R v Campbell - [2009] HCATrans 49

[2009] HCATrans 049

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S465 of 2008

B e t w e e n -
THE QUEEN
Applicant
and
BELINDA MARY CAMPBELL
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 13 MARCH 2009, AT 10.25 AM

MS W.J. ABRAHAM, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.K. JORDAN, for the applicant. (instructed by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)

MR T.A. GAME, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent with MR R.J. BROMWICH. (instructed by Giddy & Crittenden)

GUMMOW J: Yes, Ms Abraham.

MS ABRAHAM: Your Honour, the special leave question that arises here is the interpretation of the word “imports” as it appears in section 307 of the Criminal Code. In particular, in my submission, this application focuses on the latest point of time at which that physical element had been completed. It is a question, with respect, that this Court clearly has not considered earlier. The court here concluded that there was a test and it appears in paragraph 128 of the chief justice’s judgment, application book 131. The effect of the test that has been imposed ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J: What paragraph?

MS ABRAHAM: Paragraph 128. The effect of the test that he has imposed is that importing is complete when it gets to a stage – the goods are delivered to a point where they would remain in Australia.

GUMMOW J: What were the particular facts here that you say fall within your construction of the expression?

MS ABRAHAM: Your Honours, after the accused gave evidence she put forward a scenario contrary to what she had done originally. The Crown case fundamentally throughout was she was aware that the goods were being imported before they came to the country. During her evidence she gave explanations for various answers in an interview but said, “In any event, when the goods arrived at my place” – her premises, she became aware that they were the drugs and she then organised for somebody to pick the goods up, the drugs up.

So the Crown says when the arrests were then made just shortly thereafter, the arrests were made of the persons who picked the drugs up and, indeed, the respondent - at that stage the importation was continuing, it did not cease until at least then.

GUMMOW J: It did not cease until ‑ ‑ ‑

MS ABRAHAM: At least the time of the arrests because the goods had not got to their destination, the person they were intended for. She was, in effect, part of a process – if that is the right word. She received the goods and she did forward those goods on, and on her own evidence her admission to that, in the applicant’s submission, was enough.

GUMMOW J:

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Campbell

Details

AGLC: R v Campbell [2009] HCATrans 49
Case: [2009] HCATrans 49
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *R v Campbell* concerned an appeal by the applicant, Campbell, against his conviction for the offence of conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of a border-controlled drug. The prosecution alleged that Campbell had conspired with others to import cocaine into Australia. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence obtained by law enforcement agencies.

The High Court was required to determine whether the evidence obtained from the applicant's mobile phone, which had been seized pursuant to a search warrant, was admissible in the criminal proceedings. Specifically, the court considered whether the search and seizure of the phone, and the subsequent extraction and use of its contents, were lawful under the relevant provisions of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) and the common law. A key issue was whether the police had exceeded their powers in seizing the phone and accessing its data.

The High Court held that the seizure of the mobile phone was lawful under section 3L of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth), which permits the seizure of evidential material. However, the court found that the subsequent accessing and use of the data contained within the phone went beyond the scope of the powers conferred by the warrant and the Act. The majority reasoned that while the warrant authorised the seizure of the phone as an item likely to afford evidence, it did not authorise the wholesale examination of its contents without further justification. This principle underscored the importance of adhering strictly to the statutory limitations on police powers of search and seizure, even when dealing with potentially incriminating evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was quashed. The High Court ordered that the evidence obtained from the mobile phone be excluded from use in any retrial.

Orders