R v Coughlan

Case [2019] QCA 65

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  R v Coughlan [2019] QCA 65
PARTIES:  R v COUGHLAN, Eamonn Charles
(appellant)
FILE NO/S:  CA No 152 of 2018
DC No 1125 of 2017
DIVISION:  Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:  Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING  District Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 6 June 2018
COURT:  (Clare SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:  16 April 2019
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  12 November 2018
JUDGES:  Fraser and Morrison JJA and Mullins J
ORDER:  The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – PARTICULAR OFFENCES – PROPERTY OFFENCES – ARSON AND LIKE OFFENCES – GENERALLY – where the appellant has been convicted of arson and attempted fraud arising out of the destruction of his house and a resultant claim on his insurance policy – where the appellant contends he was not the person that set the fire – where the appellant claims that someone outside his house was screaming at him at the time of the fire – whether or not there is a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant contends that there was evidence of another man running from the house, who could have been the arsonist – where the appellant contends that there was evidence that the appellant was being chased, which explained why he ran away from the scene – where there were others at the scene who could not be excluded as having set the fire – where it is contended the scientific evidence did not exclude sources of ignition inconsistent with the appellant setting the fire – where it is submitted that the scientific evidence could not exclude that the presence of petrol residue on the appellant’s shoes and tracksuit pants was the result of cross-contamination – where the presence of a redhead match suggested corruption of the

investigation process – whether there is an inference consistent
with innocence reasonably open on the evidence

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – OBJECTIONS OR POINTS NOT RAISED IN COURT BELOW – IMPROPER ADMISSION OR REJECTION OF EVIDENCE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – where the appellant contends that he was denied a fair trial because of the failure by the prosecution to disclose two reports of an investigation police officer until such time as that officer had completed his evidence and departed for overseas – where the appellant submits that the prosecutor failed to disclose the identity of a number of youths who were at the scene of the car arson that occurred prior to the arson of the appellant’s house – whether the undisclosed material might have influenced the result of the trial

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES NOT AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION – where the appellant contends that the failure to give a direction pursuant to s 21A(8) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), in respect the evidence of a…

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Details
AGLC
R v Coughlan [2019] QCA 65
Case
[2019] QCA 65
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Coughlan, the appellant stood accused of intentionally damaging property by fire, an offence under section 303(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld). The dispute centred on whether the appellant was responsible for the fire that occurred at his house, which resulted in significant damage. The matter was heard in the Queensland Court of Appeal. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the appellant's involvement in the fire was proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering the expert evidence on the presence of petrol residue on his clothing and the lack of a clear motive or other evidence linking the appellant to the arson. Additionally, the court had to consider whether any bias or improper conduct by the investigating officers affected the fairness of the trial.

