the sentencing judge appropriately fixed the parole eligibility date and that the sentence represented a sound exercise of discretion. The court found that the sentence properly reflected the criminality involved in serious drug offending commenced weeks after release on parole for a serious offence of violence. The court concluded that the applicant had not established any specific error or that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. Therefore, the court ordered that leave to appeal be refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
Leave to appeal is refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Further, the sentencing judge appropriately took into account the time that the applicant had served in custody and would serve in custody before commencement of the sentence, when fixing the parole eligibility date. The sentencing judge specifically acknowledged that the applicant would be required to serve additional time as a result of the cancellation of his parole.Consideration A consideration of the sentencing remarks supports a conclusion that the parole eligibility date was fixed by the sentencing judge after a proper consideration of all of the relevant circumstances. There is no basis to conclude that it arose as a result of any misunderstanding of the sentencing submissions or through inadvertence. The sentencing judge specifically observed that the applicant had been in custody for 14 months, had a further 11 months to serve in respect of that sentence and would be required to serve a further 10 months as a result of the cancellation of his parole, such that he would serve 21 months before the commencement of any sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge further recorded that by the time the sentence commenced, the applicant would have been in custody for nearly three years. The sentencing judge also expressly recorded that it was intended that the applicant serve two and a half years in custody from the date of sentence before any parole eligibility date. There is no substance to ground one. A consideration of the circumstances also supports a conclusion that a sentence of six years imprisonment, to be served cumulatively on the existing sentence of imprisonment fell well within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. As the sentencing judge rightly observed, the applicant’s serious trafficking in more than one dangerous drug over a four month period throughout which the applicant was subject to parole would itself warrant a sentence in the order of seven to eight years imprisonment. A reduction in that sentence to six years imprisonment properly reflected the mitigating factors and the consequence of the imposition of a cumulative period of imprisonment. Once it is found that a cumulative period of six years imprisonment fell well within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion, there is no basis to conclude that a requirement that the applicant serve a further two and a half years from the date of sentence before eligibility for parole was itself manifestly excessive. Such a requirement properly reflected the criminality involved in serious drug offending commenced weeks after release on parole for a serious offence of violence. Whilst a consequence of the setting of the parole eligibility date is that the applicant will serve more than 50 per cent of the overall sentence in actual custody, that consequence flows from engaging in serious criminal offending whilst on parole. Such a requirement did not constitute a crushing sentence. It also did not evidence any misapplication of sentencing principles.