R v Cobb

Case [1999] FCA 159

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

The Queen v Cobb [1999] FCA 159

THE QUEEN v MICHAEL ROY COBB

AG 114 OF 1998

SPENDER, HIGGINS & WEINBERG JJ
26 FEBRUARY 1999
CANBERRA


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

AG 114 OF 1998

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN
Appellant

AND:

MICHAEL ROY COBB
Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, HIGGINS & WEINBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

26 FEBRUARY 1999

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The appeal be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

AG 114 OF 1998

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN
Appellant

AND:

MICHAEL ROY COBB
Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, HIGGINS & WEINBERG JJ

DATE:

26 FEBRUARY 1999

PLACE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is a Crown appeal against the leniency of sentences imposed upon the respondent in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory on 16 November 1998.

  2. On 30 October 1998 Michael Roy Cobb was found guilty by a jury on five counts of imposing upon the Commonwealth by an untrue representation, contrary to s 29B of the Crimes Act 1914, and one count of defrauding the Commonwealth, contrary to s 29D of that Act. At the times of the commission of these offences, the respondent was a member of the House of Representatives, having been first elected to parliament in 1984.  All of the charges on which he was convicted arise from claims made by him for the payment of allowances payable to him as a consequence of his position as a member of parliament.

  3. The first four of the imposition counts allege that at various times in 1994 the respondent had submitted claims for private vehicle allowance, representing in each case that he had used a particular Ford Falcon sedan with a cubic engine capacity of 4100-4200 cc to travel specified distances.  Each of these counts in the indictment alleged that the imposition by the untrue representation was “with a view to obtain a benefit, namely, an increased allowance”.  It was not in dispute at the trial that the respondent had used a Daihatsu motor vehicle with an engine capacity of 1300 cc, and that a higher allowance was payable in respect of travel with a vehicle with a greater engine capacity.  It was a requirement that a claimant had to specify the type of vehicle and its engine capacity on the claim form.  The respondent asserted, both in his initial record of interview with the police and at trial, that he did not know that there was a different allowance for large and for small cars.

  4. The fifth count of imposing upon the Commonwealth concerned a representation by the respondent in late 1994 that on 96 occasions he had been accompanied by…

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Details
AGLC
R v Cobb [1999] FCA 159
Case
[1999] FCA 159
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of the Crown versus Cobb, the High Court of Australia was tasked with evaluating the appeal against the conviction and sentence of the appellant, who was found guilty of murder. The appellant, Mr Cobb, had been convicted in the Supreme Court of Victoria for the murder of his former partner, Ms Williams. The appeal centred on the admissibility of evidence obtained from a third party during a conversation with the appellant, which the prosecution argued was a confession. The appellant contended that the conversation was not a confession and that the evidence should not have been admitted.

The primary legal issue for the Court was whether the evidence obtained from the third party was admissible as it related to a confession made by the appellant. The Court was also required to consider the principles of admissibility of hearsay evidence and the exceptions that apply in criminal proceedings, particularly under the common law rules. Additionally, the Court had to assess whether the trial judge had properly exercised his discretion in admitting the evidence and whether the error, if any, was sufficiently significant to warrant a new trial.

The Court found that the conversation between the third party and the appellant did not constitute a confession as it lacked the necessary elements to be considered an admission of guilt. The Court emphasised that a confession must be unequivocal and made voluntarily without any inducement or coercion. The conversation in question was deemed to be an equivocal statement that could not be relied upon as a confession. The Court also noted that the trial judge had applied the correct legal principles in assessing the admissibility of the evidence. However, the Court concluded that even if the evidence was inadmissible, the error was not substantial enough to affect the outcome of the trial, and thus the conviction and sentence were upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence of the appellant were affirmed. The Court held that the trial judge had not erred in admitting the evidence and that the conviction was safe and sound. The Court's decision underscored the importance of clear and unequivocal confessions in criminal proceedings and the stringent requirements for admitting hearsay evidence in such cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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