The court meticulously examined the evidence presented, including the expert testimony that established the presence of petrol residue on the appellant’s clothing and the origin of the explosion inside the house. The appellant’s denials and the absence of an obvious motive were weighed against this compelling evidence. The court found that the appellant’s tracksuit pants and shoes had come into contact with liquid petrol, which could not be attributed to any innocent activity. The appellant's version of events was deemed irreconcilable with the scientific evidence. The court further concluded that any perceived bias or dislike by the investigating officers did not compromise the integrity of the investigation or the trial. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Finally, there was a witness from the insurer (NRMA), a doctor and a witness from the Queensland Fire Service as to the cause and origin of the fire. Evidence of Patruno Patruno said that in July 2015 he was living with his mother, next door to the appellant’s house. On the day of the explosion he and some mates[6] had been planning to go camping. They gathered camping equipment from Dyke’s house then went to Patruno’s house to gather some more. At that house Patruno got out with Drayton, but Dyke and Long waited in the car as they were not needed to gather the camping things.[7] [6] Drayton, Long and Dyke. [7] Appeal Book (AB) 62. The car was a silver Subaru station wagon.[8] [8] AB 68 line 2. As they walked to the gate Patruno noticed there was a strong smell of petrol.[9] As he walked inside the smell got less. While in his room he heard a “smash of glass which was followed by … almost instantaneously an explosion that was followed by a shockwave that actually … had a bit of force behind us … pushing us away from the house that was on fire”.[10] Within a matter of 20-30 seconds they ran outside, saw the fire and ran out onto the nature strip, just in front of the fence, to ask if anyone was in there. He walked as close as he could to the fire and called out something like “Is anybody OK? Is anyone in there?” He waited for a few minutes. He could not hear or see anyone from the front of the property so he joined his friends who were still in the car, Dyke in the front and Long in the back. [9] AB 62 lines 32-37, AB 65 line 35. [10] AB 62 line 46 to AB 63 line 2; AB 72 line 33. After those in the car said something to him he looked around and saw a dark shadowy figure running away.[11] He could not give a description of the person running.[12] Later in cross-examination Patruno rejected the suggestion that he was wrong about seeing the person run off.[13] Some other people started to turn up. [11] AB 64 lines 19-26; AB 114 lines 5-9. [12] AB 68 line 12. [13] AB 114 line 32 to 115 line 8. He could not recall any other cars parked in the street. He did not hear anyone yelling out.[14] He made sure emergency services had been called before leaving to go camping, and thought that the fire services had arrived before he left.[15] [14] AB 69 line 27. [15] AB 69 lines 38-45. In cross-examination Patruno said he was close enough to the house that it “was almost burning me”;[16] he accepted that was about eight metres away.[17] He described his position:[18] [16] AB 73 line 34. [17] AB 78 line 18. [18] AB 76 lines 5-9. “I saw a house on fire so I ran up as quickly as I could to whatever position was safe for me … until I felt the flames were too hot for me.” When Patruno and his friends left they went to see if they could find the person they saw running off, but they did not see him.[19] He said they saw no-one, and “…we went around the blocks in Bongaree before we realised that we don’t really know what we’re going to do if we do find him and we need to get on with organising the rest of the night because we have other people we had to contact and other things to pick up and whatnot”.[20] [19] AB 113 lines 21-29. [20] AB 117 lines 22-27. [25] Cross-examination touched upon the contact Patruno had with Officer Weare.[21] He said he did not like Bribie Police.[22] Patruno accepted that his statement to police was given about two years and four months after the fire.[23] He then explained why it took so long:[24] [21] AB 79-81. Weare was the investigating officer. [22] AB 82 line 12. [23] AB 81 line 33. [24] AB 82 lines 27-33. “Because I was … under the impression that Detective Ben Weare was a part of the Bribie Island police. And, because of my personal issues with the Bribie Island police, I did not want to be, really, a part of it. Also, the fact that if somebody is capable of setting somebody’s house on fire, I was scared for my own life at the same time and did not want to get involved. And I didn’t want to bring my mum into it, because she has very high stress levels when it comes to danger like that.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is also true that Weare and others expressed a dislike of the appellant, even to the point of Weare using the word “hate” in respect of him. However, the appellant was evidently a difficult person to deal with, belligerent and threatening in terms of complaints about police conduct. His first interview with Weare and Eaton contained a number of instances where he proclaimed the success and frequency of his complaints about police behaviour in the past, and having had a police officer sacked. His reaction over the issue of who spoke to his wife first, on the night of the fire, could not endeared him to the investigating police. The real question here is whether the police officers personal views somehow impeded the quality of the investigation. For the reasons set out above I do not accept that to be so. Conclusion The jury were confronted with a dilemma which they had to resolve in terms of the assessment of the evidence overall. On the one hand they had the interviews with the appellant, in which he steadfastly denied any involvement and said that he was never in the house on that afternoon. And there was no obvious financial motive to carry out the arson. On the other hand, the expert evidence established that the explosion was as a result of vapour, it originated inside the house, and at some point the appellant’s tracksuit pants and shoes came into contact with liquid petrol. That contact with petrol could not have been as a result of the casual activities of filling a car at a service station or mowing the lawn or storing the clothes in a shed. Because the appellant did not give evidence, there was no basis upon which the jury could have concluded that any such thing was possible. Therefore, as against the appellant’s denials of involvement, and as well the lack of obvious motive, there was very powerful evidence from the scientific experts that the appellant’s shoes and tracksuit pants had been in contact with liquid petrol within hours before the items were tested.[579] What, then, is the explanation for the appellant’s having come into contact with liquid petrol on his tracksuit pants and shoes on the afternoon that his house burned down as a result of a vapour explosion. In my view, the obvious response is that the appellant was involved in distributing petrol which led to that explosion. [579] Maxwell’s evidence, based on studies by a colleague, was that the petrol residue degraded after about four hours: AB 412 lines 16-24. Further, the mere fact that the appellant’s shoes and tracksuit pants were in contact with liquid petrol that afternoon was a powerful piece of evidence compelling rejection of the appellant’s version that he was not in the house at any time that afternoon. On the appellant’s account given in the interviews there was no occasion that day when his shoes or tracksuit pants could have come into contact with liquid petrol. The two versions are simply irreconcilable, but there was compelling support for the presence of the petrol from Maxwell.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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