R v Cunningham

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:  R v Cunningham
Citation:  [2020] ACTSC 269
Hearing Dates:  23 September 2020
Decision Date:  23 September 2020
Reasons Date:  9 October 2020
Before:  Burns J
Decision:  See [10]-[13]
Catchwords:  CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – Admissibility of evidence –
whether photoboard identification by two witnesses is admissible
– whether police conducted the photoboard procedures in breach
of s 235 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) – consideration of probative value of evidence – whether desirability of admitting the
evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence
Legislation Cited:  Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 114, 115, 138
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 235
Parties:  The Queen (Crown)
Christopher Cunningham (Accused)
Representation:  Counsel
M Dyason (Crown)
T Jackson (Accused)
Solicitors
ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Legal Aid ACT (Accused)
File Numbers:  SCC 214 of 2019; SCC 270 of 2019
BURNS J: 

1.       Mr Jackson on behalf of the accused Christopher Cunningham objected to evidence that the Crown proposed leading of photoboard identification processes conducted by police with two witnesses, BE and TB. On 23 September 2020, I ruled that the Crown would be permitted to lead the evidence relating to BE, but not that relating to TB. I indicated that I would give my reasons at a later date. There are my reasons.

2.       The Crown alleges that Mr Cunningham was one of a number of people present at an argument between two groups of people which occurred in front of residential premises in South Canberra. It alleges that the accused fired a number of shots from a rifle during that argument, wounding HP. Mr Cunningham has pleaded not guilty to the charges brought by the Crown.

3.       The Crown alleges that BE and TB were present at the scene of the shooting and saw the person who fired the shots. It was a person who was at that time unknown to them. Both BE and TB participated in a photoboard identification procedure conducted by the police. It is alleged that BE identified a photo of the accused Mr Cunningham as a photo of the man who fired the rifle on 2 March 2019. TB identified a photo of a person who was not Mr Cunningham.

4. The objection taken by Mr Jackson was two-fold. First, that the evidence was inadmissible by virtue of s 114 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) (the Evidence Act) and, secondly, that the police had breached s 235 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (the Crimes Act).

  1. The first objection was misconceived. Section 114 of the Evidence Act renders “visual

    identification evidence” inadmissible unless an identification parade was conducted, it

    would not have been reasonable to conduct an identification parade or the accused refused to participate in an identification parade. The section, however, expressly

    excludes “picture identification evidence” which is governed by the provisions of s 115

    of the Evidence Act. With the exception of an accused person who is in custody, s 115 does not contain a…

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Details
Case
[2020] ACTSC 269
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory was presented with an application to exclude evidence obtained from two witnesses who participated in a photoboard identification procedure conducted by police. The Crown proposed to lead the evidence relating to the identification of Christopher Cunningham by two witnesses, BE and TB. Mr Jackson, counsel for the accused, objected to the admission of both pieces of evidence on two grounds: firstly, that the evidence was inadmissible under section 114 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT); and secondly, that the police had breached section 235 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The court found the first objection misconceived, as the provision excludes "picture identification evidence," which is governed by the provisions of section 115 of the Evidence Act. The court also found that the police had breached section 235 of the Crimes Act by not offering Cunningham the opportunity to participate in an identification parade.

The court considered whether the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained, as per section 138 of the Evidence Act. In relation to the evidence of BE, the court found that the probative value of the evidence was high and it was important evidence in the proceeding. Although the decision not to offer Cunningham the opportunity to participate in an identification parade was deliberate, the court was not satisfied that there was a deliberate or reckless breach of section 235 of the Crimes Act. The court was satisfied that the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in the way the evidence was. However, in relation to the evidence of TB, the court found that the probative value of her evidence was slight and it had little importance in the proceeding. Therefore, the court declined to exercise its discretion under section 138 of the Evidence Act to admit the evidence.

The court ruled that the Crown would be permitted to lead the evidence relating to BE but not that relating to TB. The reasons for the decision were to be provided at a later date. The court certified that the preceding numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Burns.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of R v Cunningham involves allegations that Christopher Cunningham fired shots from a rifle during an argument in South Canberra, resulting in the wounding of HP. Cunningham has pleaded not guilty to the charges brought by the Crown. The Crown seeks to lead evidence from two witnesses, BE and TB, who participated in photoboard identification procedures conducted by police. BE identified a photo of Cunningham as the person who fired the rifle, while TB identified a different person.

Cunningham's legal representative, Mr Jackson, objected to the admissibility of the photoboard identification evidence on two grounds. Firstly, he argued that the evidence was inadmissible under section 114 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) because an identification parade was not conducted, and it was not reasonable to do so or because Cunningham refused to participate. However, section 115 of the Evidence Act exempts picture identification evidence from this requirement, provided the accused is not in custody, which was the case here. Secondly, Mr Jackson argued that the police breached section 235 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) by not offering Cunningham the opportunity to participate in an identification parade when conducting the photoboard procedures.

The court found that while a legislative preference exists for identification parades, a broader interpretation of "otherwise available" in section 235 of the Crimes Act was more appropriate. Cunningham was deemed available to participate in an identification parade on the date the photoboard procedures took place. However, the police made a deliberate decision not to offer Cunningham the opportunity to participate due to concerns about potential ambush and witness reluctance. The court found that the police breached section 235 but balanced this against the probative value and importance of the evidence in determining admissibility under section 138 of the Evidence Act. The court concluded that the desirability of admitting BE's evidence outweighed the undesirability of its procurement, but declined to admit TB's evidence due to its slight probative value and minimal importance.

