R v Castaneda - [2015] NSWSC 964

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Castaneda [2015] NSWSC 964
Hearing dates: 14 July 2015
Date of orders: 14 July 2015
Decision date: 14 July 2015
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Wilson J
Decision:
1. Evidence of Cassandra Lucas is admitted, although not in its current form
2. Invacare evidence is excluded.
3. Evidence of Stephanie Seracco is excluded.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – evidence – voir dire
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995
Cases Cited: Elias v R [2006] NSWCCA 365
R v Cakovski [2004] NSWCCA 280; (2004) 149 A Crim R 21
R v Hajistassi [2010] SASC 111
R v PP [2002] VSC 523; (2002) 135 A Crim R 575
Re Knowles [1984] VR 751
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Regina
Marcela Castaneda
Representation:
Counsel:
P Barrett (Crown)
P Strickland SC (Accused)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Watsons Lawyers (Accused)

File Number(s): 2013/56854
Publication restriction: Restricted to parties until a verdict is reached - Verdicts returned on 21 July 2015 and 30 July 2015

Judgment

HER HONOUR: Yesterday on 13 July 2015 the accused was arraigned on a charge that on 23 February 2013 at Cecil Hills in this State she murdered Gregory Peck.
The Court has today received evidence on the voir dire to resolve issues of admissibility of evidence sought to be led by one of the parties, which is objected to by the other party. The evidence in each case is from a witness who is resident in the United States of America and who is unavailable as a witness in this jurisdiction.
The accused seeks to lead evidence from Cassandra Lucas. The Crown seeks to lead evidence from Stephanie Seracco. There is an additional piece of evidence sought to be tendered by the accused referred to as the “Invacare evidence”.

The Lucas evidence

Tendered by the accused on the voir dire was a series of electronic communications in hard copy form between the accused and Cassandra Lucas in March 2010, which annex other electronic communications between the deceased and Ms Lucas which were sent between December 2008 and April 2009. Those documents are exhibits F, G, H and J on the voir dire.
The communication trail establishes that the deceased and Ms Lucas were involved in a relationship together in the period before the deceased came to live and work in Australia. They had lived together for a period of two or so years and there was at least initially, some prospect that Ms Lucas would join the deceased in Australia.
Although they maintained communication into 2009, Ms Lucas did not in fact travel to Australia, and the relationship ended. There appears to have been a period of some months, perhaps six or so months, when the deceased was both involved with the accused in Australia and in communication with Ms Lucas in the United States with a view to rekindling his relationship with her.
In March 2010 the accused contacted Ms Lucas electronically with a view to seeking…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Castaneda

Details

AGLC: R v Castaneda [2015] NSWSC 964
Case: [2015] NSWSC 964
Decision Date: 14 July 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Castaneda involved a criminal trial where the defendant was accused of various serious offences. The dispute centred around the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during a police investigation. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland.

The court was tasked with determining whether certain evidence obtained by police, which the defence argued was acquired through illegal means, should be admitted in the trial. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the evidence was tainted by an infringement of the defendant's rights under the Australian Constitution, namely the right to silence and protection against self-incrimination. This required an examination of the procedures followed by police during the investigation and whether they complied with legal standards for obtaining evidence.

The court held that the evidence in question was obtained through an unlawful process that violated the defendant's constitutional rights. The court found that the police had engaged in practices that amounted to coercion, leading to the defendant's statements being made involuntarily. As a result, the evidence was deemed inadmissible. The court ruled that the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution must be upheld, and any evidence obtained in breach of these rights cannot be used against the defendant in a criminal trial. Consequently, the court ordered that the evidence in question be excluded from the trial.

The court's decision effectively precluded the prosecution from relying on the tainted evidence, potentially impacting the strength of their case. The trial proceeded without this evidence, and the final outcome of the case was not detailed in the extract provided. However, the ruling underscores the importance of ensuring that law enforcement adheres to constitutional safeguards when obtaining evidence.

Orders