R v Coman

Case [2020] QSC 60

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Coman [2020] QSC 60

PARTIES:

THE QUEEN
v

ELISABETH MARY COMAN

FILE NO/S:

Indictment 1458 of 2019

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

3 April 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 March 2020

JUDGE:

Burns J

VERDICT:

Count 1 – Manslaughter – Not guilty.

Count 2 – Dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death whilst adversely affected by an intoxicating substance – Not guilty.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – GENERAL MATTERS – PROCEDURE – TRIAL HAD BEFORE JUDGE WITHOUT JURY – VERDICT – where the accused made application for a judge alone trial pursuant to s 614 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) – where no jury trial orders were made pursuant to s 615 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) – where the accused was tried by a judge sitting without jury

CRIMINAL LAW – PARTICULAR OFFENCES –OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON – HOMICIDE – MANSLAUGHTER – VERDICT – where the accused was charged on indictment with manslaughter – where the accused pleaded not guilty – where the deceased died of traumatic asphyxiation after a motor vehicle driven by the accused drove over him as he lay on the ground – where the Crown alleged that the accused knew that the deceased was on the ground – where the Crown alleged that the accused deliberately drove her motor vehicle over the deceased – whether the accused intentionally drove her vehicle over the deceased – whether the accused caused the death of the deceased – whether the accused is guilty of manslaughter

CRIMINAL LAW – PARTICULAR OFFENCES – DANGEROUS DRIVING – DANGEROUS OPERATION OF A VEHICLE CAUSING DEATH WHILST INTOXICATED – VERDICT – ALTERNATIVE VERDICTS – where the accused was charged on indictment in the alternative with dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death whilst adversely affected by an intoxicating substance – where the accused pleaded not guilty – where the deceased died of traumatic asphyxiation after a motor vehicle driven by the accused drove over him as he lay on the ground – where the Crown alleged that the accused operated the motor vehicle dangerously – where the Crown alleged that the accused was grossly intoxicated with alcohol – where the Crown alleged that the accused failed to keep a proper lookout – where the Crown alleged that the accused failed to keep the motor vehicle on an established driveway – where the Crown alleged that the accused was aware of at least the possibility of the presence of the deceased – whether the accused operated the motor vehicle dangerously – whether the dangerous operation of the motor vehicle by the accused caused the death of the deceased – whether the accused is guilty of dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death whilst adversely affected by an intoxicating substance

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – MATTERS RELATIING TO PROOF – PRIMA FACIE CASE OR CASE TO ANSWER – where the accused was…

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AGLC
R v Coman [2020] QSC 60
Case
[2020] QSC 60
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Coman, the respondent, Elisabeth Mary Coman, was charged with the manslaughter of Clive Douglas Crandley and dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death whilst adversely affected by an intoxicating substance. The case was heard before the District Court of Queensland. Coman was accused of driving over Crandley, resulting in his death from traumatic asphyxiation. The Crown argued that Coman was aware of Crandley's presence on the ground and deliberately drove over him. Coman pleaded not guilty to both charges.

The court had to determine if Coman intentionally drove over Crandley, whether she caused his death, and if she was guilty of manslaughter. Additionally, the court had to decide if Coman operated the vehicle dangerously and if her intoxication contributed to the dangerous operation of the vehicle. The court also had to assess if the evidence supported a reasonable inference that Coman knew Crandley was on the ground and if she intentionally drove over him.

The court dismissed the no case submission, finding the evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Coman knew Crandley was on the ground and that she deliberately drove over him. However, the court could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Coman intended to drive over Crandley. The court found that Coman's intoxication impaired her ability to safely control her vehicle, but there was no evidence to support the inference that her intoxication was a substantial or significant cause of Crandley's death. Regarding the alternative charge, the court found that Coman was adversely affected by alcohol, but there was no evidence to support the inference that her intoxication contributed to the dangerous operation of the vehicle.