The matter of R v Cunningham came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory for a preliminary hearing on 23 September 2020, presided over by Justice Burns. The accused, Christopher Cunningham, was represented by Mr Jackson, while the Crown was represented by Ms Dyason. Cunningham had pleaded not guilty to charges of wounding with intent, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and possession of a firearm without a licence. The primary issue in the case was the admissibility of photoboard identification evidence provided by two witnesses, BE and TB, who claimed to have witnessed the accused firing a rifle during an altercation in South Canberra. The Crown sought to introduce this evidence, but Mr Jackson objected on the grounds that the procedure was conducted in breach of statutory requirements, potentially rendering the evidence inadmissible.

Mr Jackson's objection was twofold. Firstly, he argued that the evidence was inadmissible under section 114 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), which generally prohibits visual identification evidence unless specific conditions are met. However, Justice Burns found that the objection was misconceived as the statutory provisions governing picture identification evidence, under section 115 of the Evidence Act, did not contain equivalent preconditions for admissibility when the accused was not in custody. Secondly, Mr Jackson contended that the police had breached section 235 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), which mandates that a suspect must be offered the opportunity to participate in an identification parade unless certain conditions are met. The Crown argued that the term "otherwise available" in section 235 should be narrowly interpreted to mean immediate availability, which Justice Burns rejected. Instead, he adopted a broader interpretation consistent with the legislative preference for identification parades, finding that Cunningham was available to participate but police did not offer him the opportunity due to concerns about witness safety and cooperation.

Justice Burns concluded that the photoboard procedures were conducted in breach of section 235 of the Crimes Act, and thus the admissibility of the evidence hinged on the discretionary provisions of section 138 of the Evidence Act. He assessed the probative value and importance of the evidence provided by BE, finding that it had significant probative value and was crucial in the proceedings due to the gravity of the charges against Cunningham. Despite the deliberate breach of section 235, Justice Burns determined that the desirability of admitting BE's evidence outweighed the undesirability of its acquisition. Conversely, he ruled that TB's evidence had little probative value and importance, and thus declined to admit it under section 138 of the Evidence Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is photoboard identification evidence admissible under the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) in the absence of a conducted identification parade?
2. Did the police breach s 235 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) by not offering the accused the opportunity to participate in an identification parade?
3. If there was a breach of s 235, does the desirability of admitting the photoboard identification evidence outweigh the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in the manner it was?
4. Should the evidence of the witness who did not identify the accused be admitted under s 138 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)?

Held
1. Is photoboard identification evidence admissible under the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) in the absence of a conducted identification parade?
The court concluded that photoboard identification evidence is admissible under the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) even in the absence of a conducted identification parade. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

2. Did the police breach s 235 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) by not offering the accused the opportunity to participate in an identification parade?
The court concluded that the police breached s 235 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) by not offering the accused the opportunity to participate in an identification parade. The appeal on this issue was allowed.

3. If there was a breach of s 235, does the desirability of admitting the photoboard identification evidence outweigh the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in the manner it was?
The court concluded that the desirability of admitting the photoboard identification evidence by BE outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in the manner it was. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

4. Should the evidence of the witness who did not identify the accused be admitted under s 138 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)?
The court concluded that the evidence of the witness who did not identify the accused should not be admitted under s 138 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT). The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court in R v Cunningham addressed several critical issues concerning the admissibility of photoboard identification evidence and the legal obligations of police under the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). Firstly, the court considered whether photoboard identification evidence is admissible under the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) in the absence of a conducted identification parade. The court concluded that section 114 of the Evidence Act, which governs visual identification evidence, does not apply to picture identification evidence such as that obtained via a photoboard. Instead, the admissibility of such evidence is governed by section 115, which does not require an identification parade unless the accused is in custody. As Cunningham was not in custody, the failure to conduct an identification parade did not render the photoboard evidence inadmissible.

Secondly, the court examined whether the police breached section 235 of the Crimes Act by not offering Cunningham the opportunity to participate in an identification parade. Section 235 requires police to offer a suspect the opportunity to participate in an identification parade unless specific conditions are met. The court found that Cunningham was "otherwise available" to participate in an identification parade, and the reasons provided by police for not conducting one were insufficient. Police were concerned about potential witness intimidation and the witnesses' willingness to participate, but these concerns did not justify bypassing the statutory requirement. The court held that the police breached section 235, leading to the admissibility of the photoboard evidence being subject to the discretionary provisions of section 138 of the Evidence Act.

Thirdly, the court considered whether the desirability of admitting the photoboard identification evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in breach of section 235. The court assessed various factors, including the probative value and importance of the evidence, the nature of the offence, and the gravity of the breach. The evidence from one witness, BE, who identified Cunningham, had high probative value and was crucial to the case. Although the breach was deliberate, the court accepted that police had reasonable grounds for their actions. Balancing the relevant considerations, the court concluded that the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the evidence of the witness who did not identify Cunningham should be admitted under section 138 of the Evidence Act. The court found that the probative value of this evidence was slight and it held little importance in the proceeding. Therefore, the court exercised its discretion under section 138 not to admit this evidence.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that photoboard identification evidence can be admissible in the absence of a conducted identification parade, but police must adhere to the requirements of section 235 of the Crimes Act. If there is a breach of these requirements, the admissibility of such evidence will be subject to the discretionary provisions of section 138 of the Evidence Act, where the desirability of admitting the evidence must outweigh the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in the manner it was. The court distinguished this decision from prior authority by applying a broader interpretation of the term "otherwise available" in section 235, emphasizing the legislative preference for identification parades.