R v Deering - [2009] SASC 53

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
R v DEERING
[2009] SASC 53
Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Kelly
25 February 2009
CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - INSANITY - DISEASE OF THE MIND, MENTAL DISEASE OR MENTAL INFIRMITY
MENTAL HEALTH - CONFINEMENT AND RESTRAINT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS AND SIMILAR ORDERS - GENERALLY
Application by DPP that order for detention not be discharged - respondent convicted in 1986 of four counts of rape and declared incapable of controlling his sexual instincts - released to Glenside Hospital on licence - two psychiatric reports support the application that the order for detention not be discharged - respondent not fit to be released - unlikely to successfully integrate back into the community - lack of remorse - lack of insight into his psychiatric condition - order made under s 24(11) of Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act that the order for detention of respondent will not be discharged for a period of three years.
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 s 24(11), referred to.
Director of Public Prosecutions v Deering (2000) 206 LSJS 482, considered.

R v DEERING
[2009] SASC 53
Kelly J
Reasons for Decision

This application by the Director of Public Prosecutions is made under the provisions of Section 24(11) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (“the Act”).
S 24(11) states:
24—Release on licence
(11)Where a person has been subject to a licence under this section for a continuous period of three years, the order for his or her detention under this Division will, unless the Supreme Court, on application by the Director of Public Prosecutions, orders otherwise, be taken to have been discharged on the expiration of that period.
The application by the Director is that the order of detention in relation to Mr Deering under Part 2 Division 3 of the Act not be discharged. The application refers to the detention of Mr Deering by virtue of the most recent order made in this Court by Anderson J on 20 March 2006. However, this matter has a very long history. In September 1986 Mr Deering was convicted of four counts of rape and later that year in December 1986 he was declared incapable of controlling his sexual instincts. Thereafter he was detained in an institution until 1998 when he applied to have the order for indeterminate detention discharged. The history of the matter to that time and the relevant changes to the legislation governing Mr Deering’s detention are set out in a very thorough judgment of Wicks J in Director of Public Prosecutions v Deering (2000) 206 LSJS 482.
Since then the Director of Public Prosecutions has, on two occasions, applied to this Court for further orders that the detention of Mr Deering not be discharged. The first such application was made in January 2003 as a result of which Martin J on 24 January 2003 refused to discharge the order. The second was made in March 2006 as a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Deering

Details

AGLC: R v Deering [2009] SASC 53
Case: [2009] SASC 53
Decision Date: 25 February 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Deering, the respondent, previously convicted of multiple counts of rape, was the subject of an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) seeking to prevent the discharge of a detention order imposed under the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act. The respondent, who had been released on licence to Glenside Hospital, was deemed incapable of controlling his sexual instincts and had been detained under a psychiatric order. The DPP's application was based on two psychiatric reports indicating that the respondent was unfit for release and unlikely to successfully reintegrate into the community. The court was tasked with determining whether the detention order should be discharged.

The legal issues central to this case revolved around the respondent's mental capacity and the potential risk he posed to the community if released. The court had to assess the validity of the psychiatric reports and decide whether the respondent's mental condition warranted continued detention. This involved examining the respondent's lack of remorse, his lack of insight into his psychiatric condition, and the likelihood of his successful reintegration into society. The court also had to consider the statutory provisions under section 24(11) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act that provided the framework for the detention order.

After reviewing the psychiatric reports and considering the evidence presented, the court found that the respondent was not fit to be released and that there was a significant risk he would reoffend if set free. The court noted the lack of remorse and insight into his condition, which further supported the need for continued detention. Based on these findings, the court upheld the DPP's application and made an order that the detention order for the respondent would not be discharged for a period of three years. This decision was aimed at ensuring public safety and providing the respondent with the necessary treatment and supervision to address his psychiatric condition.

Orders