R v Blockey

Case [2021] QCA 77


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Blockey [2021] QCA 77

PARTIES:

R
v
BLOCKEY, Renee Helen
(applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 250 of 2020
SC No 154 of 2020

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Sentence Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 5 November 2020 (Bond J)

DELIVERED ON:

21 April 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 April 2021

JUDGES:

Sofronoff P and McMurdo JA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

1.   Leave to appeal against sentence be granted.

2.   The appeal against sentence be allowed.

3.   The parole eligibility date of 22 January 2022 be set aside.

4.   The applicant be eligible for parole on 22 April 2021.

5.   The sentence be otherwise confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of manslaughter, being a domestic violence offence – where the applicant was convicted and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment – where a parole eligibility date was set after serving three years and nine months’ imprisonment – whether there was a misapplication of sentencing principles – whether the requirement that the applicant serve three years and nine months in actual custody was manifestly excessive

COUNSEL:

S Lewis for the applicant
D Nardone for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. THE COURT:  On 27 October 2020, the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of manslaughter, being a domestic violence offence.

  2. On 5 November 2020, the applicant was convicted and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment.  A parole eligibility date was set after serving three years and nine months’ imprisonment.

  3. The applicant seeks leave to appeal that sentence.  The sole ground of appeal, should leave be granted, is that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

  4. The applicant does not contend the sentence of nine years was manifestly excessive.  Manifest excess is said to arise by reason of the requirement that she serve more than one third of that sentence in actual custody.

    Offence

  5. The offence was committed on 23 April 2018.  The applicant stabbed the deceased with a hunting knife.  That action, inflicted with a moderate to severe degree of force, caused a 16 centimetre deep single stab wound below the deceased’s left collar bone.  Death was caused by acute circulatory failure, respiratory failure and hypervolemic shock due to blood loss.

  6. The deceased and the applicant had been in a domestic relationship for some months prior to his death.  During that relationship, the deceased had committed acts of domestic violence against the applicant.  He was the subject of a domestic violence protection order.

  7. The relationship was characterised by irrational jealousy on the part of the deceased and complaints by the applicant about the deceased taking property and money.  There was evidence that the applicant had, in the month before the death, told an acquaintance that, if the deceased continued to accuse her of sleeping…

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R v Blockey [2021] QCA 77
Case
[2021] QCA 77
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Blockey, the applicant was convicted of manslaughter, specifically a domestic violence offence, and was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed against the sentence, arguing that the requirement to serve three years and nine months in actual custody was manifestly excessive. The appeal centred on whether the sentencing judge had misapplied sentencing principles, particularly by tempering the applicant's cooperation with her plea of guilty with her failure to provide comprehensive details about the stabbing. The court had to determine if the parole eligibility date set after serving three years and nine months was appropriate.

The legal issues involved whether the sentence warranted a parole eligibility date set after one third of the sentence or at another time, considering the specific circumstances of the case. It was also necessary to examine whether the sentencing judge correctly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors. The court held that the sentencing judge had carefully considered the circumstances but misapplied sentencing principles by tempering the applicant's cooperation with her failure to provide detailed information about the stabbing. The court found that there was no obligation on the applicant to provide such details, given her guilty plea.

The court concluded that while the sentence of nine years' imprisonment was appropriate, the parole eligibility date set after serving three years and nine months was excessive. The applicant's sincere remorse and significant steps towards rehabilitation, along with her timely plea of guilty, supported a parole eligibility date fixed after serving only three years. The court granted leave to appeal against the sentence, allowed the appeal, set aside the parole eligibility date, and fixed the new date for parole eligibility on 22 April 2021. The sentence of nine years' imprisonment was otherwise confirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal against sentence be granted.

2. The appeal against sentence be allowed.

3. The parole eligibility date of 22 January 2022 be set aside.

4. The applicant be eligible for parole on 22 April 2021.

5. The sentence be otherwise confirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant submits that the requirement that the applicant serve three years and nine months in actual custody was manifestly excessive, having regard to the circumstances, and that the sentencing Judge erred in finding that the applicant’s cooperation was to be tempered by the applicant having falsely sought to initially implicate the deceased in the infliction of his own injuries and by the applicant’s failure to provide any reliable, comprehensive details of the stabbing.Consideration Whether a sentence warrants mitigation reflecting a parole eligibility date set after one third of a sentence or at some other time, always turns on the particular circumstances of an individual case.[5] Further, the weight to be given to factors in the sentencing process is inherently a matter for the sentencing Judge.[5]R v Crouch; R v Carlisle [2016] QCA 81 at [29]; R v Rooney; R v Gehringer [2016] QCA 48 at [16]. A review of the sentencing Judge’s reasons evidenced a careful approach to both the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating factors when affixing the sentence of nine years’ imprisonment. The applicant, whilst pleading guilty, had committed a serious offence involving the loss of life through the use of a knife. However, the sentencing Judge’s conclusion that the applicant’s cooperation was tempered by her failure to provide any comprehensive, reliable detail concerning the stabbing was inconsistent with the sentencing Judge’s conclusion that the material was insufficient to justify a finding that the applicant “engaged in consciously-informed obfuscation or denial”[6] designed to minimise culpability.[6]AB114/45-46. There was no obligation on the applicant to provide a comprehensive, detailed account of the sequence of events concerning the stabbing; the applicant had accepted unlawfully causing the victim’s death by stabbing him when she pleaded guilty to his manslaughter. Against that background, a finding that the applicant’s cooperation in entering a timely plea of guilty, was to be tempered by her failure to provide such an account evidenced a misapplication of sentencing principles, particularly where, as here, there was an acceptance that the applicant was sincerely remorseful for her conduct. That being so, it is necessary to re-exercise the sentencing discretion. For the reasons previously given, a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment properly reflected the applicant’s criminality. However, the applicant’s sincere and obvious remorse, and her significant steps towards rehabilitation against a background of a timely plea of guilty, support a conclusion that the applicant ought to receive a parole eligibility date fixed after having served three years of that sentence.Orders We would order:(1)Leave to appeal against sentence be granted.(2)The appeal against sentence be allowed.(3)The parole eligibility date of 22 January 2022 be set aside.(4)The applicant be eligible for parole on 22 April 2021.(4)The sentence be otherwise confirmed.