SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v BEU [2025] QCA 155
PARTIES:
R
v
BEU
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 225 of 2024
DC No 2380 of 2022DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 19 September 2024 (Porter KC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
26 August 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
12 May 2025
JUDGES:
Bowskill CJ, Bradley JA and Callaghan J
ORDER:
1. The application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed on counts 1 and 2 is granted and the appeal against those sentences is allowed.
2. The sentences imposed at first instance on counts 1 and 2 are varied by substituting an operational period of 18 months.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under care – where the applicant was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for each of counts 1 and 2 and six months imprisonment for count 3, to be served concurrently – where the sentences imposed for counts 1 and 2 were ordered to be suspended, after six months, for an operational period of five years – whether the operational period of five years rendered the sentence manifestly excessive – whether the application for leave to appeal against the sentence should be granted
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 9, s 144, s 145
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, cited
Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; [1984] HCA 46, applied
R v Hartnett[2001] QCA 512, cited
R v Tilley (1991) 53 A Crim R 1, considered
Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458; [1979] HCA 7, cited
Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14, citedCOUNSEL:
D V Nguyen for the applicant
S R O’Rourke for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Craven Lawyers for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
THE COURT: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against the sentences imposed on him for three counts of indecent treatment of a child under the age of 16 in circumstances where the child was under his care.
The then 68 year old applicant’s son was in a relationship with the mother of the 12 year old complainant, who called the applicant “granddad”.
In January 2022 all were living in the applicant’s house. The complainant’s mother and the applicant’s son went away for a long weekend and left the complainant in the care of the applicant.
On the morning of 31 January, the applicant began giving the complainant a massage on her back. The complainant agreed to have her bra removed for the massage to continue. After turning her over such that she was lying on her back, the applicant started sucking on her…
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- AGLC
- R v Beu [2025] QCA 155
- Case
- [2025] QCA 155
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the sentence imposed by the lower court was manifestly excessive or inadequate. The applicant argued that the operational period of five years rendered the sentence manifestly excessive, whereas the Crown contended that the sentence was appropriate given the nature of the offences. The court had to consider whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or inadequate, particularly in light of the operational period specified in the suspended sentence order.
The court examined the history and legislative context of suspended sentences, noting the evolution of the concept from the Offenders Probation Act of 1886 to the current Penalties and Sentences Act 1992. The court found that the operational period of five years did not render the sentence manifestly excessive. It held that the sentence was appropriate in the circumstances, and the argument that it might have been lower did not necessarily mean that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court concluded that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive, and the application for leave to appeal against the sentence was rejected.
The court made an order granting the application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed on counts 1 and 2, allowing the appeal against those sentences, and varying the sentences imposed at first instance on counts 1 and 2 by substituting an operational period of 18 months.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed on counts 1 and 2 is granted and the appeal against those sentences is allowed.
2. The sentences imposed at first instance on counts 1 and 2 are varied by substituting an operational period of 18 months.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It can be dealt with at once. The Court was referred to some cases[1] which were said to make it “arguable” that the sentence might have been lower. Even if that was the case, it would not mean that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, and it was not. This ground is rejected.[1]R v SDX[No 2] [2024] QCA 78; R v MDG [2020] QCA 113; R v SDF [2018] QCA 316; R v Nelson [2018] QCA 53; R v Horvath [2014] QCA 344; R v CBI [2013] QCA 186.Operational periods This application was heard on the same day as the application made by R v Pacaci [2025] QCA 154. These cases required some conceptual consideration of suspended sentences, and the following observations (in [18] – [54]) are applicable to both.History The history of suspended sentences in Queensland traces at least to the Offenders Probation Act of 1886. Section 3(2) of that Act applied to first offenders or those whose only offence had been a crime punishable by no more than three months imprisonment. A court sentencing such an offender could suspend the execution of the sentence, on terms, “for a period from the date of the sentence equal to the term of the sentence, or if the term of the sentence is less than twelve months, then for the period of twelve months.”[2][2]Underlining added. An amended form of s 3(2) appeared as s 682 in Sir Samuel Griffith’s draft[3] and in 1901 was enacted as s 656 of the Criminal Code. It applied to offenders with no or minor criminal history and if the notional term of imprisonment did not exceed three years. It contemplated only the suspension of the whole of the term of imprisonment imposed,[4] and it remained the case that what we now call the “operational period” could run only for a period “equal to the term of the sentence.”[3]Griffith, Sir Samuel Walker, Draft of a code of criminal law: prepared for the Government of Queensland; together with an explanatory letter to the Attorney-General, a table of contents, and a table of the statutory provisions proposed to be superseded by the code (Government Printer, 1897) (Qld). Notes describe the procedure as an “indulgence…” but that was said in the context of a statute which made provision for whipping, sentences being served in irons and the death penalty.[4]A more elaborate version, which amongst other things allowed for partial suspension of a term of imprisonment, was created by the insertion of s 656(2A) in 1943 but this was removed in 1971. These amendments added no new learning about operational periods. In 1992, s 656 was removed and replaced upon enactment of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (the Act), which introduced, in Part 8, the concept of suspended sentences as it is understood today.Section 144 Section 144 of the Act provides:“144 Sentence of imprisonment may be suspended(1)If a court sentences an offender to imprisonment for 5 years or less, it may order that the term of imprisonment be suspended.(2)An order under subsection (1) may be made only if the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances.(3)An order under subsection (1) may suspend the whole or a part of the term of imprisonment.(4)A court must not suspend a term of imprisonment if it is satisfied, having regard to the provisions of this Act, that it would be appropriate in the circumstances that the offender be imprisoned for the term of imprisonment imposed.(5)The court must state an operational period during which the offender must not commit another offence punishable by imprisonment if the offender is to avoid being dealt with under section 146 for the suspended sentence.(6)The operational period starts on the day the order is made and must be—(a) not less than the term of imprisonment imposed; and(b) not more than 5 years.”[5][5]Section 144 has been amended only once since its enactment and has been in this form since 1993.