The court acquitted Coman of both manslaughter and dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death whilst adversely affected by an intoxicating substance.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I therefore dismissed the no case submission but that of course did not mean that I could, or would, be satisfied about the correctness of that inference. After all, acceptance of it would mean that I was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Coman saw Mr Crandley either go to ground or already on the ground and that, rather than stopping or driving around him (and in that way make good her escape), she chose to drive over him. That was an unlikely scenario but it was not excluded as a possibility on the evidence constituting the Crown case.The defences raised on the evidence A number of defences under the Code were raised on the evidence but, for reasons that will shortly become plain, there is no need to examine their potential operation in depth. It is sufficient instead to record which defences were raised: unforeseen consequence (s 23(1)(b)) and one of extraordinary emergency (s 25) or compulsion (s 31(1)(c) and/or s 31(1)(d)). The latter two defences could not stand together because of the opening words of s 25 which exclude its operation where the provisions of the Code relating to compulsion apply (see R v Smith [2005] 2 Qd R 69).Count 1 – Manslaughter Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a person in circumstances not amounting to murder. Before Ms Coman can be found guilty of count 1, the Crown must prove each of the following three elements of that offence beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that Mr Crandley is dead; (2) that Ms Coman killed Mr Crandley, that is, caused his death; and (3) that the killing was unlawful. As to (2), any person who causes the death of another, directly or indirectly and by any means whatever, is deemed to have killed that other person. It is enough that the accused person did an act that was a substantial or significant cause of death or which substantially contributed to it. As to (3), “unlawful” means not authorised, justified or excused by law, that is to say, by any available defences under the Code. It is not an element of the offence of manslaughter that the accused intended to kill the victim or to do him grievous bodily harm. However, as I have already made plain, the Crown case on this count was that Ms Coman knew that Mr Crandley was on the grassed area between her and the gate and that, armed with that knowledge, she deliberately drove over him. Another way of putting that proposition would be to say that the Crown alleged that Ms Coman intended to do the act that resulted in Mr Crandley’s death, although not intending by that act to kill Mr Crandley or to cause him grievous bodily harm. Therefore, before Ms Coman can be found guilty of manslaughter – and in addition to proof of the three essential ingredients of that offence – I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that she intended to drive her vehicle over Mr Crandley. Intention may be inferred or deduced from the circumstances in which Mr Crandley’s death eventuated, and from the conduct of Ms Coman before, at the time of, or after she did the act which resulted in death. In this regard, whatever Ms Coman said about her intention may be looked at for the purpose of deciding what that intention was at the relevant time.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On the other hand, Ms Coman was grossly intoxicated (0.241%) and, as she herself frankly conceded under cross-examination, her capacity to safely control her car would thereby have been impaired. But Ms Coman’s intoxication has to have causal significance before it can bear upon proof of this count. The expert evidence in that regard was that her motor and sensory abilities, visual acuity, reaction times and peripheral vision would all have been affected. It may therefore be thought possible to infer that, had she not been so intoxicated, Ms Coman may have braked sooner or swerved earlier and, further, to infer that, had she done either or both of these things, Mr Crandley’s death may have been avoided, but that would be wrong in principle. That is because there is no proper evidentiary basis to support either inference. For example, there is no evidence to the effect that a sober woman of Ms Coman’s age and abilities could have braked any earlier or swerved any sooner than Ms Coman in fact did or, perhaps more to the point, if such a person could have braked earlier or swerved sooner, whether that would have made any difference to the outcome. To conclude otherwise on the evidence in this case would be to indulge in intuition, if not outright speculation. It follows that, I could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Coman caused Mr Crandley’s death, whether in a substantial or significant sense, or at all.Count 2 – Dangerous operation causing death It is therefore necessary to consider count 2, being the alternative offence charged on the indictment: dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death whilst adversely affected by an intoxicating substance. For the reasons that follow, Ms Coman must also be acquitted with respect to this count. It is useful to set out the precise wording of count 2:“That on the twenty-eighth day of July 2018 at Wamuran in the State of Queensland, ELISABETH MARY COMAN dangerously operated a vehicle in a yard at … Newlands Rd Wamuran and caused the death of CLIVE DOUGLAS CRANDLEY.And at the time of committing the offence, ELISABETH MARY COMAN was adversely affected by an intoxicating substance.” Before Ms Coman can be found guilty of dangerously operating a vehicle causing death while adversely affected by an intoxicating substance, the Crown must prove each of the following five elements of that offence beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that Ms Coman operated a vehicle; (2) that the vehicle was operated in a yard at Newlands Road, Wamuran; (3) that Ms Coman operated the vehicle dangerously; (4) that Ms Coman thereby caused the death of Mr Crandley; and (5) that Ms Coman was adversely affected by alcohol. There was no issue at trial concerning (1), (2) or (5), and I am otherwise satisfied that those elements were proved beyond reasonable doubt. As to (5), the certificate of breath alcohol analysis tendered in evidence during the Crown case was conclusive evidence of Ms Coman’s alcohol concentration when she drove over Mr Crandley’s body and, further, conclusive evidence that she was adversely affected by alcohol at that time. But, whilst the fact that a person is adversely affected by alcohol is a circumstance relevant to the issue in (3) as to whether the person was operating a vehicle dangerously, it does not necessarily follow that he or she was doing so.