SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Compton [2017] QCA 55
PARTIES:
R
v
COMPTON, William John Noel
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 143 of 2016
DC No 1856 of 2016DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Ipswich – Date of Sentence: 20 May 2016DELIVERED ON:
4 April 2017
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
14 March 2017
JUDGES:
Gotterson and McMurdo JJA and Flanagan J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
The application is refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the respondent appeals against sentence – where the respondent pleaded guilty to one count of malicious act with intent (domestic violence offence) – where the respondent sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with a parole eligibility date fixed at 1 December 2018 – where the respondent was subject to two suspended sentences at the time of the commission of the offence – where, at sentencing, defence counsel and the Crown agreed as to how the sentence should be structured – where the Crown proposed, and defence counsel accepted, a head sentence of seven years – where the sentence was structured in the context that both suspended sentences be activated – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive
Criminal Law (Domestic Violence) Amendment Act 2015 (Qld), s 6
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 15Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2, considered
R v Amery[2011] QCA 383, applied
R v Cobb[2016] QCA 333, considered
R v Flew[2008] QCA 290, cited
R v Frame[2009] QCA 9, cited
R v Goodwin; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2014) 247 A Crim R 582; [2014] QCA 345, cited
R v Holland[2008] QCA 200, distinguished
R v Lowe[2001] QCA 270, considered
R v Mitchell[2006] QCA 240, distinguished
R v Oakes [2012] QCA 336, consideredCOUNSEL:
L D Reece for the applicant
C W Heaton QC for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
GOTTERSON JA: I agree with the order proposed by Flanagan J and with the reasons given by his Honour.
McMURDO JA: I agree with Flanagan J.
FLANAGAN J: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his sentence imposed in the District Court at Ipswich on 20 May 2016. The applicant was sentenced in relation to one count of malicious act with intent (domestic violence offence). The maximum penalty for this offence is life imprisonment. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment with a parole eligibility date fixed at 1 December 2018. The structure of the sentence was complicated by the fact that at the date of the commission of the offence the applicant was subject to two suspended sentences imposed by the Brisbane…
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- AGLC
- R v Compton [2017] QCA 55
- Case
- [2017] QCA 55
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. The structure of the sentence was largely urged by the respondent's counsel, and the respondent was bound by this conduct. The sentence imposed was only 11 days more than the parole eligibility date suggested by defence counsel, and approximately two months and 20 days less than the parole eligibility date proposed by the Crown prosecutor. The sentencing judge's decision to fix the parole eligibility date at 1 December 2018 was considered appropriate, given the context of the case and the submissions made by both parties.
The Court of Appeal rejected the respondent's argument that the sentence was manifestly excessive, as it was not out of step with the relevant authorities. The Court noted that the sentence imposed was in accordance with the submission put to the sentencing judge by the respondent's counsel and did not warrant interference. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
ORDERS:
The application is refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application is refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
His Honour fixed the applicant’s parole eligibility date at 1 December 2018. This was only 11 days more than the parole eligibility date submitted by defence counsel. It was approximately two months and 20 days less than the parole eligibility date submitted by the Crown prosecutor. In fixing the parole eligibility date at 1 December 2018 his Honour stated:“I take account of the period of 240 days that you’ve served, and I fix your parole eligibility as December 1, 2018. So I didn’t quite give you the full benefit that Mr Seaholme suggested but I have given you a benefit there.”[9][9]ARB 33, lines 13-19.Consideration As is apparent from the above discussion of the sentencing proceedings, the structure of the sentence by which the learned sentencing judge determined the head sentence and fixed the parole eligibility date was that largely urged by the applicant’s own counsel. The difficulty that this presents to the present application is acknowledged by the applicant.[10][10]Outline of Submissions on behalf of the applicant, paragraph 7.3. In R v Flew[11] Keane JA (as his Honour then was) identified the hurdle that an applicant for leave to appeal faces in such circumstances:“Next, it should be noted that the sentence imposed was in accordance with that proposed to the learned sentencing judge by the applicant’s Counsel. While it is true that the imposition of a just sentence is the responsibility of the sentencing judge, appeals are available to correct errors on the part of the sentencing judge, not to provide a second hearing on sentence as if the first sentence were merely provisional. When an offender seeks leave to appeal against a sentence on the ground that the sentence is manifestly excessive, it must be recognised that the ground of the application is directly contradicted by the conduct of the applicant’s case before the sentencing judge by which the applicant is bound.”[11][2008] QCA 290 at [27]. His Honour noted that where a sentence was imposed in accordance with the submission put to the sentencing judge on the offender’s behalf, an assertion that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive could be upheld only in circumstances which are sufficiently exceptional to warrant relieving the applicant from responsibility for the conduct of his case at first instance. This requirement for “exceptional circumstances” to warrant the conclusion that the applicant should not be regarded as bound by the conduct of his case in the court below was subsequently emphasised by Keane JA (with whom Muir and Fraser JJA agreed) in R v Frame.[12][12][2009] QCA 9 at [5] and [6]. The applicant submits, however, that the sentence imposed is so clearly out-of-step with the relevant authorities that this is a case in which the applicant should not be bound by the conduct of his case at first instance. This submission should not be accepted because the sentence imposed was not, in my view, manifestly excessive. The basis for the applicant’s submission that the sentence was manifestly excessive is that the learned sentencing judge was not specifically referred to the statement of Keane JA in R v Holland[13] where his Honour observed:“[T]he range of sentence which might have been imposed in a case where grievous bodily harm has been deliberately inflicted by the use of a weapon by a mature offender with a record of personal violence is between four and seven years imprisonment.”[13][2008] QCA 200 at [63].